Mitigate denial of service attacks in mobile ad-hoc networks by Alsumayt, A
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MITIGATE DENIAL OF SERVICE  
ATTACKS IN MOBILE AD-HOC 
NETWORKS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ALBANDARI ALSUMAYT 
 
 
 
 
 
A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of 
Nottingham Trent University for the degree of  
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
School of Science and Technology 
Nottingham Trent University 
 
 
 
March 2017 
  ii 
A Copyright statement  
 
 
 
"This work is the intellectual property of the author. You may copy up to 5% of this work 
for private study, or personal, non-commercial research. Any re-use of the information 
contained within this document should be fully referenced, quoting the author, title, 
university, degree level and pagination. Queries or requests for any other use, or if a more 
substantial copy is required, should be directed in the owner(s) of the Intellectual Property 
Rights.” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  iii 
Acknowledgment 
 
First and foremost, I would like to thank almighty Allah (God) who gave me 
the power, patience, health, environment and people to support me during my PhD 
study, and blessed me in completing this research.  
In addition, I would like to express my deepest gratitude towards my Director 
of Study, Dr John Haggerty, for all his advice, valuable support, guidance, 
constructive comments, patience, kind encouragement, time and knowledge, which 
he provided during my study and without which I would never have reached this 
stage.   
 I would like to sincerely thank my co-supervisor, Professor Ahmad Lotfi, for 
all his advice, guidance and support during my study at the university.  
I would like especially to thank my husband, Sattam, for all his help, endless 
love, support, patience and continuous encouragement during my study, without 
which the research could not have been completed. I am truly thankful and indebted 
to my beloved three kids Lyan, Abdullah, and Reem for all their patience, pure love 
and their innocent smiles which have helped me forget me my tiredness during the 
writing of this thesis.  
I would like to thank my closest family members for their love and support. 
My mum, no words can be enough to ever thank her. I would say thank you for 
your love, taking care of my children and all your help during this study. My father, 
thank you for your advice and support. My sweet sisters, I would say thank you for 
everything, love, and encouraging me to strive towards excellence.  In particular, I 
want to thank my sister Monirah, as she visits me regularly and has cheered me up 
and supported me in my hard times. 
I would also like to extend my sincere thanks to my friends in Manchester, 
Nottingham, and Saudi Arabia for their understanding, help, love and support 
during these years of study.  
I would also like to thank my uncle, Saad; although he passed away in 2013, I 
wish he were still here today. He encouraged me to achieve at this level, and I will 
always be grateful for his advice, support, and love. Last but not least, I thank my 
father-in-law, Abdullah, who recently passed away. I very much wish that he were 
among us today, as he was a constant source of hope and advice.  
 
  iv 
Abstract 
 
Wireless networks are proven to be more acceptable by users compared with wired 
networks for many reasons, namely the ease of setup, reduction in running cost, and ease 
of use in different situations such as disasters recovery. A Mobile ad-hoc network 
(MANET) is as an example of wireless networks. MANET consists of a group of hosts 
called nodes which can communicate freely via wireless links. MANET is a dynamic 
topology, self-configured, non-fixed infrastructure, and does not have any central 
administration that controls all nodes among the network.  Every device, used in day-to-
day living, is assumed to be a network device, and it is managed using Internet Protocols 
(IP). Information on every electronic device is collected using infrared sensors, voice or 
video sensors, Radio-Frequency Identification (RFID), etc.  The new wireless networks 
and communications paradigm known as Internet of Things (IoT) is introduced which 
refers to the range of multiple interconnected devices which communicate and exchange 
data between one another.  
MANET becomes prone to many attacks mainly due to its specifications and challenges 
such as limited bandwidth, nodes mobility and limited energy. This research study focuses 
specifically on detecting Denial of Service attack (DoS) in MANET. The main purpose of 
DoS attack is to deprive legitimate users from using their authenticated services such as 
network resources. Thus, the network performance would degrade and exhaust the network 
resources such as computing power and bandwidth considerably which lead the network to 
be deteriorated.  
Therefore, this research aims to detect DoS attacks in both Single MANET (SM) and Multi 
MANETs (MM). A novel Monitoring, Detection, and Rehabilitation (MrDR) method is 
proposed in order to detect DoS attack in MANET. The proposed method is incorporating 
trust concept between nodes. Trust value is calculated in each node to decide whether the 
node is trusted or not. To address the problem when two or more MANETs merge to 
become one big MANET, the novel technique of  Merging Using MrDR (MUMrDR) is 
also applied to detect DoS attack.  As the mobility of nodes in MANET, the chance of 
MANETs merge or partition occurs.  Both centralised and decentralised trust concepts are 
used to deal with IP address conflict and the merging process is completed by applying the 
MUMrDR method to detect DoS attacks in MM. The simulation results validate the 
effectiveness in the proposed method to detect different DoS attacks in both SM and MM.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
 
 
 
The current wireless network technology revolution has occurred due to the 
implementation and availability of many wireless devices in different sectors, such 
as in the military arena, at conferences and in cafes. A wireless network enables two 
or more computers to connect with each other without using cables. There are many 
types and modes of wireless network communication, each of which has a different 
architecture. Available architectures include ad-hoc, peer-to-peer, infrastructure, Wi-
Fi, and WiMAX.  
A wireless ad-hoc network involves a set of mobile devices, or hosts that can 
connect to each other wirelessly with no requirement for access, or centralised 
points. This network type can be employed as long as the devices are both within a 
specified range. The devices can connect and share data via radio waves. A Mobile 
Ad-hoc Network (MANET) is one type of ad-hoc network and it is the focus of this 
research. Due to the nature of MANETs, they are prone to many attacks, such as 
Denial of Service (DoS) attacks.  
This chapter outlines the problem addressed by this research, the aims and 
objectives of this research, and thesis novel contributions.   
 
1.1 Problem definition  
 
MANET is a temporary, self-configuring, wireless network that consists of 
nodes, which can communicate with each other without any fixed infrastructure. 
MANET has a dynamic topology, meaning nodes can move in and out of the 
network frequently without any previous announcement. As such, nodes can move 
independently in any direction. Nodes can refer to smart phones, tablets, MP3 
players, iPads, personal computers, or even laptops. In addition, nodes in MANET 
do not have a central administration point (Jain and Buksh, 2016).  
Instead, each node in MANET behaves as a router and a host by sending and 
receiving packets. As such, each node can communicate separately with each other 
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node and may provide services to, or act as a client, with other network entities. 
MANET has received much interest as it is easy to use and setting-up the network 
architecture is not complex. For example, it can be used in emergency relief 
situations, such as search, disasters, and rescue, military services, such as use in 
transport and by soldiers, civilian usage, such as at airports, conferences, cafes, 
lectures and planes, and personal usage, such as personal laptops, wrist watches, and 
smart phones (Agrawal and Chauhan, 2015). This type of network is increasingly 
important with society’s move towards Internet of Things (IoT) computing. Detailed 
of IoT paradigm will be presented in Chapter 3. 
Due to the nature of MANET, many security concerns and challenges have 
been raised. MANET contains a number of flaws that make it an easy target for 
attackers. First, as each node can communicate with each other node separately, 
there is no central computer capable of monitoring the entire network and ensuring 
correct behaviours by participants. Second, nodes can move arbitrarily. As such, the 
topology changes unpredictably and frequently. Third, each node needs energy to 
communicate with another node. This means that power constrains are a significant 
concern in MANET. Scalability is another concern in MANET as each node can 
access the network and also leave dependently. As such, the number of nodes within 
the network often changes and is unpredictable and particularly the case as MANETs 
merge. The fifth issue is that the bandwidth in MANET is constrained compared to 
other wireless networks, and the links between variables have a low capacity. 
 Wireless networks are vulnerable to many problems, such as interference, 
external noise, and signal effects. All of these factors mean that MANET is 
vulnerable to numerous internal and external attacks. For example, eavesdropping, 
fabrication, and DoS attacks can occur in MANET due to these vulnerabilities. The 
aim of these attacks differs and requires different responses from the security 
services to ensure the maintenance of Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability 
(CIA) (Conti and Giordano, 2014).  More details about CIA are provided in Chapter 
2. 
There are many security services that are required from MANET and any 
other network. Confidentiality, integrity, availability, non-repudiation, authorisation 
and authentication are the main security services that are required for a 
communications system to be considered safe. Confidentiality ensures that the 
transmitted data is only read at the intended destination, thus protecting transmitted 
data from eavesdropping. Integrity protects the transmitted message from 
Introduction 
 
 3 
modification by adversaries, meaning that only the intended recipients can edit the 
data. Availability ensures that the data is available whenever the legitimate users 
need to access it. In addition, it ensures that data can be transmitted from the source 
to the target destination promptly (Berman and Mukherjee, 2006).  
The most critical and crucial type of attack in modern society is known as a 
DoS (Malhotra et al., 2013).  In this research, the focus is specifically on this type of 
attack. DoS attacks paralyse, deprive and disrupt the availability of the network, 
thereby preventing legitimate users from accessing the services. Also, this kind of 
attack reduces the performance of the network and can cause harm in many ways, 
both financially and in terms of resources (Patel and Sharma, 2013). For example, if 
the MANET connects to the Internet (connected MANET) and one of the most 
popular sites, such as Amazon or eBay, is subject to a DoS attack, even for a short 
time, the financial losses would be huge (Lotfy and Azer, 2013). Moreover, DoS 
attacks are a severe problem because many users may not realise that they are under 
attack, instead thinking that the delay is merely the result of network congestion 
(Ponsam and Srinivasan, 2014).  
Distributed DoS (DDoS) attacks utilise many devices such as botnets or 
zombies as well as multiple Internet connections to launch an attack, whereas DoS 
attacks are launched by employing a single device and a single Internet connection 
(Sharma et al., 2013a).  In this thesis, DoS and DDoS are used interchangeably. 
It will be demonstrated later on in this thesis that, traditional approaches to 
mitigate DoS attacks in fixed-wire networks cannot be applied to MANET due to 
certain characteristics it presents.  There are many methods that can be used to detect 
a DoS attack in MANET, such as distributed firewalls, filtering, IDS (Intrusion 
Detection System) and so on. The majority of existing methods used to detect DoS 
attacks have advantages and disadvantages. For example, there are some limitations 
in the use of distributed firewalls because of the vulnerabilities of host networks. 
Essentially, if users do not keep systems up to date, some complex systems can 
succeed in launching an attack that firewalls are unable to distinguish from normal 
traffic (Alicherry et al., 2008). These existing methods with their advantages and 
disadvantages are illustrated in detail in Chapter 4. 
The use of ‘trust concepts’ to detect DoS attacks in MANET are studied in 
this research. The proposed method is called MrDR (Monitoring, Detection, and 
Rehabilitation) and it is used in this research to detect DoS attacks in both Single 
MANET (SM) and Multiple MANET (MM) systems. MM systems refer to those 
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with two merged MANETs as well as those with more than two MANETs.  This 
method relies on the use of the trust concept between nodes in order to detect DoS 
attacks in the early stages. Monitoring the network ensures that any irregular activity 
is detected as early as possible. Detection identifies misbehaving nodes and 
determines whether they are malicious or selfish. Rehabilitation refers to the return 
of the network to a secure state. In order to achieve this system’s goals, this approach 
recognises the issues discussed above, and uses a trust-based approach to mitigate 
DoS attacks in MANETs. 
The Merging Using MrDR (MUMrDR) method will be used to detect DoS 
attacks when merging multiple MANETs. Two situations will be discussed in this 
thesis: merging two MANETs; and merging four MANETs. The reason why these 
numbers are selected is due to the fact that two which are related to any standard 
networks and four MANETs reflects the situation when there are more than two 
networks while this number can be increased by five, six, or more networks. 
According to the trust concept, MUMrDR would detect DoS attacks when merging 
MANETs. Another issue that must be considered is whether the IP addresses in the 
network are unique after merging. Centralised and decentralised trust concepts are 
used to help MM to merge in this study.  
 
 
1.2 Research aims and objectives 
 
The aim of this research project is to investigate and recommend a novel method 
for the identification of DoS, specifically in MANET. The two types of MANET discussed 
above, SM and MM will be considered in this research. This method will implement the 
trust concept in an effort to encourage cooperation between nodes to detect, respond, and 
rehabilitate the network following an attack. Furthermore, this method rehabilitates 
misbehaving nodes in an attempt to reuse them, which could drastically increase the 
performance of the network.  
In order to achieve the above aim, the following project objectives are identified: 
 To study and understand the nature of MANET and its security challenges and 
vulnerabilities. The research will focus on DoS attacks in particular in order to 
determine how they occur, the various types, and the threat they pose to MANET 
architecture, resources, and users.  
Introduction 
 
 5 
 To critically evaluate existing countermeasures used to identify DoS attacks on 
MANET and identify their advantages and disadvantages. This will highlight any 
flaws in the existing detection methods.  
 To design and implement a novel method for the early identification of DoS attacks 
in both SM and MM, acknowledging the disadvantages of existing methods.  
 To evaluate the proposed novel method in an effort to establish its strengths and 
weaknesses, particularly with respect to SM, under various types of DoS attack. 
 To compare the performance of the proposed method with existing methods using 
the trust concept to detect DoS attacks on SM.  
 To use the trust concept to assign IP addresses on MM. 
 To test the proposed method in MM where two MANETs merge, and in MM where 
more than two MANETs merge. This is the first attempt to use the trust concept to 
detect DoS attacks during the merger of MM. 
 
1.3 Thesis contributions 
 
There are four novel contributions to this research. First, the MrDR method is 
used to detect DoS attacks in SM. This method involves calculating the trust value for each 
node in the network. However, this value is short-lived and needs to be recalculated each 
time the node displays a different behaviour. This method enables detection and response 
to attacks in a timely manner whilst preserving network, coup, and power resources. In 
addition, this method allows rehabilitation of the network following an attack, to mitigate 
the resultant damage. Rehabilitation is important in MANETs, with their dynamic 
topology, as nodes cannot be continuously of a single value.  
Second, the trust values of nodes will be used to assign IP addresses in the network 
when new nodes join or when networks merge. Thus, IP conflict would be controlled in a 
MANET as the trust value of each node would be continuously updated and all 
information, such as vacant IP addresses, would be up to date. It is important to emphasise 
that this is the first work that presents this trust concept to assign IP addresses in during 
MM merger.  
Third, the Merging Using MrDR (MUMrDR) method will be used to detect a type 
of DoS attacks when two MANETS merge. Many factors need to be considered in this 
situation, such as assigning IP addresses and ascertaining that there is no IP conflict after 
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merging. This is the first work to use the trust concept to detect DoS attack when merging 
two MANETs. Centralised trust concept will be used in this situation.  
Fourth, the MUMrDR method will be used to detect four types of DoS attacks 
when four MANETs are about to merge. Decentralised trust concept will be used in this 
scenario to complete the merging process. Again, this is the first work to use the trust 
concept to detect DoS attacks when more than two MANETs merge. These contributions 
provide protection during attacks on MANETs. 
The MrDR method is considered novel for many reasons. First, trust has only two 
values: trusted (= 1) and untrusted (= 0). This is the first method known to assume this 
concept as a binary (trusted =1 or untrusted =0).  The reason for why there are only two 
values of trust in the proposed method rather than a continuous value in a range is to safe 
the power of nodes in MANET as MANET has limited energy; therefore, the node can be 
trusted or not. Second, this method uses different values to calculate the total trust value. 
Because many challenges exist in MANETs – such as dynamic topology, non-fixed 
infrastructure, and the absence of central administration – calculated trust must be based on 
many factors. Another novel component is that trust is defined as a temporal action, which 
needs to be calculated regularly. Nodes in MANET move in and out of the network 
frequently. Trust values therefore need to be recalculated regularly. The rehabilitation of 
misbehaving nodes will be considered in this study as nodes cannot always be trusted in an 
environment such as MANET with its dynamic topology.  
The ability of this method to detect many different types of DoS attack in the 
MANET environment – both SM and MM – is also novel.  It is worth noting that no 
previous method has been capable of detecting DoS attacks when two or more MANETs 
are about to merge. In such an environment it is vital that the MANET is able to detect 
misbehaving nodes in real time, as nodes can enter and exit the network frequently. In 
addition, this method is heuristic, allowing it to monitor the network in numerous possible 
scenarios, such as the merging of two or more MANETs.  
 
1.4 Chapters summaries 
 
The research in this thesis is organised into eight chapters. Every chapter starts with 
a brief introduction that highlights the main overview and what is going to be discussed in 
the chapter. At the end of each chapter, a brief summary is presented. The next seven 
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chapters contain more detailed information about the history of this research and how the 
contributions are presented in different aspects. Figure 1.1 illustrates how the thesis is 
structured and how the chapters are connected.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter two (Computer and Network security in Literature)- 
In this chapter, computer and network security are defined. Increased use of 
wireless networks has led to an increase in security threats. Security services refer to the 
CIA Triad, as well as Authentication and Non-Repudiation (or Accountability). These 
services are essential in ensuring that effective security is implemented. MANET, an 
example of a wireless network, has been controversial due to its uncomplicated nature. As 
such, security in wireless networks such as MANET is important because there is no 
central administration to monitor all devices or nodes within the network. Security threats 
Figure 1.1. Thesis structure. 
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against wireless networks, such as DoS attacks, could lead to a loss in revenue, time and 
reputation.  
Chapter three (Mobile ad-hoc network (MANET)- 
Chapter three gives a detailed explanation and definition of MANET itself, such as 
its history, features and the routing protocols used in it. Three types of routing protocol are 
used in MANET and are different in their performance and usage. Due to the ease of 
infrastructure, MANET is used in many sectors such as disaster relief situations. However, 
due to the special characteristics of MANET, it is also vulnerable to many attacks. The 
security challenges are discussed briefly in this chapter. In addition, attacks types based on 
their location or on their performance are debated. The definition of a DoS attack is also 
presented and how this attack takes place is also explained. Different DoS attacks 
according to the different layers in the TCP/IP model are also discussed, along with attack 
definitions.  A definition and description of IoT is also outlined in this chapter. 
Chapter four (Research Gap in Denial of Service Attack)- 
This chapter provides and discusses the comprehensive review of relevant work in 
this area based on three dimensions: traditional methods to detect DoS attacks in MANET, 
methods which are based on trust concept to detect DoS attacks in MANET, and IP 
address configuration methods in MANET. Thus, this area includes a broad range of topics 
worth investigating and comparing in terms of their performance. Identifying the 
advantages and disadvantages of the available literature helps to improve the proposed 
method considerably. This method tries to take the features of the existing studies and 
bypass any limitations, in order to improve the method to combat a DoS attack in a 
challenging environment such as MANET. 
Chapter five (Design and Analysis of Monitoring, Detection and Rehabilitation Method-
MrDR)- 
This section illustrates the design and hypothesis of the proposed method with its 
different stages, elements and performance. Moreover, an example, which shows the 
performance of the proposed method, is explained in detail in this chapter. However, the 
proposed method also applies with MM, and analysis of different trust concepts used, such 
as centralised and decentralised trust concepts are examined in order to check the IP 
address and complete the merging process smoothly. The experimental design in three 
different scenarios would express the robustness of the proposed method in both SM and 
MM. 
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Chapter six (Implemented a Simulation of MrDR)- 
This chapter describes the simulation scenario for the three experiments. The first 
experiment on SM is where the proposed method would be applied to detect different DoS 
attacks: wormhole attack; blackhole; grayhole and jellyfish attack. These attacks would be 
detected on four experiments as each study will measures the network performance every 
specific time depends on the experiment time. Three aspects of network performance are 
considered: network throughput; packet delivery ratio and packet delay ratio.  Furthermore, 
the proposed method will be applied on MM and two experiments will be conducted to 
evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed method in this situation. The first experiment 
will be on two independent configured MANETs and it uses the centralised trust concept 
to merge. The second experiment will be on four independent configured MANETs. 
Decentralised trust concept in used in this experiment. Grayhole attacks will be used with 
two MANETs. In addition, all four types of DoS, which are used in the first experiment, 
also will be used when four MANETs merge.  The complete scenario of each experiment 
is illustrated and discussed in detail in this chapter. 
Chapter seven (Results and Evaluation)- 
Here the overall findings of the three experiments are presented. The comparison 
between the performances of each attack in the first experiment indicates that the 
performance of the proposed method would vary from one attack to another. In addition, in 
each experiment on MM, the network performance will be measured multiple times pre-
merging and post-merging. Subsequently, the evaluation of the performance of the 
proposed method on SM will be conducted between these different DoS attacks. In 
addition, one method, which is based on trust to detect misbehaving nodes (mentioned in 
the literature section in Chapter 4), will be used to evaluate this proposed method. 
However, there is no existing method to study the case of detecting DoS attacks in the 
merging MM scenario, therefore there is no evaluation made at this stage as it is unique.  
Chapter eight (Conclusions and Future Work)- 
An overall conclusion pertaining to this research is drawn in this chapter. It also describes 
how the research objectives were attained, the strengths and limitations of the study, as 
well as the proposal of a number of recommendations for future work. These 
recommendations would improve the study to test and cover different scenarios.  
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1.5 Chapter summary 
 
The goal of this chapter is to illustrate the problem area of this thesis. In 
addition, the aims and objectives of this thesis are presented. Furthermore, the main 
four contributions that are proposed in the thesis are also discussed. There are many 
concerns related to the security of data in wireless networks because they do not 
depend on routers which control packets, unlike wired networks. In addition, 
wireless ad-hoc networks raise greater concerns than other infrastructures or 
managed wireless networks because there is no access point. MANET is a type of 
ad- hoc wireless network that consists of nodes. Each node is considered to be both a 
router and a host, sending and receiving packets. As MANETs lack any central 
supervision point, MANETs are prone to attacks, such as eavesdropping, fabrication, 
and DoS attacks. The focus of this study is to detect DoS attacks in MANETs; both 
SM and MM. The MrDR method is used in this research to detect DoS attacks in SM 
and MM. This method uses the trust concept to calculate the trust value for each 
node. The next chapter will explain the computer and network security definitions. 
Moreover, the three pillars of security (or the CIA triad) will be explained in detail. 
Other aspects that related to the CIA triad also discussed. Furthermore, the 
importance of security to both customers and industry is posited from many aspects.  
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Chapter 2: Computer and 
Network Security in Literature 
 
 
 
 
Both wireless and wired networks are used for communication between 
devices and data sharing. However, these networks differ in terms of topology, 
transmission method and features. More recently, wireless networks are used widely 
due to the ease of installation and low requirements, important in certain situations 
such as emergency relief at disasters. Network security becomes the major concern 
due to the extra demands on the network. There are many security requirements that 
need consideration in order to ensure that a network is secured. In this chapter, 
different types of network, and wireless network, will be discussed, focussing on 
wireless networks. The comparison between wired and wireless networks will be 
explained. Also, the available security services will be outlined and the importance 
of security for both customers and the industrial sector will be discussed.   
 
2.1  Types of network  
 
There are four main types of network based on the geographical area they 
cover: Wide Area Network (WAN), Metropolitan Area Network (MAN), Local Area 
Network (LAN), and Personal Area Network (PAN) (Kizza, 2009). WANs cover 
large geographical areas and usually consist of many connected LANs. In contrast, 
LANs cover small geographical areas such as buildings or schools. An example of 
this type of setup is a school LAN network which, when it connects to the Internet, 
becomes part of a WAN.  
MANs are larger than LANs. MAN refers to a computer network across an 
entire college campus, city, or small region, and is typically limited to a single site or 
even building. MANs may cover an area up to tens of miles depending on their 
configuration. Usually, many LANs are connected together to form a MAN. This 
type of network is commonly used on sites such as college campuses, and is 
sometimes referred to as a Campus Area Network (CAN). A PAN is a computer 
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network that is organised around an individual person in a single building or 
location, such as a small office. Typically, a PAN could include one or more 
telephones, computers, video game consoles, or other personal devices. When 
several individuals use the same network in a residence, then the network is referred 
to as a Home Area Network, or HAN. In a typical setup, a residence might have a 
single wired Internet connection linked to a modem. This modem can provide wired 
and wireless connections for various gadgets. A single computer in the network can 
manage from and also can access to the network from any device. PAN has many 
uses. For instance, it allows a user to send a document to a wireless printer in another 
room (Han, 2012).  
A wireless equivalent of each of these network types exists:  Wireless Wide 
Area Network (WWAN); Wireless Metropolitan Area Network (WMAN); Wireless 
Local Area Network (WLAN); and Wireless Personal Area Network (WPAN). A 
comparison of the coverage between the different wireless networks indicated that 
WWAN gives a low performance, WPAN gives a moderate performance, and 
WMAN and WLAN give high performances (Hucaby, 2014). 
 
2.1.1 Wired network 
 
Wired network refers to the physical configuration of devices and it is also 
called an Ethernet network. A wired network is a collection of two or more devices, 
such as computers, printers, scanners or even a piece of network hardware such as a 
router, hub, or switch, which are linked using Ethernet cables. A wired network can 
be used as part of other wireless or wired networks. In order to connect a device to 
the network using Ethernet cables, a Network Interface Card (NIC) must be included 
in the device.  
The fastest wired network protocol is Ethernet, as it provides a connection 
speed ranging from 10 Megabits per second (Mbps) to 100 Mbps, or even higher. 
There are three main network topologies that are commonly utilised in wired 
networks: star network; bus network; and ring network (Jiang, 2012). Figure 2.1 
shows the bus topology of a wired network, where devices connect to the hub. 
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Figure 2.1. Wired network (bus topology). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.1.2 Wireless network 
 
A wireless network uses high-frequency radio waves, rather than wires, to 
communicate between nodes. Organisations and individuals can use this type of 
network to expand their existing wired network, or to go completely wirelessly. A 
wireless device is able to share data without networking cables, which decrease 
range; mobility is thereby increased in a wireless system. There are two main types 
of wireless network: infrastructure and peer-to-peer, or ad-hoc. There are several 
differences between each mode, in terms of their requirements, efficiency and format 
(Bosworth et al., 2009). 
An infrastructure network requires a base station or an access point. The 
access point acts as a hub, providing connectivity for wireless devices. The access 
point converts data to radio signals and transmits them using the IEEE.802.11 
protocol. There is usually one access point in the wireless network, which connects 
the devices; this set up is called the Basic Service Set (BSS).  
Sometimes there is more than one access point allowing connection to the 
network; in this case the wireless infrastructure is called the Extended Service Set 
(ESS). This allows wireless computer access to LAN resources as file servers or 
existing Internet connections. It is also possible to bridge or connect the wireless 
LAN to a wired LAN (Loo et al., 2011). Figure 2.2 shows the architecture of this 
type of network. 
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Figure 2.2. Infrastructure wireless network. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
According to the Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE), 
there are four main transmission standards for wireless networks: 802.11; 802.11a; 
802.11b; and 802.11g. The four standards differ in terms of radio frequency and 
connection speed. The slowest are 802.11 (1 or 2 Mbps) and 802.11b (5.5 to 
11Mbps) (Dean, 2012).  
Peer-to-peer or ad-hoc networking involves a number of devices, such as 
computers, each equipped with a wireless NIC. Each computer, or node, 
communicates with all other nodes directly, without any need for an access point or a 
centralised point (Seet, 2009). This can be used as long as the device is located 
within the range of the other devices or nodes. They can share printers and files, but 
may not be able to access wired LAN resources. One of the nodes can act as a bridge 
to the wired LAN using special software, so the network would be able to access 
other wired resources. This mode is flexible and allows quick installation. Ad-hoc 
wireless networks can be divided into three groups according to their performance: 
Mobile ad hoc network (MANET); Wireless Mesh Network (WMN); and Wireless 
Sensor Network (WSN). Figure 2.3 shows the architecture of the ad hoc network 
(Shen et al., 2010).  
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Figure 2.3. Ad hoc network architecture. 
Figure 2.4. Wireless mesh network topology. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MANET will be explained in detail in Chapter 3. WMN is a mesh network, 
established via the connection of wireless access points installed in every network 
user's locale. Every network user is considered as a provider, so it can forward data 
to the next node. The networking infrastructure is simplified and decentralised as 
each node needs only transmit as far as the next node. Topology of WMN is 
illustrated in Figure 2.4. WMN allows users living in remote areas, and small 
businesses operating in rural places, to connect their networks together to gain 
affordable internet connections (Misra et al., 2009a). 
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Figure 2.5. Wireless sensor network topology.  
WSNs are composed of spatially distributed autonomous gadgets utilising 
sensors to monitor environmental or physical conditions. WSN systems incorporate a 
gateway, which wireless connects the distributed nodes to the wired network. Figure 
2.5 illustrates wireless sensor network topology. There are three components of a 
WSN: nodes, gateways, and software. The wireless protocol utilised depends on the 
application requirements (El Emary and Ramakrishnan, 2013). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.1.3 Comparison between wired and wireless networks 
 
The major difference between the two types of network is the method of 
connecting nodes; a wired network uses cables whilst a wireless network uses radio 
waves. Generally, the wired network gives a faster and more secure connection. 
However, it is only suitable for connection over distances of less than 2,000 feet. 
Conversely, the transmission speeds of wireless networks can be limited by external 
interference. In a wireless network, the network is usually 150-300 indoors and 
around 1000 feet outdoors, depending on the terrain (Randhawa and Hardy, 2013).  
Another drawback of a wired network is the necessity for complicated 
installation procedures. Cables must be connected to all computers in the network. 
Reliance on radio waves to transmit data means that wireless networks do not require 
cables to connect devices (Kaur and Monga, 2014).  
In respect to the cost, the equipment required for a wireless network costs 
more than the equivalent wired Ethernet products. Access points and wireless 
adapters could cost three to four times as much as Ethernet. Wired networking is 
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inexpensive. For example, hubs, Ethernet cables and switches are all cheap. 
Broadband routers may cost more, but these components are optional in wired 
networks. Usually, the higher cost translates into benefits such as built-in security 
features and easier installation. Wired LANs enable superior performance. A 
traditional Ethernet connection gives about 10 Mbps bandwidth. Interestingly, fast 
Ethernet technology, giving around 100 Mbps, costs only marginally more and is 
readily available. Fast Ethernet is sufficient for gaming, high-speed internet access 
and file sharing.  
Wired networking that uses hubs may experience performance slowdown 
when several devices use the network simultaneously. It is possible to use Ethernet 
switches rather than hubs to avoid this problem, but this setup is more expensive (Liu 
et al., 2009). In a wireless network there are many wireless standards with different 
speeds. For instance, 802.11a with a speed of 54 Mbps, and high-speed 802.11ac at 
1300 Mbps, faster than a wired network speed (Nikolikj and Janevski, 2014). 
The mobility and flexibility of a wireless network helps offset the 
performance limitations. Mobile devices such as computers and cellular do not need 
to be tied to an Ethernet cable and are able to roam freely within the wireless 
network range. This is in contrast to wired networks where devices must remain 
connected with Ethernet cables. However, the openness and high mobility of 
wireless networks leaves them vulnerable to attacks (Balandin, 2010). 
Wireless networks have a higher rate of interference than wired ones. A 
wired network is invisible to other wired networks. Thus, the presence of one wired 
network would not affect the performance of other networks. Consequently, signal 
loss and fading is a less common occurrence than in wireless networks. Wireless 
networks can suffer from radio interference due to other wireless devices, 
obstructions by walls, or weather conditions. As a result, signal loss and fading 
occurs more frequently than in wired networks (Noda et al., 2015). 
Wireless networks are less secure than wired networks. In wired networks, 
firewalls as the primary security defence when a connection is made to the internet. 
However, the wired Ethernet switches and hubs do not support firewalls. Firewall 
software products, such as Zone Alarm, can be installed on the computers 
themselves. Also, broadband routers enable equivalent firewall capability, which is 
configurable through its own software and built into the device (Xiao et al., 2007).  
Overall, wireless networks are less secure than wired networks because 
information is travelling via the air and can easily be intercepted. The limitations of 
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wireless security are more theoretical than practical. Wireless networks conserve 
their data by using the Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) encryption standard that 
ensures the safety of wireless communications is close to that of wired networks 
(Liang and Yu, 2015).   
In summary, no computer network is completely secure. For organisations, 
the main security considerations tend not to be whether the network is wired or 
wireless, but rather to ensure that the safety measures taken, such as firewalls, are 
properly configured, and that employees are aware of vulnerabilities such as spoof 
emails. Table 2.1 shows the differences between both wired and wireless networks 
based on different aspects. 
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Table 2.1. Comparison between wired and wireless networks. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.2   Security trends in modern technology 
 
There are a number of definitions of security. It can refer to a group of 
individuals that are responsible for the protection of people or organisations. Another 
meaning of security, which is related to this research, refers to the protection of an 
Comparison factor Wired network Wireless network 
Requirements 
Ethernet cables; hubs and 
switches for connections. 
Two modes: ad hoc or 
infrastructure. Wireless 
devices need WLAN 
cards and access points to 
communicate. Works by 
radio waves; does not 
need hubs or switches. 
 
Cost 
Ethernet cables and 
switches are not expensive. 
Wireless Adapters and 
access points are 
expensive.  
Mobility 
Mobility is limited as 
computers need to be 
physically connected to the 
network. 
More mobility as devices 
can be moved around 
freely within the wireless 
network. 
Performance 
High; can give up to 100 
Mpbs bandwidth using fast 
Ethernet technology.  
There are currently many 
wireless standards with 
different speeds, some of 
which are higher than 
wired networks.  
Reliability 
Ethernet cables and 
switches are reliable. 
Less reliable than a wired 
network. 
Interferences Low High 
Security considerations 
More secure than wireless 
networks. Use software 
such as firewalls. 
Less secure than wired 
networks. Signals travel 
via the air and may easily 
be intercepted. 
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entity, be it an organisation, building, country, or individual against threats, attacks, 
or crimes (Alpcan and Başar, 2010). Computer security is defined as the protection 
of automated information systems via the preservation of the three pillars of the 
security; Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability (CIA) triad. This also 
encompasses information system resources, such as hardware, software, information, 
and data (Stallings, 2014).  
As a result of the rapid growth of technology, devices have become 
omnipresent. Subsequently the threats against these technologies have increased.  
Mobility and flexibility are the most popular benefits of a wireless network 
(Reardon, 2015). Although security threats can appear in both wired and wireless 
networks, it is easier to launch attacks in wireless networks because in wired 
networks the adversary needs to pass many defensive lines in order to launch attacks. 
By contrast, in wireless networks the adversary can launch attacks from anywhere in 
the network if the wireless node is within the radio transmission range (Ahmad et al., 
2012).  
The use of wireless networks has grown exponentially in the 2000s. Many 
devices are available with different specifications and features in MANET. For 
example, smart phones, MP3 players, iPods, computers, and laptops are devices that 
can use the same wireless connection (Reardon, 2015). In addition, wireless 
networks are deployed widely in different sectors, such as academic institutions.  
From a security perspective, these networks need to be monitored closely to detect 
any misbehaving node as these can have serious effects, such as data loss or even 
theft (Shorey et al., 2006).  
There are many reasons that threats to wireless networks have increased to 
the point that it is described as commonplace nowadays. First, the users of these 
devices are not usually technically minded and do not know of the potential threats.  
Second, a person can open an anonymous email without knowing whether it 
contains a virus or if it is allowing hackers to gain control over a device. In MANET, 
security threats and challenges emerge due to its ease of use.  
Third, the technological revolution has increased the occurrence and use of 
wireless networks. People can often easily acquire the password to a network within 
different sectors, such as hotels, cafes, airports, and even when visiting friends. For 
instance, nodes in MANETs can join or leave a network anytime, so nodes do not 
know each other.  
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Fourth, the majority of all modern devices, if not all, support a wireless 
connection.  
Finally, modern social media encourages people to use wireless network and 
share information, which is really resourceful. An attacker can easily launch an 
attack by advertising a link under an attractive title or scandal (Vacca, 2012). 
Accordingly, security is a critical issue especially in wireless networks where the 
control and monitoring processes are quite difficult.  
Security is an essential component of any network or organisation. Data loss, 
theft, or be compromised is a critical issue but can avoided by applying appropriate 
security measures. Some security mechanisms, such as cryptography and the use of 
secret keys, can exhaust the network’s power. This is especially true of MANETs 
due to its limited energy (Sastry et al., 2013).  
 
2.3   Pillars of security 
 
There are three pillars of security that must be applied for a system or 
network to be described as secure. Figure 2.6 shows the CIA triad (also known as the 
security triad): Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability (Bishop, 2005). These 
three integral components were supplemented with two desirable items in 
communications added in International Organisation for Standardisation ISO7498-2 
[ISO89]: Authentication and Non-Repudiation (or accountability) (Pfleeger et al., 
2015) .  
 
 
Figure 2.6. CIA triad. 
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2.3.1 Confidentiality 
 
Confidentiality means ensuring and preserving access to, and disclosure of, 
information according to authorised restrictions. For example, protecting property 
information and personal privacy. When confidentiality is lost, this is deemed to be 
an unauthorised disclosure of information (Bishop, 2003).  
2.3.2 Integrity 
 
This process guards against the improper modification, fabrication, or even 
destruction of information. This includes checking and ensuring the authenticity and 
non-repudiation of information. A lack of integrity leads to the production of 
unauthorised information (Hrabik et al., 2006). 
2.3.3 Availability or Access control 
 
 This ensures that intended users have reliable and timely access to 
information. The loss of availability to a legitimate user means the disruption of 
access to or use of information, a network, or system (Seidl et al., 2015).  
2.3.4 Authentication 
 
Authentication is important to ensure that data is genuine, trusted, and verified. 
It is pivotal users’ identities are verified and that they are who they say they are. In 
addition, authentication must ensure that data entering the system comes from a 
trusted sender (Stapleton, 2014).  
2.3.5 Non-repudiation or accountability  
 
Repudiation literally means “denial”; therefore non-repudiation is the “inability 
to deny”. In network security, non-repudiation refers to the ability of the system to 
confirm that the sender of a message cannot convincingly deny sending that 
message. Therefore, it is a process of confirming that the user performed a specific 
action (Ciampa, 2014).  
 
2.4   The importance of security for both customers and industrials sectors 
 
         The legislative measures conducted in the name of security aim to decrease the 
number of threats.  A number of detection technologies used in congestion with each 
other, such as IDS, firewall, antiviruses, each focusing on different aspects of 
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security. However, incidents can still arise despite the high implementation on 
security countermeasures. There is no doubt that security is something requisite and 
essential with our widespread use of technology. For example, in hospitals there is a 
high level of authentication required to access patients’ files. Another example, using 
it in military arena (Ancona et al., 2000).   
The available safeguards and increasing awareness of risk could decrease the 
chance of an attack but cannot fully prevent it. Nowadays, people consider data 
breaches in some organisations, such as banks, as a scandal and they request 
compensation (Koch et al., 2012). As such, many financial losses can be connected 
with compromised data. According to (Martin, 2015), one of the biggest 
communications companies in the UK, TalkTalk, had a major security breach in 
October 2015 that resulted in the theft of clients’ information. In addition, around 
£3,500 was stolen from customers’ accounts. The company tried and failed to mend 
its relationship with its customers by paying them compensation of around £30.20 
each. This cost the company many customers as many cancelled their contracts due 
to a loss of trust (Martin, 2015).  
 Another incident specifically related to a DDoS (Distributed DoS) attack was 
against a popular web hosting service. Freeparking was hit by DDoS attack in June 
2015. Customers complained as they have many domains that rely on Freeparking’s 
named servers. Unfortunately, due to the nature of this attack it took long to mitigate 
and resolve the problem (Hall, 2015b). 
Another security concern that is raised is when a personal device is brought 
into an organisation. There are some advantages when employees supply their own 
device, such as a tablet, iPad, or laptop. For example, this can increase productivity, 
flexibility, and efficiency while also allowing employees to log-in to the organisation 
from anywhere at any time (Miller et al., 2012).  
Despite these benefits, there is still a concern about the effect of these private 
devices on the security within an organisation. The organisation’s security needs to 
consider the CIA triad for both the organisation’s resources and its assets. Assets 
refer to data and information that is stored, recorded, or even processed within the 
organisation. It is difficult to prevent employees from bringing their own devices into 
work. In near future, the devices will be even smaller, such as computerised glasses 
and wristwatches, which will be even more difficult to detect. As such, an 
appropriate security policy and privacy settings are important in order to 
accommodate these incidents in organisations. Multiple aspects of information 
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security, processes, and privacy functions need to be combined in order to protect 
confidential information (Bello Garba et al., 2015).  
All in all, there is a potential need for security in wireless networks. The idea 
is not only to allow users to communicate with each other and use the service, but 
also to be secure in doing so. Applying security in such an area effectively involves 
the consideration of many aspects. For example, in a wireless network, such as 
MANET where nodes can join in and leave the network arbitrarily, determining a 
solution can be hard.  Consequently, a security mechanism for a MANET network 
should be appropriate to its specific characteristics, such as limited energy supply 
(Kahate, 2013).  
 
2.5   Chapter summary  
 
This chapter aims to give an overview of computer networking and security 
systems in literature, focusing on wireless networks, and the various types of wireless 
network. This general information is a base to understand the idea of the project.  
Knowledge and understanding of network security is vital. Despite the fact that wireless 
networks help people to perform many tasks online easily, there are many threats and 
challenges associated with them. A comparison of many aspects of wired and wireless 
networks has been given. The technology revolution in the last five years has dramatically 
increased people’s reliance on wireless networks. This chapter illustrates many reasons 
why the threat of an attack has increased through the use of wireless networks. In addition, 
five security aspects or services are discussed that are important in ensuring the security of 
communications. Finally, the importance of security to both customers and organisations is 
explained, relating to many factors such as financial factors and reputation. In the next 
chapter, the MANET network will be explained in detail, as this is the focus of this 
research. MANET’s characteristics, features, and vulnerabilities will be discussed in detail. 
Moreover, Denial of Service attacks and the Internet of Things paradigm will be 
illustrated. 
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Chapter 3: Mobile ad-hoc 
Networks (MANET) 
 
 
 
This chapter provides a concise overview of MANET. Many aspects of the 
network are considered including MANET’s history, characteristics, specifications, 
routing protocols, challenges, and attacks including DoS attacks. In addition, an 
overview of the Internet of Things (IoT) is discussed. The arguments presented in 
this chapter are supported with relevant literature and discussion of other studies. 
 
3.1 History of MANET 
 
Ad-hoc networks have now reached their third generation. The first 
generation was developed in 1972 and called Packet Radio Networks (PRNET), a 
system which was used for military research purposes in the 1970s. The second 
generation emerged in the 1980s when the ad-hoc network was implemented as part 
of the Survivable Adaptive Radio Networks (SURAN) programme (Bang and 
Ramteke, 2013).  
This generation had the merit of providing a packet-switched network to the 
mobile field without infrastructure. Furthermore, this programme improved the 
radios’ performance and made them resilient against electronic attacks, cheaper and 
smaller than the first generation. The third generation was developed in the 1990s, 
notebook computers and other viable devices reflected considerable improvements in 
the concept of commercial ad-hoc networking (Kumar et al., 2013). The MANET 
group was conceived by Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), who worked hard 
to standardise the routing protocols for ad-hoc networks (Suri and Singh, 2014).  
 
3.2   Characteristics of MANET  
 
Wireless ad-hoc networks were first unveiled in the 1990’s. A MANET is a 
temporary, short-lived, spontaneous network with a non-fixed infrastructure and self-
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organised wireless network. This consists of nodes which communicate with each 
other without an infrastructure or a topology. These nodes or devices can be iPads, 
smart phones, computers, laptops or even MP3 players (Perkins, 2008). Nodes in this 
environment act as routers and hosts, sending and receiving packets. In addition, 
nodes can join or leave the network arbitrarily without giving any prior warning and 
organise themselves arbitrary.  
 Moreover, a MANET can operate in a standalone fashion where it is 
unconnected to any network or even the Internet or in a connected fashion where it 
connects to the Internet (Sarkar et al., 2007).  MANET has multi-hop routing, which 
means that when packets are delivered from a source to a destination which is out of 
the direct transmission range, then the packets will be forwarded to other 
intermediate nodes. 
Due to the simple architecture of MANET and the advent of the Internet, the 
prevalence and usage of MANET have shown a clear increase in many sectors, for 
example in emergencies such as relief situations and disasters, military services, 
airports, conferences, lectures, cafes and so on (Carrell et al., 2012); (Su et al., 2014). 
Mobile users usually use this network to communicate when no fixed wired 
infrastructure is available (Ambhore et al., 2013).  
For instance, a teacher can utilise MANET to interact with students during a 
lecture. In such situations, a group of mobile hosts with wireless network interfaces 
form a short-lived network without the need for any fixed infrastructure. Figure 3.1 
shows the basic classification of networks whereas wired or wireless. In addition, 
wireless networks can be whether ad-hoc or infrastructure. The former do not include 
a central point to monitor the other devices and every device can connect directly to 
each other, whereas the latter include the central point that all devices connect to it. 
Three types of ad-hoc networks: mesh wireless network; sensor wireless network; 
and mobile ad-hoc network. The focus of this research on MANET environment 
(Alnaghes and Gebali, 2015).  
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Figure 3.1. Network classification: wired and wireless networks. 
 
 
 
For a MANET to be constructed, a node willing to send data to a node willing 
to accept data are the sole requirements (Micheal and Arunachalam, 2014). The 
nature of omnipresent devices makes wireless networking a favourable option for 
their interconnection due to the mobility and flexibility this technology enables 
(Bang and Ramteke, 2013). 
 Figure 3.2 shows the architecture of a simple MANET which consists of six 
nodes (Park and Yoo, 2013). Despite the fact that MANET can consist of multiple 
smart phones, there are many differences between the two. Cellular is an 
infrastructure network whereas MANET is not. Moreover, cellular has high setup 
costs and takes more time to setup than MANET, while MANET is more cost-
effective (Sarkar et al., 2007). 
 
 F 
E 
C
A 
D 
A 
B 
Figure 3.2. MANET architecture. 
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3.3   Routing protocols in MANET 
 
Routing in MANET means choosing the most suitable and viable path 
between the source and the destination nodes. In addition, protocols mean a set of 
rules and instructions which allow different nodes to communicate with each other 
properly. Therefore, routing protocol in MANET means that nodes, according to a 
set of rules, will search for the other nodes in order to communicate and share 
packets (MCA, 2015). 
 The impact of different routing protocols in MANET has varied for different 
reasons. For example, one study in (Bai et al., 2003) proposes that mobility affects 
the performance of many routing protocols, including DSDV, AODV, and DSR. As 
a result, simulation studies have been conducted on multiple MANET routing 
protocols to assess memory, control overheads, communication, time complexity, 
route discovery, and maintenance. For example, (Cano and Manzoni, 2000) 
compared measurements and energy consumption behaviour of four routing 
protocols: Destination Sequenced Distance Vector (DSDV); Ad-hoc On-demand 
Distance Vector (AODV); Direct Source Routing (DSR), and; Temporally Ordered 
Routing Algorithm (TORA). Although simulations and comparisons show that 
AODV and DSR give better performance results than others, TORA is the worst 
performing. Further research indicates that the number of nodes affects the impact of 
routing protocols including AODV, as is discussed (Bagwari et al., 2012). 
 There are different routing protocols in MANET. Generally, these routing 
protocols can be classified into three groups in MANET: proactive, reactive and 
hybrid. Under the proactive routing protocol each node discovers the route to the 
next node before the actual communication is requested. This cuts the time delay but 
adds to overhead costs (Muralishankar and Raj, 2014). A full comparison between 
proactive and reactive routing protocols in (Mohseni et al., 2010) emphasised that the 
former, including DSDV, have a higher control overhead when compared with the 
latter, for example AODV. 
 There are different proactive protocols such as DSDV, OLSR and Open 
Shortest Path First (OSPF) (Dhenakaran and Parvathavarthini, 2013). In contrast, a 
reactive approach is considered as a demand-led protocol. Nodes can be described as 
being in sleep mode and they are activated only if there is a request to communicate 
with other nodes. Therefore, the network overhead will be lower than that associated 
with the proactive protocol, but more time will be needed to establish 
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communications than is the case with the proactive protocol. DSR and AODV are 
examples of reactive protocols (Tayal and Gupta, 2013).  
Hybrid protocol combines the advantages of the proactive and reactive 
protocols. Zone Routing Protocol (ZRP) is an example of this type (Han and Lee, 
2013). Choosing the suitable routing protocol depends on the amount of traffic being 
handled by the network and the number of flows (Patil and Sidnal, 2013). These 
protocols are proposed in order to increment scalability by allowing mobile nodes 
close to one another to work together to form some sort of backbone to decrease 
route discovery overheads (Patel et al., 2015b). This is achieved by proactively 
maintaining routes to nearby nodes, and identifying routes to far away nodes, by 
utilising a route discovery method (Aujla and Kang, 2013). 
 Table 3.1 presents the key differences between the three types of routing 
protocol and discusses their advantages and disadvantages (Bansal et al., 2015) .  
 
Table 3.1. Comparison of routing protocol. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Various types of threats have an effect on the routing of ad-hoc networks, 
such as confidentiality, integrity, and availability. In regard to confidentiality within 
the realm of routing protocols, the main threat is the privacy of the routing data. 
Protocol Advantages Disadvantages 
Proactive 
Latency is decreased in 
the network; the 
information is always 
available to use; periodic 
update of the routing 
information 
High overheads; routing 
information is flooded 
throughout the network 
Reactive 
The path is only available 
on demand; the overhead 
is low; no need to 
distribute the routing 
information 
Increases latency in the 
network 
Hybrid 
It is suitable for large 
networks; the information 
is frequently updated and 
readily available 
High complexity 
Mobile ad-hoc Networks (MANET) 
 
 30 
When the routing data is compromised, a secondary threat may be posed to other 
forms of information such as geographical location. The integrity of the network 
relies on the accuracy of every node’s routing information. Attacks may occur, 
including those that can alter existing routing data or introduce incorrect, routing 
data. In regard to the availability aspect, it is required that nodes can obtain access to 
routing information at all times. In addition, routing operations must not delay nodes 
from being provided with up to date information. Furthermore, every node in the 
network is able to behave normally without interference from security. 
 
3.4   Security challenges in MANET 
 
Due to the specific features of MANET such as dynamic topology and the 
lack of certification authority, it becomes prone to many security breaches. In 
MANET, attacks might come from all directions and affect any node. Therefore, 
attacks could cause congestion, propagate false routing information, and prevent 
services from working normally or even shutdown them completely. This subsection 
highlights these challenges in detail. 
 
3.4.1 Vulnerabilities and Challenges  
 
 As a consequence of the openness and dynamic nature of MANET, such as 
its shared wireless medium, open peer-to-peer network architecture, high dynamic 
topology and stringent resource constraint, many security concerns have been raised 
(Ponsam and Srinivasan, 2014).  
In wired networks, firewalls are the main security method used by computers 
and routers to detect vulnerabilities; this, however, present a significant challenge for 
MANET, because a firewall in this network cannot distinguish between normal and 
malicious traffic, including denial of service attack (Sharma and Fatima, 2013). 
Therefore, identifying or making the decision about whether the neighbouring node 
is a legitimate node or malicious node is a difficult and tedious task in MANET 
(Chitkara and Ahmad, 2014). 
MANET exhibits a number of shortcomings that compromise security and 
make them easy targets for attackers. Because each node can communicate with 
others separately, there is no central nodal point as used by other systems to monitor 
traffic, other nodes in the network, control transmission of packets across the whole 
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network, and allow, or prevent, devices from launching attacks (Raghavendran et al., 
2013).  
Second, nodes can move arbitrarily, thus its topology changes unpredictably 
and frequently (Bang and Ramteke, 2013).  
Third, nodes rely on batteries and have constraints on the network and state 
information that may be stored, particularly for security-related tasks. Each node 
needs energy to communicate with another node, so power and bandwidth 
constraints are a major concern (Jain and Garg, 2013).  
Fourth, scalability is another concern in MANET as each node can access the 
network and leave dependently. This is in contrast to wired networks where the scale 
is predefined when a network is being designed and will not generally change much 
during its usage. The scale in MANET is constantly changing with due to the 
mobility of nodes. Indeed, MANET networks are designed to be scalable, often 
forming unpredictable topologies. They are transient, dynamic environments with 
nodes joining, or leaving, at any time. This results in issues surrounding trust 
establishment, as we do not know the intentions of these nodes (Singh and Dua, 
2014).  
Fifth, Bandwidth constraints and the mobility of MANET nodes increase the 
volume of packet losses due to interference and high Bit Rate Errors (BREs) 
(Chitkara and Ahmad, 2014). Thus, MANETs remain vulnerable to a range of 
attacks by malicious nodes (Singh et al., 2014a). All the previous factors have made 
MANET vulnerable to many intrusions and attacks (Patel, 2015). Figure 3.3 shows a 
summary of the challenges faced by MANET (Raj et al., 2015); (Agrawal and 
Chauhan, 2015).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mobile ad-hoc Networks (MANET) 
 
 32 
Figure 3.3. MANET Challenges. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.4.2 Attacks in MANET 
 
Attacks in MANET can be classified as internal or external attacks depending 
on the location.  
 
3.4.2.1 Internal attack 
 
Compromised nodes which are part of the network launch this kind of attack. 
As a result, nodes gain unauthorised access to the network and pretend to act as 
normal nodes. These nodes aim to launch the attack for two specific reasons (Tayal 
and Gupta, 2013). The first is to hijack or subvert authorised nodes with the help of 
an external attacker and use them to start an internal attack in the network (Faisal et 
al., 2013).  
Another kind of attack is selfish ones that enable a node to save resources, 
including processing capabilities, bandwidth, and power, exploiting the resources of 
other nodes, including their power. An example of internal attack on a MANET 
network, composed of seven nodes, is shown in Figure 3.4. In this example, node M 
in the network is a malicious node that drops packets, so when these are sent from 
the source node A they cannot reach their destination (node F) as node M drops the 
packets (Jain, 2014).  
Mobile ad-hoc Networks (MANET) 
 
 33 
Figure 3.4. Internal attack in MANET. 
Figure 3.5. External attack in MANET. 
 
 
3.4.2.2 External attack 
 
Unauthorised nodes that are not within the network launch an external attack. 
This attack may flood the network with bogus packets and even use impersonation 
(Nadeem and Howarth, 2013).  The main aim of this attack is to disturb the normal 
functioning of the network and cause congestion. Figure 3.5 presents the architecture 
of this attack. Node M, which launches the attack against this MANET, is not a part 
of this network. Besides, it drops the connection between node D and node E 
(Sivakumar and Selvaraj, 2013).  
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Figure 3.6. An illustration of passive attack. 
3.4.3 Attack types in MANET based on performance  
 
Attacks are classified into two groups according to performance and the 
nature of the attack: Passive attack and Active attack. 
3.4.3.1 Passive attack 
 
The aim of this attack is to operate stealthily and steal important information 
from the targeted network. Usually, the attacker does not disturb the normal network 
activities such as dropping packets (Goyal, 2014). Accordingly, the attacker becomes 
part of the network and listens and monitors the network traffic which violates 
message confidentiality (Kaushik and Sharma, 2015). Detecting this kind of attack is 
very challenging as the activities and operations of the network are unaffected and no 
new traffic is introduced.  
For example, although such a passive attack may not be detected, associated 
interferences will. In addition, the malicious node which launches this kind of attack 
may not even be part of the network, further complicating the detection process 
(Rajakumar et al., 2014). Examples of this type of attack include eavesdropping 
attacks and traffic analysis attacks. Figure 3.6 illustrates the architecture of this 
attack; as an attacker sniffs the connection, between the source and destination, 
confidentiality, and thus security, is affected.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
3.4.3.2 Active attack 
 
The attacker, an unauthorised party, disturbs network operations, and 
modifies or fabricates messages (Mani and Kamalakkannan, 2013). The attacker 
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Figure 3.7. An illustration of active attack. 
disturbs the normal activities of the network. In addition, the intruder can insert, 
modify, delete, reply, or drop packets using this attack (Mori and Jethava, 2013). 
Although it is possible to detect these attacks quickly compared to a passive attack, 
they cannot be prevented (Aggarwal and Dhankhar, 2014).  
For example, masquerading and message modification are examples of this 
type of attack. The malicious nodes which launch this attack can be internal or 
external (Nandini and Aggarwal, 2015). Figure 3.7 shows the format of this attack 
where the attacker disturbs the connection between source and destination and drops 
the connection. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.5  Denial of Service attack in MANET 
 
 
Denial of Service attack (DoS) is one form of attack that paralyses, deprives 
and disrupts the availability of the network, thereby temporarily preventing 
legitimate users from accessing services (Lotfy and Azer, 2013). Moreover, this type 
of attack degrades the performance of the network and causes harm in many ways, 
such as financial damage and in terms of the use of resources (Patel and Sharma, 
2013). 
 In an example of connected MANETs, if one military system were attacked 
by a threat like this, even for a short time, this could be enough to destabilise security 
and cut communications between soldiers and the command centre (Burbank et al., 
2006).  Moreover, because a DoS attack is a complicated problem, many users do not 
realise they are under attack, thinking the issue is just network congestion. 
Mobile ad-hoc Networks (MANET) 
 
 36 
Figure 3.8. DoS and DDoS attacks architecture. 
Furthermore, this type of attack exhausts the victim’s network resources such as 
computing power and bandwidth (Dhanalakshmi, 2013). 
A complex version of DoS attack is Distributed Denial of Service attack 
(DDoS). It is important mentioning that DDoS attack is a subset of DoS attack (Gulia 
and Sihag, 2013). Both attacks are applicable to MANET (Kumar and Singh, 2015). 
In DoS the attacker uses one Internet connection and one device to overwhelm their 
victim with packets (Chhabra et al., 2013).  
For example, an attacker can launch this kind of attack against a specific user, 
using just one device and one Internet connection (Vishwakarma and Rao, 2014). In 
contrast, when an attacker uses many devices to launch this kind of attack against 
many users, for example bank customers, many Internet connections and zombies are 
used (Mittal, 2015). However, in DDoS attack the attacker uses multiple 
compromised devices usually called (botnet or Zombie) and multiple Internet 
connections to launch this attack (Abdelaziz et al., 2013). Figure 3.8  shows the 
architecture of both DoS and DDoS respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
People who perpetrate such attacks do so for varying motives (Sinha et al., 
2013). For example, it might be for personal reasons if it is considered as revenge 
against specific people or work. In addition, it could be for fun or for prestige and the 
attacker might think that it will help to gain respect or a good reputation among the 
peers (Hashmi et al., 2012). Moreover, it can be for political reasons, such as in 
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military operations to disrupt the enemy by flooding their network and crippling it. 
As a result, soldiers (for example) cannot receive instructions from their commander 
(Udhayamoorthi et al., 2014); (Yadav and Sharma, 2015).  
A DoS attack essentially increases network delay and affects the network 
activities to deny availability to legitimate nodes. DoS attack floods the victim with 
an enormous number of packets which render the victim’s device unavailable. As a 
result, the victim is unable to provide services to legitimate users. Time, effort, 
financial losses, reputation, secrecy and trust are all factors that are affected as a 
consequence of DoS attacks. It is notable that DoS attacks can be launched using a 
variety of methods. However, these attacks share a common general goal, which is to 
prevent authorised users accessing to authorised services and to degrade the 
performance of the network and inflict considerable problems on service users.  
Eclipse is an online Internet provider which has been hit by DDoS attack 
twice in quick succession. The first hit was on Monday 23
rd
 November 2015, and the 
second wave was on Wednesday 25
th
 November 2015. Eclipse sent an email to 
customers confirming that it had been attacked and informed their users that Internet-
based services might not be working until the attack had been dealt with. The email 
also contains apologies for inconveniences to service users (Hall, 2015a).  
Rutgers University in the USA was hit by DDoS attack in September 2015 
for the whole morning and the first part of the afternoon. According to the New 
Jersey news, the hacker who launched this attack is alleged to have taunted the 
school on social media. The hacker claimed that he or she was being paid around 500 
dollars an hour by someone who bears a grudge against the school. The reason for 
the grudge was that the school had increased tuition fees to improve cyber security 
following previous cyber-attacks (MARAS, 2015).  
 
3.6   Types of DoS attack in MANET 
 
A DoS attack can be launched against different layers in the Transmission 
Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) model. The TCP protocol was designed 
in 1974, and was spilt into TCP and IP protocols in 1978 (Carrell et al., 2012). A 
TCP/IP stack is an informal collection of protocols loosely organised as a stack 
(Alani, 2014), while TCP/IP protocols are widely used, forming the basis of the 
Internet, and can be compared to the Open Systems Interconnection basic reference 
model (OSI) which is never used in practice. Instead, OSI is normally used to 
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Figure 3.9. TCP/ IP model vs OSI model. 
describe network structure, explain functions, and illustrate relationships between 
various networking protocols and technologies.  
The OSI model was developed in 1977, designed based on LAN, and fits 
poorly in WAN. The reason for the latter is that there are many overlapping, even 
partial coverage of layers; the OSI model is a framework that can be used to explain 
how any network works in a generic sense. In the OSI model, a network is broken 
down into seven layers: Application; Presentation; Session; Transport; Network; 
Data Link, and; Physical. In this sense, OSI is not a suite of protocols in the way that 
TCP/IP is, and this latter kind of stack is implemented on almost all networked 
hardware everywhere. In contrast to OSI, the TCP/IP model has four layers: 
Application; Transport; Internet, and; Network access or host-to-network (Hunt, 
2002);(Casad, 2011). The TCP/IP and OSI models are illustrated below in Figure 
3.9. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TCP/IP are a group of protocols which support network communications, 
identify network processes, and illustrate data format and information content 
(Carrell et al., 2012). In summary, the application layer provides the processes, 
programs, and applications used in the network, while the transport layer provides 
the end–to-end data delivery service and transmission. The network, or Internet, 
layer determines and defines the datagram, or packet construct, to be transmitted, and 
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handles data routing, while the network access layer encapsulates IP packets into 
frames for transmission, and maps IP addresses to physical hardware (Alani, 2014). 
A DoS attack can be classified as active and passive attack depending on the 
attack’s aims and performance as with other types of malicious activity. DoS attack 
can be launched against different layers in the TCP/IP stack (Singh and Gupta, 
2013). Table 3.2 shows some attacks and multiple DoS attacks which can appear in 
each layer in TCP/IP stack with their definitions (Tyagi, 2013). Jellyfish attack, 
wormhole attack, blackhole attack, grayhole attack are explained in detail later in 
Chapter 6. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mobile ad-hoc Networks (MANET) 
 
 40 
Table 3.2. Different attacks and their definitions. 
Attack Definition 
Repudiation 
attack 
This attack is also called a ‘denial of participation’ as it can include all or 
some part of communications. For instance, a user might deny purchasing a 
credit card online or even making any online transaction (Rai et al., 2010). 
Worms and 
viruses 
Defined as the selfish and malicious behaviour of nodes. 
TCP/SYN 
attack 
An intruder sends a succession of SYN requests to the victim’s device. Thus, 
the device under attack is unable to complete the three-way handshake to 
establish a connection between client and server. 
Session 
hijacking 
An intruder spoofs the IP address of the victim’s device. Thus, when the 
attacker defines the correct sequence number, (an expected outcome), a DoS 
attack is launched on the victim’s device. 
Sinkhole 
attack 
This attack can take place in two ways. In the first case, a node exploits an 
AODV protocol, thus advertising itself as owning a valid route to a destination 
node, even though the route is false, with the intention of intercepting packets. 
In the second case, an intruder consumes intercepted packets without 
forwarding them to their destination (Jathe and Dakhane, 2012). 
Sybil attack In this situation, a malicious node claims many identities to violate the 
mapping of a one to one identity in MANET. In addition, the malicious node 
gives the incorrect impression of being distinct in multiple node-disjoint paths 
or locations (Abbas et al., 2013). 
Rushing 
attack 
This kind of attack is against on-demand routing protocols. The intruder 
receives Route Request (RREQ) packets then quickly floods them on the 
network before other nodes can react to which receive the same RREQ 
(Kumar and Rishi, 2010). 
Malicious 
and selfish 
behaviours 
These behaviours disturb the normal activities of nodes in a network. 
Malicious nodes give fake information and misroute other nodes. However, 
the selfish node does not complete missions, including forwarding packets, in 
order to save energy. 
Traffic 
analysis 
 
In this case, an attacker analyses traffic and reveals information regarding the 
network including the location of nodes, current sources, destination nodes, 
and network topology. This information can then be used to launch further 
attacks (Singh and Gupta, 2013). 
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Further, different types of DoS attacks have different goals to detect the 
network and different performance. As can be seen in Table 3.3, DoS attack can be 
launched against any layer of the ad-hoc network.  
 
Table 3.3. Classification of DoS attacks in each layer. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.7   An overview of the Internet of Things (IoT) 
 
Rapid technological advancements, combined with a sudden increase in the 
number of users accessing a range of different network devices, have precipitated the 
development of various types of internetworking components. This has led to the 
launch of a new Internet generation or paradigm known as the Internet of Things 
(IoT) or the Internet of Everything (IoE). Using tools such as physical devices, 
virtual machines, services or processes, global communication and the exchange of 
data between individuals is now possible through Internet Protocols (IP).  
The feature which distinguishes the Internet from other products is that it can 
be accessed remotely, whereby anyone can operate a system, or use a particular 
Layer DoS attack type 
Application layer 
Repudiation attack; 
worms and viruses  
Transport layer 
TCP/SYN attack; 
Jellyfish attack; 
Session hijacking 
 
Network/Internet layer 
Wormhole attack; 
Grayhole attack; 
Sinkhole attack;; 
Jellyfish attack; 
Blackhole attack; 
Sybil attack; 
Rushing attack 
Network access layer 
Malicious and Selfish 
misbehaviours; traffic 
analysis 
Mobile ad-hoc Networks (MANET) 
 
 42 
Figure 3.10. IoT architecture. 
device, without having to be based in a specific location. IoT is considered to be one 
of the most popular paradigmatic strings of thought in relation to the future state of 
the Internet. IoT provides multiple lenses by which to link the Internet with other 
real-world devices or objects (Reina et al., 2013). 
 Figure 3.10 illustrates the architecture of the IoT. The current dominant 
paradigm within the Internet is one that relies upon human-to-human interaction. 
However, IoT posits a novel emerging paradigm of thought, which postulates that 
any object, identified using a unique identifier, is assumed to be interconnected 
(Bahga and Madisetti, 2014). IoT authorises many technologies and communication 
solutions, such as wired and wireless networks, as well as exchange networked 
communications. Both powerful computers and small simple hardware devices are 
able to interconnect in an IoT setting, by using Radio-Frequency Identification 
(RFID) techniques (Bellavista et al., 2013).  
IoT provides effective control mechanisms, whether available at hand or 
remotely. For instance, a car engine may be controlled using a mobile phone, as the 
car which is an object, connects with the phone via an IP. Another example is where 
a laundry machine can be programmed remotely, through the use of online 
communications, to commence a washing cycle.  
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 However, in the last decade, ad-hoc networks have been the centre of 
extensive attention, regardless of their appeal and specifications. A MANET requires 
less infrastructural networks, as they can be set up without any wired facility. 
Furthermore, MANET can be applied to many different sectors, as explained earlier 
in this chapter, and also in the IoT. The guarantees of data transfer in MANET within 
the large scale IoT needs to be considered (Zhou and Li, 2012).  
The deployment of the IoT raises issues in relation to the dependence on 
computer technologies, significant infrastructural requirements, communications and 
multiple IoT objects, which are all constantly evolving. Thus, the vulnerability of 
IoT applications increases due to various potential forms of attack. Hence, an urgent 
need exists to develop a scalable and sustainable cyber ecosystem in IoT technology 
to detect and investigate attacks (Aldosari et al., 2016).  
 
3.8   Chapter summary 
 
MANET environment, its features and characteristics are explained in this 
chapter. In addition, it also covers the vulnerabilities in the MANET environment as 
a consequence of the system’s characteristics which will help to understand the 
problem area of this project. All the challenges which are outlined in this chapter 
enable MANET to be attacked by various means such as eavesdropping, fabrication, 
and DoS attack. However, the focus of this study is DoS attacks and how to detect 
them in a MANET environment. Even though many types of DoS attack are detected 
in multiple layers in the TCP/IP model, this increases the severity of this type of 
attack. Additionally, types of attacks based on performance or location, whether 
passive, active, internal, or external are clearly explained and differentiated. Many 
examples are provided to illustrate the effects of these attacks and how they severely 
affect the victim’s devices and resources. Moreover, an explanation of the IoT and its 
vibrant role with the technology revolution is discussed in brief. In the next chapter, 
the literature focusing on the methods used to detect DoS attacks will be reviewed 
and discussed. Prior to the method proposed in this study, the trust concept is used to 
detect DoS attack specifically in MANET. In view of this situation, the methods used 
to detect this attack based on the trust concept will be discussed extensively and the 
advantages and disadvantages of each method will be illustrated. Besides, different 
methods to assign IP address in MANET are discussed with identifying of their 
advantages and limitations. 
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Chapter 4: Research Gap in 
Denial of Service Attack   
 
 
 
There are three research aspects which need to be considered in this research 
project. First, it should demonstrate the existing methods used to detect DoS attacks 
in MANET. Second, it should discuss the methods currently used to detect DoS 
attacks based on using trust; and third, it will discuss a number of methods used to 
assign IP address when MANETs are merged, and explain how these MANETs will 
be merged.  
As mentioned in Chapter 1, no methods discuss the detection of DoS attacks 
when MM are merged, so no studies about this specific situation will be mentioned 
in this chapter. 
4.1  Basic methods used to detect DoS attack in MANET 
 
There are many countermeasures to control DoS attacks in MANET. A 
considerable amount of the published literature argues about various methods and 
approaches to precisely detect such attacks in a MANET environment. The basic 
methods used to detect a DoS attack in MANET will be discussed below. 
4.1.1 Firewalls 
 
The basic method to detect DoS attack involves using firewalls and proxies. 
A firewall is a system which monitors and controls traffic between two networks. 
Unfortunately, traditional firewalls are considered to be unreliable because they 
cannot distinguish between normal traffic and DoS attack traffic (Stewart, 2013). In 
addition, the mobile nature of MANET means that a number of traditional techniques 
ideal for wired networks, such as encryption software and firewalls, are insufficient. 
For example, firewalls use simple and basic rules such as allowing or denying certain 
ports or IP addresses. In addition, most people do not keep their firewall up to date, 
which raises the level of vulnerability. With this object, distributed firewalls work 
efficiently in MANET to prevent DoS attacks. Distributed firewalls use a central 
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policy which defines what is inbound and outbound, what is permitted to do and 
appropriate connectivity. In addition, this policy will be applied to all the endpoints 
and will be enforced for all hosts that participate in the distributed firewall. The 
distributed firewalls are designed to be reconfigurable, so it can be argued that 
distributed firewalls are used in filtering in MANET (Gupta et al., 2012).  
Reverse firewall is also developed to detect flooding attacks, which is a type 
of DoS attack in MANET. Traditional firewalls usually protect the network from 
incoming packets, while reverse firewalls protect the outside from any flooding 
attacks that originate from inside the network. Flooding attacks aim to consume 
significant amounts of resources, such as battery power and bandwidth, and can even 
disturb normal routing processes (Zargar et al., 2013). (Filipek and Hudec, 2015) 
suggested another type of distributed firewall should be used in MANET with 
Intrusion Detection System (IDS) capabilities. This approach adds extra security to 
the network and protects it from DoS attacks.   
 
4.1.2 Intrusion Detection System (IDS) 
 
An ‘intrusion’ is any type of action by someone attempting to affect any 
aspect of the security triad that are discussed earlier in Chapter 2: Confidentiality, 
Integrity and Availability (CIA). An IDS is an important pillar of network security 
infrastructure. IDS is thus a system which aims to detect any intrusions or anomalies. 
There are three components of IDS: data collection, detection and response. Data 
collection involves collecting and processing data tasks, such as storing, sending and 
transferring data. IDS is another countermeasure used against DoS attack. The 
intrusion detection system works as an alarm to protect computer systems from any 
vulnerability.  
The main problem with using IDS in MANET is the many false alarms raised 
by individual nodes. False alarms occur as a result of false claims or reports which 
have been created by anonymous nodes. In addition, the anonymity issue in MANET 
is considered a significant challenge due to the difficulties of disguising between 
trusted and untrusted nodes in MANET. When compromises occur then the IDS will 
issue an alert message to the security administrator, such as the website security 
officer. The IDS will collect, monitor and analyse the audit data in order to find any 
intrusive or anomalous attempts. Three classifications of intrusion detection 
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techniques were proposed by (Misra et al., 2009b): anomaly-based, misuse-based 
and specification-based.  
The first technique is the anomaly-based intrusion detection method. This 
defines the symptoms of the normal activities of the system, such as using commands 
frequently. This technique detects intrusions as anomalies (Mitrokotsa and 
Dimitrakakis, 2013). Many techniques have been used to detect anomalies, such as 
statistical approaches as well as artificial intelligences such as neural networks and 
data mining. The challenge in this technique is to define normal behaviour, because 
normality can changed over time and the IDS must be up-to-date in order to detect 
any new vulnerabilities (Sahu and Sinha, 2013).  
The second technique is misuse-based intrusion detection. This technique 
compares the signatures of known attacks with the activities of the current system. In 
commercial IDS, this technique is preferred over others since it is efficient and has 
low false positive rates. The main drawback of this type is that it is unable to detect 
new attacks. The power of this system results from its signature database, and it 
needs continuous updates to add new attacks.  
The last technique is specification-based intrusion detection. This method 
places a set of defined constraints on a protocol or a program. Intrusions will 
therefore be detected as runtime violations of these specifications. This technique 
combines the strengths of the other techniques discussed above, as it detects both 
known and unknown attacks with low false positive rates. For instance, it could 
detect new attacks which do not follow the system’s specifications. The limitation of 
this technique is that it is unable to detect some types of DoS attacks when they do 
not directly violate the program specifications.  
There are many problems with using IDS. First, fidelity problems can occur. 
The information used in IDS is usually obtained from a packet on the network or 
from the audit trails. The data travels along a path, and could potentially be modified 
or even destroyed by an attacker. Second, resource usage problems have been raised. 
IDS will monitor the network at all times, even if there is no intrusion, which will 
lead it to use additional resources. Third, reliability problems exist. As the IDS is 
implemented as a separate program, this could be tampered with or even deleted by 
an attacker (CHAUDHARI and PRASAD, 2015). 
The first IDS for MANET was proposed by (Zhang and Lee, 2000), who 
argue that many intrusion detection systems used in wired networks are not capable 
of working in MANET. They present an intrusion detection method for wireless ad- 
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hoc networks based on cooperative statistical anomaly recognition techniques. This 
method is based on running an IDS agent on each mobile node in the network. 
Agents collect data by gathering a real-time data and audit them from local sources 
and using an anomaly detection method to detect anomalies which are then updated 
in the routing table. One problem with using this method is that it results in a number 
of false positives, so it is unreliable. (Nadeem and Howarth, 2013) conducted a 
comprehensive survey on the use of IDS in MANET. This study uses IDS to detect 
many network layer attacks. A table in this research compares the use of different 
IDS methodologies in detecting attacks in MANET.  
To sum up, IDS is more complex and challenging in MANET for many 
reasons. Mobility and dynamic topologies are factors which made IDS difficult in 
MANET and hindered its work. Fulfilling the requirements of IDS is thus difficult in 
MANET, such as collecting data and applying IDS techniques to detect intrusions 
with low false positive rates and effective responses (Begam and Murugaboopathi, 
2013).  
 
4.1.3 Filtering 
 
Filtering is another technique used to stop excessive packets by using a router 
to detect them. However, this technique cannot be considered reliable as sometimes 
the packets can overwhelm the router and cause a DoS attack. (Tan and Seah, 2005) 
proposed the use of statistical filtering. This is a reactive method used to detect 
DDoS attacks in MANET by using traffic profiling for the purpose of filtering and 
detection. The main advantage of using this mechanism is that the packet delivery 
ratio is raised, whereas the average end-to-end delay is clearly decreased. The major 
limitation of this method is the cluster-based routing protocol filtering mechanism, as 
it does not guarantee detection of illegitimate packets and acceptance of the 
legitimate ones (Tyagi, 2013). 
 In addition, some mechanisms based on filtering use sophisticated filters. 
This would block any malicious nodes from sending such immoderate packet traffic 
to the victim node. However, this technique requires a high level of filter 
deployment, which is impractical and costly. Overlay filtering is suggested instead, 
as this technique could be deployed increasingly. For example, the CenterTrack 
method uses an overlay conforming from routers with network borders, which 
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determines the source of any DoS attack and the input debugging capabilities (Jia et 
al., 2013).  
 
4.1.4 Watchdog/Pathrater 
 
This method shows that it is possible to increase the throughput of a network 
despite the presence of malicious nodes. The aim of this method is to detect 
misbehaving nodes. A watchdog is set in the node when it forwards a packet to 
ensure that the next node will also forward the packet in the path. The watchdog 
performs this task by listening to all nodes within the transmission range in the 
network. The node will be tagged as misbehaving if it fails to forward the packet to 
the next node. If a packet is not forwarded to the next node during a timeout period, 
then a failure tally for the node responsible for forwarding the packet is increased. 
When this tally exceeds a predetermined threshold, the node is considered malicious 
(Arunkumar and Annalakshmi, 2014).  
The watchdog mechanism’s easy implementation and effectiveness means 
that many methods use it as a base, such as Pathrater. In the Pathrater method each 
node uses information obtained from the watchdog to rate its neighbours. Neighbour 
nodes can be classified as members, fresh, unstable or malicious. The watchdog is 
considered to be an intrusion detection system for MANET (Mishra et al., 2013). In 
addition, it is responsible for detecting misbehaving nodes by listening to the next 
hop and ensuring that nodes do not fail to transmit the packet to the next node 
(Padiya et al., 2013). If the watchdog finds a misbehaving node then it will be 
reported so that Pathrater and router protocols can avoid using this node in future 
transmission (Varshney et al., 2014).  
Despite the fact that the watchdog scheme can successfully detect malicious 
nodes, as proven by much of the research, this method still has some limitations 
(Buddha, 2013). The watchdog scheme is unable to detect malicious nodes in certain 
situations. For instance, the watchdog cannot detect malicious nodes in the presence 
of receiver collisions and false misbehaviour reports, or if there is limited power for 
transmission (Sharma et al., 2013b).  
An approach called TWO network-layer ACKnowledgment-based scheme 
(TWOACK) has successfully solved some of the flaws with the watchdog method. 
This approach resolves some of Watchdog’s weaknesses such as its limited 
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transmission power and the receiver collision problems. The only limitation of this 
method is the network overhead, because the acknowledgment process is required in 
every packet transmission process (Abraham, 2013). In Selective TWOACK (S-
TWOACK, three nodes work as one group to detect misbehaving nodes within the 
network. S-TWOACK is an updated version of the TWOACK scheme as it is able to 
detect misbehaving nodes even in situations of limited power and receiver collision. 
The three nodes work together in one route, so the third node is responsible for 
sending the S-TWOACK packet to the first node.  
The use of the Message Report Authentication (MRA) method is proposed in 
order to discover misbehaving nodes in the presence of false misbehaving reports 
which are launched by intruders to mislead innocent nodes (Mahajan and Patil, 
2015). The Adaptive Acknowledgment (AACK) method is used to resolve two of the 
watchdog’s most significant problems, namely receiver collision and limited 
transmission power. This method is an improvement of the TWOACK scheme as its 
detection overhead is lower while its detection efficiency is improved. However, the 
AACK method does not work well on long paths as it would take a long time for 
end-to-end acknowledgment. This limitation means the malicious nodes would have 
more time to drop extra packets (Al-Roubaiey et al., 2010).  
Enhanced TWOACK  (E-TWOACK) is an improved version of the previous 
method. The main difference between TWOACK and E-TWOACK is that the former 
detects malicious links in the network, whereas the latter detects malicious nodes in 
the network (Botkar and Chaudhary, 2011). The efficiency level for detecting 
misbehaving nodes is therefore increased (Dave and Dave, 2014). ExWatchdog is an 
extended form of Watchdog which solves one of Watchdog’s weaknesses: the false 
misbehaviour problem. Some nodes report that certain other nodes are malicious, but 
in fact they are the real intruders (Nasser and Chen, 2007). ExWatchdog also detects 
misbehaving nodes and reports them to the response system (Chaturvedi and Sharma, 
2013).  
The Enhanced Adaptive ACKnowledgment (EAACK) method is 
recommended especially for MANET to detect malicious behaviours. This method 
addresses three weaknesses of Watchdog: receiver collision, limited transmission 
power and false misbehaviour (Shakshuki et al., 2013). This protocol can be 
compared with TWOACK and AACK method in terms of receiver collision, limited 
transmission power and false misbehaviour (Elizabeth et al., 2014). Results show 
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that the EAACK method has the best results. EAACK is based on the concept of the 
hierarchical clustering of nodes (Ghodake et al., 2015).  
 
4.1.5 Traceback 
 
Traceback is another method which has attained satisfactory results in 
detecting denial of service attacks and identifying the source of an attack. There are 
many types of IP traceback techniques available for both wired and MANET 
networks: manual traceback schemes, packet marking schemes (PPM), ICMP 
traceback schemes (ITrace), and logging-based traceback schemes.  
The strategy used to trace DoS attacks in MANET is different from that used 
on the Internet in three ways. First, on the Internet both the attacker and the victim 
are located on the same subnet. This means when the attacker sends packets to the 
victim, the packets should be transmitted to the gateway first and then get on the path 
via routers until they arrive at the victim. The gateway is usually a router or 
computer which has a fixed IP address. The main aim of tracing a DoS attack on the 
Internet is therefore to determine the attacker’s subnet. Meanwhile, in MANET the 
nodes move arbitrarily so the relative position between two nodes will change 
frequently. There will consequently be no fixed gateway for every node, so the 
address of nodes is considered to be flat. The purpose of tracing the DoS on MANET 
is to find out the physical location of the attacker (Jin et al., 2006).  
Second, in tracing a DoS attack in the Internet it is impossible for the attacker 
to succeed in displacing quickly. In addition, the path that the packets use cannot be 
changed considerably (Shinde and Bakal, 2015). On the other hand, in MANET the 
path which packets pass through can change frequently. The time needed to trace the 
attacker should thus be short, because the attacker could move to another position 
before the tracing process is completed.  
Third, in the Internet different devices such as routers, computers and 
switches have high and reliable computational abilities, and also unlimited battery 
power. The tracing algorithm would then be complex and more accurate, whereas in 
MANET nodes have constrained battery power and low computational abilities. The 
tracing algorithm is therefore accurate and simple when compared with tracing on 
the Internet. Moreover, traceback methods on the Internet consume a lot of 
computational resources, battery power and even bandwidth. However, in MANET 
nodes have limited computational resources, battery power and bandwidth.  
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Subsequently, MANET needs more efficient traceback schemes than the 
Internet. Nodes in MANET are arbitrary and can come in and out of the network at 
any time, meaning the attack path will change frequently. Attackers in MANET can 
also spoof the source address, which makes identifying the real attackers impossible 
(Vegda and Sahu, 2015).  
(Jin et al., 2006) proposed a novel traceback scheme called the Zone 
Sampling-Based Traceback (ZSBT) algorithm which is used to trace denial of 
service attackers in MANET. The concept of this approach is based on dividing the 
network into a number of zones. Each zone puts its ID in every passing packet. 
When the node then receives a packet and wants to forward it to another node, the 
node first writes its own ID on the packet and the probability (P) then forwards the 
packet to another node. Using zone ID, which is written in the packet, it is easy to 
tell if a node has suffered a DoS attack or not. The victim can then reconstruct the 
whole path to the attacker by combing these packets (Kim and Kim, 2008).  
Manual traceback schemes have many shortcomings, such as high 
management costs, inaccurate results and slow tracking speeds.  Many traceback 
schemes which are suitable for wired networks, such as manual, logging-based and 
ICMP-based traceback schemes are inappropriate for MANET (Foroushani, 2013). 
This is because its characteristics rely on assumptions which are unsuitable for the 
MANET platform, such as trustworthy routers and static route topology (Shinde 
Sandeep and Bakal, 2014).  
 
4.1.6 Pushback 
 
Pushback is another mechanism which can be used to defend against DDoS 
attacks. If it is possible to determine whether a packet belongs to an attacker and 
drop it, the problem will be solved. However, routers cannot determine if a packet 
definitely belongs to a good or malicious flow. In the pushback mechanism, routers 
are enabled to identify the high bandwidth aggregates that participate in the 
congestion rate and help to limit them. Whenever the congested router fails to sustain 
this control then it requests the help of its upstream neighbour. If the attackers are 
collocated on a path separate from the normal traffic, the performance of the 
pushback mechanism will be better.  
Pushback is unable to work in non-contiguous deployment, and is also unable 
to compromise attacks that do not overcrowd its core routers (Varadharajan and 
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Tupakula, 2014). In selective pushback, pushback messages are sent to the routers 
that are closest to the attack source by analysing the traffic, which leads to a change 
of upstream routers at the target.  
This scheme has two main features. First, the location of the attack source via 
traffic distribution analysis will be determined more accurately. Second, mitigating 
the damage from a DoS attack can be more efficient because the pushback message 
will be sent directly to the routers closest to the attack source. However, this scheme 
cannot be very accurate when it is used in multiple domains (Gasti et al., 2013).   
All in all, Pushback mechanism is useful and works well if there is indication 
of a DoS attack. However, the power of Pushback would be severely impaired by 
mobility issues, as with MANET there are no fixed upstream routers but rather nodes 
which carry the traffic through ordinary movements. 
 
4.1.7 Game theoretic approach 
 
A game theoretical approach is used in order to forward the good packets and 
filter out the bad packets using verification. Game theory classifies games into two 
groups: non-cooperative and cooperative. Non-cooperative games are composed 
from two or more players and compete with each other. In contrast, cooperative 
games consist of multi-players cooperating with each other in to gain the highest 
possible total benefits. This method is based on using digital signatures to verify 
legitimate packets. If any packet does not pass this verification process, it will be 
dropped and named a bad packet. In addition, bad packets sometimes escape the 
verification process if the forwarder does not verify the packet. There is a penalty to 
the forwarders of bad packets (Otrok et al., 2008).  
Verifying packets would help users to discover malicious attacks and drop 
affected packets. There is also a reward system to forwarders that verify packets, 
which is gained as a credit. An accounting system is responsible for calculating these 
rewards and continuously tracking them (Rachedi et al., 2010). This system is such a 
game where forwarders verify packets that they receive. It succeeds in encouraging 
cooperation among nodes and mitigates DoS attacks in MANET (Wu and Yau, 
2007). 
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4.2   Commercial solutions to detect DoS attacks 
 
The revolutionary advances in the use of wireless networks in business, 
airports and homes has helped to increase the risk of certain attacks, such as DoS 
attacks. The increased number of DoS attacks in many sectors and organisations, 
such as banks and universities, has led to the creation of commercial software 
designed to detect and diminish the effects of these attacks. With the increase of 
threats beyond DoS attacks, many commercial programs and solutions have been 
proposed to protect both individuals and organisations.  
For instance, Barracuda firewalls are designed to protect users against threats, 
malware and DoS attacks. In addition, the software guarantees service will be 
restored as soon as possible. The main aims of these security companies are to 
respond to incidents response, backup data and keeps customers away from threats 
such as DDoS and phishing attacks. Security companies help individuals and firms to 
maintain security and protection from intrusions. For instance, Dell SecureWorks is a 
famous security organisation which focuses on incident response and protecting 
customers from cyber-attacks (Secureworks, 2015).  
These security programs cannot absolutely guarantee protection from these 
attacks. However, they can at least try to decrease the likelihood an attack will occur, 
and if it does occur then they can try to detect attacks as soon as possible in order to 
recover the system and control the effects.  
 
4.3   Other methods used to detect DoS attacks in MANET based on using 
trust 
Using trust in MANET helps to encourage nodes to participate in network 
communications. However, regards to MANET’s nature such as resources 
constraints, trust establishment and trust management are complex in MANET. This 
section defines the meaning of trust in various sectors and highlights the existing 
studies in this area briefly.  
4.3.1 The meaning of trust in different sectors 
 
Another method used to avoid DoS attacks in MANET is trust between 
nodes. First, it is essential to understand what is meant by trust in MANET. 
Generally, trust means one party or person believes in someone else and always 
expects positive behaviour from the other side. This party or person is then 
Research Gap in Denial of Service Attack 
 
 54 
considered trustworthy. Originally, the concept of trust derived from social science 
as a degree of subjective belief against the behaviour of an entity (Roth, 2013). 
In network security and communications, the concept of ‘trust management’ 
refers to a means of specifying and interpreting security credentials, relationships and 
policies (Pinyol and Sabater-Mir, 2013). Trust management is an essential tool in the 
relationship of nodes, in particular when nodes work together without any past 
interactions (Menaka and Ranganathan, 2013).   
In the sociology sector, trust affects every work project, relationship, business 
venture, effort is engaged, and communication (Misztal, 2013). Personally and 
professionally, trust changes the quality of each present moment, as well as the 
trajectory and outcome of each coming moment of life. Moreover, trust is essential to 
building strong relationships, which lead to cooperation between people (Harper, 
2014). 
Trust has different meanings in economics, and may be either impersonal and 
personal or informal. An example of the former is buying a product online and 
giving a website your personal credit card information to complete the purchase 
process. The latter is the trust built from personal experience, such as being friendly. 
Trust in economics is therefore an expectation which applies to situations where 
risky action is taken based on incomplete information (Horváth, 2013).  
Trust in philosophy is critical and is important in life, as people usually use 
trust to rely on others for help, advice and when making important decisions. 
Moreover, trust can be a moral behaviour in human society (Marshall and 
Elghossain, 2014). 
Trust in psychology grows from birth and becomes stronger over time 
depending on one’s relationships. For example, a child which grows up in a very 
loving family is likely to express love and trust toward other people. When trust is 
lost, regaining it is difficult. We believe someone we have high trust in is less likely 
to cheat, steal or lie to us. In addition, a trustworthy person is less likely to be 
conflicted, unstable or sad, and is sought by many people. However, many trustees 
have been deceived and fooled by distrusting trustworthy people (Tyler et al., 2014).  
There is a difference between confidence and trust, as confidence is based on 
knowledge or predictability whereas trust is needed preserve interactions. In real life, 
trust is emotive and has various levels. Trust in relationships is also provisional and 
contested. People have to trust each other in certain situations. For instance, a 
customer demonstrates trust in a store website when they purchase an item and insert 
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all their payment details. This trust is based on the store’s reputation. In real life trust 
is temporal and related to past information, reputation and the future (Haggerty, 
2012). 
 
4.3.2 Using trust to detect DoS attacks in MANET 
 
The usage of trust is used, combined with security, in order to enhance the 
security level (Felici, 2013). MANET has five properties of trust. First, trust is 
dynamic and not static, so trust establishment is based on spatial and temporal 
information. Second, trust is subjective. This means a trusted node can display a 
varying level of trust against the same trusted node regards the different experience 
and that due to the dynamic topology of MANET. Third, trust is not transitive. For 
example, if node A trusts node B, and node B trusts node C, it does not mean that 
node A trusts node C. Fourth, trust in MANET is asymmetric. Usually a node with 
higher capabilities and more energy will not trust a node with less power. Fifth, trust 
is context-dependent, so nodes trust others depending on the task, such as trust in 
selfishness or in computational power (Cho et al., 2011). 
 For instance, Alice can trust Bob’s abilities as a mechanic but not as a 
plumber. A comprehensive study of trust management in MANET provides different 
definitions of trust which are dependent on different fields, including economics, 
organisational management, psychology, autonomic computing, as well as 
communications and networks (Chen et al., 2014). In addition, many studies have 
investigated ways to detect misbehaving nodes in addition to attack and design 
protocols based on different directions. For example, there are many research 
directions and protocols based on secure routing, access control, authentication, trust 
evaluation, trust computation, trust distribution and general trust level identification 
(Cho et al., 2011).  
(Blaze et al., 1996) conducted the first research into trust management for 
network security. They considered trust management to be a separate component of 
security services within a network. The effectiveness of trust management is that it is 
possible without any previous interactions the nodes in the network can participate 
with an acceptable average of trust relationships of nodes. The main objectives of 
this framework are to support localised control and relationships by binding public 
keys to allow the access control process to proceed without complex security 
authentication procedures. This paper’s only limitation is that only localised trust 
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management is based on an entirely decentralised concept, which is essential to 
policy information (Seigneur et al., 2013).  
In MANET, trust management is used for two motivations. First, trust 
management can help to identify and isolate misbehaving nodes, decreasing the 
impact of faulty nodes. Second, trust management can predict a node’s future, 
helping to improve network performance (Govindan and Mohapatra, 2012). Trust 
management is classified as both a trust-establishment framework and a reputation-
based framework (Li et al., 2007). The former evaluates neighbouring nodes based 
on direct observations, as trust between nodes is built by combining opinions from 
intermediate nodes (Cho et al., 2012). Multiple trust management schemes have been 
developed for MANET. (Marti et al., 2000) argued for the use of secure routing in 
particular, as one trust management scheme consists of both a watchdog and a 
pathrater. The watchdog is used to monitor node behaviours, whilst the pathrater 
collects reputations and forms reactions. It is observed that this method is based only 
on direct monitoring (Varshney et al., 2014).  
With regard to MANET, definitions of trust can be classified into four 
categories: trust as a risk factor, trust as belief, trust as subjective probability, and 
trust as a transitivity relationship. This study defines trust as dynamic, and as 
oscillating over time. Many attacks can occur in trust management in MANET, 
including Sybil attacks, collusion attacks, and DoS. Furthermore, the study explains 
the three main areas of trust in MANET are trust propagation, trust aggregation, and 
trust predication. The two main requirements that must be considered when 
developing any trust management method are the detection of maliciousness and the 
accuracy of trust. The authors assume that the area of trust management is not yet 
fixed (England et al., 2012). Every node which conducts a trust calculation on 
another node will raise the resource cost. Unfortunately, these resources are limited 
in MANET. It would thus be beneficial to share trust values with nodes, which is 
known as trust propagation. 
Trust propagation has two additional requirements. First, partial availability 
should be available at the time, which according to the nature of MANET means just 
partial information. Trust can be calculated when only some of the trust scores can 
be obtained. Second, minimal overhead is another requirement as resources in 
MANET are limited (Zouridaki et al., 2006). The disadvantage of trust propagation 
is that attackers can exploit the advantage of this method by consuming as many 
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resources as they can by flooding the network with trust recommendations. The 
network will then suffer from a DoS attack (Govindan and Mohapatra, 2012).  
Establishing trusted communications in MANET to ensure authentication is 
another way to perform security in MANET. (Weimerskirch and Thonet, 2002) used 
human behaviour as a base to develop a novel trust model. Society in this research is 
considered to be an ad hoc network. The Secure and Objective Reputation based 
Incentive (SORI) is developed as another reputation based trust management scheme 
that employs an incentivized approach. This scheme is based on encouraging the 
forwarding packets process whilst discouraging selfish behaviour through the use of 
a reputation propagation method and quantified objective measures.  
Another approach based on a reputation trust management scheme is known 
as Cooperation Of Nodes - Fairness In Dynamic Ad-hoc NeTworks (CONFIDANT). 
This method is unique as it provides an incentivised approach for altruistic nodes, 
paid as a response for cooperative action. This scheme is based on detecting 
misbehaving nodes via direct and indirect observations, and recommendations from 
other nodes. CONFIDANT results suggest that 60% of the network contains 
misbehaving nodes. CONFIDANT is used as a benign network. CONFIDANT is 
constructed of four main processes: monitoring, a reputation system, a path manager 
and a trust manager. Monitoring is responsible for checking each forwarding packet 
in order to detect any deviations. The reputation system maintains the identities of 
the table of nodes using associated ratings. The path manager removes the path 
which contains the malicious node, whilst the trust manager transacts with the sent 
and received alarm messages. CONFIDANT uses timers which are associated with 
each node identity; when a timer expires, the node is considered legitimate 
(Buchegger and Le Boudec, 2002).  
A new mechanism is proposed: COllaborative REputation (CORE). This 
approach combines a reputation function with a monitoring mechanism. CORE is 
intended to provide a decision-making process regarding the cooperation or gradual 
isolation of a specific node (Michiardi and Molva, 2002). An innovative 
characteristic of this approach is that the exchange of solely positive and reputable 
information can occur. The only limitation of this approach is that it can decrease the 
resilience of positive reports, whilst there is no facility to submit negative feedback 
(Thorat and Kulkarni, 2014).  However, CORE differs from CONFIDANT as the 
latter sends the reputation values to nodes in the network, allowing fake reputation 
values to be spread maliciously, while the former uses the reputation values defined 
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by each node. In addition, the CORE scheme allows only positive reports to pass 
through, but CONFIDANT also allows negative ones. CORE is thus better at 
preventing the false reports which cause DoS attacks (He et al., 2004).   
(Zhong et al., 2003) proposed a simple cheat-proof credit-based system 
named SPRITE. This system applies an incentive to MANET by encouraging selfish 
nodes to cooperate with other nodes. A node will inform the credit clearance service 
about received messages, or will even forward messages by uploading receipts 
(Buttyán and Hubaux, 2003). The intermediate nodes then gain credit if they succeed 
in forwarding the message to other nodes. Generally, credit systems give nodes an 
incentive to cooperate (Crowcroft et al., 2004). When a node relays a packet to other 
nodes, it will therefore receive credit it can use to send its own packet. Meanwhile 
malicious nodes will continue to drop packets, which will eventually deplete their 
credit eventually so it will not even be able to send its own traffic (Dev and 
Augustin, 2015). One benefit of SPRITE is that it takes both public key 
infrastructure and source routing into consideration. The superiority and merit of this 
work is highlighted by the relatively low cost overheads, as well as its ability in areas 
such as MANET and its constrained resources. SPRITE however is considered 
unreliable as the resources of nodes are low (Sedghi et al., 2013) .   
(Liu et al., 2004) posited trust levels in the routing process. Source nodes use 
the trust level to evaluate the security of the destination point. Subsequently, trust 
levels can be used as a guide to the source node and selecting the most appropriate 
and secure route. Trust management schemes are used to detect misbehaving nodes, 
for example selfish and malicious nodes. Many attacks have been deterred based on 
the implementation of trust management strategies, such as varying types of DoS 
attacks, including wormhole, blackhole and grayhole attacks. MANET employs 
many trust management schemes based on secure routing, authentication, IDS, 
access control and key management.  
In addition, (Sun et al., 2008) introduced a ‘trust manager’ element into their 
scheme. This scheme is based on determining the trust level of the node by drawing 
upon self-monitored information. As a result, reputation is collected via direct and 
either indirect observations or experience. No results have been generated from this 
approach, but some important questions are raised. A key question is the nature of 
the relationship between the number of tolerated malicious nodes and the total 
number of nodes in the network.  
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(Denko, 2005) proposed the use of reputation-based incentive mechanism for 
detecting and preventing DoS attacks in MANET. This method uses a clustering 
architecture to perform reputation data management in both distributed and localised 
ways. This method allowed DoS attacks to be detected using information exchange 
and collaborative monitoring. The reputation rate is proceeded using cluster level 
information and neighbourhood, but more weight is given to the node’s observation. 
In order to reduce traffic between cooperative nodes, a load balancing mechanism is 
used. Simulation results reflect the success of using this method considerably. It is 
important to distinguish between selfish and malicious nodes. The former type 
refuses to cooperate with other nodes in the network to perform network services and 
operations, while the latter type performs attacks in order to degrade the performance 
of the network. Trust-based routing algorithms aim to identify malicious and selfish 
nodes in MANET.  
Observation-based Cooperation Enforcement in Ad hoc Networks (OCEAN) 
is an extension of the DSR routing protocol. OCEAN uses both monitoring and 
reputation systems. Unlike the approaches discussed above, OCEAN relies only 
upon its own observation to bypass the new intrusions of false accusations from 
second-hand reputation exchanges. OCEAN is therefore standalone architecture. 
OCEAN considers two kinds of routing misbehaviour: misleading and selfish. When 
a node has participated in the route discovery but not packet forwarding, it is 
considered to be misleading because it misleads other nodes in order to route packets 
via itself. However, if a node does not participate in the route discovery, then it is 
considered to be selfish (Anantvalee and Wu, 2007).  A Locally Aware Reputation 
System (LARS) has the same concept of OCEAN as it relies on the local information 
in order to handle and isolate misbehaving nodes and does not consider second hand 
reputation information (Hu and Burmester, 2006). 
In order to deal with selfish nodes, a new mechanism is conjectured. This 
approach encourages nodes to cooperate in MANET by employing many 
components of trust, including transitivity, subjectivity and dynamicity. In order to 
evaluate trust, this scheme uses packet forwarding behaviours (Soltanali et al., 2007). 
To strengthen the power of security within MANET, a new trust model is proposed. 
This research focused on issues related to recommendations. Only trusted routes are 
used in this model when communicating between nodes. Furthermore, malicious 
nodes are isolated based on information from direct interactions and 
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recommendations. This model considers the traits of DoS attacks and attempts to 
detect them within the network (Balakrishnan et al., 2007).   
In order to construct trusting relationships, this study uses recommendations 
as mentioned by (Li et al., 2009). Trust can be calculated using these 
recommendations, so this work will use trust for the purpose of authentication. The 
model is based only on monitoring packet forwarding behaviours. (Moe et al., 2008) 
proposed an extension of the DSR referred to as a Trust-based Secure MANET 
Routing (TSR). This is based on an incentive mechanism which promotes 
cooperation among nodes and weakens the strength of selfish nodes as far as 
possible. In addition, this work uses a Hidden Markov Model (HMM) in order to 
quantitatively measure the trustworthiness of nodes. The selfish node is described as 
benign as it drops packets selectively. The only limitation of this work is that it 
cannot detect modifications and some attacks performed by malicious nodes. 
(Chang and Kuo, 2009) proposed the use of the Markov chain trust model in 
order to generate Trust Values (TVs) for one-hop nodes. TVs are computed based 
only on direct observations of node behaviours, not by measuring the decay based on 
the recommendations from other nodes. By using a Certificate Authority (CA) server 
and a backup CA with high levels of TVs, this scheme delimits a trust-based 
hierarchical key management approach. However, this work is limited due to the lack 
of consideration of trust decay, although trust is based on the recommendations of 
other nodes.  
It is proposed that the Distributed Cooperative Trust based Intrusion 
Detection (DICOTIDS) architecture for MANET can protect the network from 
misbehaviour, such as selfish nodes. The key aspect of this framework is to use both 
direct and indirect observations among nodes. In addition, this framework can target 
false trust information propagated by malicious nodes within the network. This 
method uses the ‘promiscuous mode’ to observe other nodes. The main goal of 
DICOTIDS is to detect compromised nodes which disseminate false detection alerts 
in MANETs. This method is based on using trust with IDS. This approach uses a 
reputation mechanism to rate nodes. After detecting misbehaving nodes, a distributed 
IDS algorithm will broadcast IDS alert messages among nodes. All data collected 
from the nodes will be shared between them periodically. The reputation mechanism 
is used to evaluate the level of trust in a specific node. In summary, the level of trust 
- whether trusted, untrusted or undecided - is calculated based on the reputation value 
in this method (Mutlu and Yilmaz, 2011).  
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(Khan and Vatsa, 2011) proposed a new method to detect DDoS attacks in 
MANET by providing a credit-based mechanism. This method helps nodes in 
MANET to cooperate. The performance of this method is based on three phases: 
reputation and score-based cluster creation and cluster head selection, DDoS 
classification of attacks and their detection, and DDoS control packet requests. This 
method is efficient, and its only limitation is the mobility issue. This was not 
considered when designing the architecture, as the cluster heads are assumed to be 
stationary so that only the nodes of the cluster could move freely. Scalability is 
another issue, as in order to balance the workload on the cluster, the size of the 
network would increase dramatically.  
Another study which uses a reputation, trust based scheme and credit to 
enforce nodes communications was posited in (Abbas et al., 2011). Identity based 
attacks such as the Whitewashing and Sybil attacks have affected the performance of 
this method. In order to hinder these attacks, a non-monetary and entry fee per 
identity is used that helps to handle these type of scenarios considerably. The 
limitation of this work is that newcomer nodes are not welcomed with regard to the 
free identities available in the network. Simulation results provide better evidence in 
plummeting evil nodes and evil throughput compared to the CONFIDANT scheme 
in the occurrence of whitewashing nodes. 
Another collaborative and multidimensional trust-based outlier detection 
algorithm is proposed in order to secure MANET and detect misbehaving nodes. 
This allows nodes which have exhibited abnormal behaviour to be identified. In 
addition, this algorithm evaluates the trustworthiness for nodes from three 
perspectives: Collaboration Trust (COLT), Behavioural Trust (BET) and Reference 
Trust (RET). COLT is determined based on the collaboration rate, while BET is 
defined based on the misbehaviour rate, such as the number of flooding attacks. RET 
is determined based on the correctness of the opinion given to other nodes. The 
initial trust value is 1. A punishment factor is applied to the trust value of any 
misbehaving node. These factors will be updated using the weighted voting method 
in the local view update step. Although this algorithm records downgrade, it is 
considered better than other methods such as Simple trust-based Weighted Voting 
(SWV) and the Simple Averaging (SA) method (Li et al., 2009). The limitation of 
this method arises due to differing circumstances; for example, if the majority of 
nodes are malicious, then the local views are unreliable. Furthermore, this method is 
overly robust in small communication overheads (Li et al., 2012). 
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(Xia et al., 2013) suggested another trust model which is extended from Trust 
based Source Routing protocol (TSR). This method relies on the individual 
experience and prediction methods to indicate the safest route from source to the 
destination. Nodes prediction trust value is considered as the input. Untrusted nodes 
would be removed from the transmission in this situation. Nodes can be malicious, 
suspect, low trustworthy, trustworthy, and completely trustworthy.  
(Vir et al., 2013) proposed the use of another trust-based routing system to 
update and store the trust value of nodes in MANET. This system assumes that 
evaluating trust will help to concisely distinguish between normal and malicious 
nodes. The study also provides a strong comparison between the three types of 
routing protocols in terms of throughput and trust-based average jitter: DSR, AODV, 
and DYnamic MANET On-demand (DYMO). The results showed that the AODV 
protocol was the strongest, as it delivered 65% of packets - more than the other 
protocols. 
(Aravindh et al., 2013) proposed another trust management scheme to 
calculate trust in MANET. This research uses direct observation to calculate trust, 
which helps to successfully isolate malicious nodes from the network. Furthermore, 
this methods uses trust values to favour packet-forwarding by maintaining the trust 
counter of every node. If the trust-counter value decreases below a certain threshold, 
the corresponding intermediate node is considered malicious and is isolated from the 
network.  
(Gunasekaran and Premalatha, 2013) suggested the use of MANET-specific 
Trust Enhanced Anonymous on-demand routing Protocol (TEAP). TEAP aims to 
control anonymity in two ways. First, by reining-in misbehaving nodes after 
receiving two warning alerts, which leads to compromised nodes not sending 
cooperative messages to other nodes. Second, if any node sends the same claim 
message about a certain node, then it is considered to be misbehaving. The TEAP 
protocol uses the concepts of anonymity and liability to detect misbehaving nodes in 
MANET. The results of this study reflect the efficacy and robustness of this protocol 
in detecting anomalies.  
(Kartha and Neeba, 2014) developed another technique to establish trust in 
nodes. Trust is assigned to a node according to the history of communications of 
trustable path from source to destination as the trust values of nodes are aggregated. 
The simulation results prove the power of this method in decreasing both overhead 
and drop packets.  
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(Krishnan et al., 2015) estimated node trust using two agents. The first agent 
continuously tracks any packet dropping and link failures. The second tracks any 
attack or malicious activities in the network. These two agents of trust interconnect 
the nodes with trusted nodes that improve the network performance. The results of 
this method highlight the effectiveness of this model, as it gives low delays and high 
throughputs.  
Another study restricts and punishes selfish nodes as they are not provided 
with packet forwarding services by the good nodes within the network (Abbas et al., 
2015). Thus, good or normal nodes will increase the network throughput and 
decrease the misbehaving nodes activities. In this study of cooperation schemes in 
MANET, where Direct Interactions (DIs) might affect metrics, such as delay, routing 
overhead, throughput, and utility, these metrics are evaluated. With regard to the 
simulation results, the cooperation promotion schemes need to be evaluated utilising 
wider areas for constant radio ranges to diminish the effect of DIs. 
 A trust based routing strategy termed routing Secure-BEst FOrwarding 
Route Estimation (BEFORE) is proposed to guarantee the optimal route estimation 
in calculating the trust value and hop counts utilising the dummy packets inside the 
network at the 1-hop level. The problem with this method is that some ‘intelligent’ 
DoS attacks cannot be detected, such as a grayhole attack. Only genuine nodes can 
send a dummy packet to the destination, therefore, a grayhole node pretends to be a 
genuine node and drops the packet. Another limitation is redundancy and overhead 
as nodes send RREP to the source nodes and only one-hop nodes are considered 
while the others are dismissed (Shah et al., 2016). 
 The Trusted Secure AODV routing protocol (TSAODV) is positioned 
carefully. This protocol is based on calculated trust values and determines the status 
of the node based on different factors such as communication type. The node can be 
one of the following: reliable; unreliable; and mostly reliable. Different trust levels 
between 0 and 1 determine the node’s status. If the node is either reliable or mostly 
reliable then it is allowed to participate in the network communications, otherwise, it 
is blocked from communications. The drawback of this work is the MANET, with its 
mobility, increases the rate of packet dropping regardless of the congestion. 
Therefore, if the node fails to send RREP then it can be considered mostly reliable or 
unreliable (Singh et al., 2016).  
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A further study which presents a comprehensive survey regarding the 
reputation based method which help to detect and even isolate misbehaving nodes 
from communications is carried out in (Abbas et al., 2010). Another study examining 
establishing trust in MANET based on different themes is illustrated in (Dalal et al., 
2012). In addition, studies which look at trust-based routing protocols in MANET 
and trust management to encourage nodes to cooperate are illustrated respectively in 
(Thorat and Kulkarni, 2014); (Gandhi and Jhaveri, 2015); (Vijayan and Jeyanthi, 
2016).  
 
4.4   Current methods used to assign IP addresses and merge MANETs 
 
Regarding the mobility of MANET, the chance of both MANET merge and 
partition occurs. Figure 4.1 shows the pre- and post-merger of two MM. Due to the 
dynamic topology of MANET, and the absence of central management, it is essential 
to assign an IP address and guarantee it is unique to avoid any IP address conflict.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This section gives detailed information about the IP address, assign IP 
address to nodes in MANET, and how the IP address conflict problem is solved in 
MANET environment according to some existing studies.  
Figure 4.1. The scenario of two MANETs merge. 
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It is essential to take into consideration the security aspect when assigning 
the IP address; for example, if a malicious node provides an incorrect vacant IP 
address to a new node, an IP address conflict would occur. 
 
4.4.1 IP address  
 
 
Internet Protocol (IP) addresses are designed to allow a device to 
communicate with other devices via the Internet. IPs facilitate the completion of 
many actions on the World Wide Web (WWW) and govern Internet activities. IPs 
thus identify both initiating devices and various Internet destinations, which enable 
two-way communication. In IP version 4 (IPv4), each device has a unique IP address 
which identifies the device on the Internet. Each IP address is composed of four 
numbers separated by a dot. These numbers can have between 1 and 3 digits. Each of 
the four numbers may range from 0 to 255. An example of an IP address could be 
58.123.0.208 (Rooney, 2011). 
The Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) is a standardised network 
protocol used on IP networks to distribute network configuration parameters 
dynamically, such as IP addresses for services and interfaces. Devices using DHCP 
can request IP addresses and networking parameters automatically from a DHCP 
server. This reduces the need of a user or a network administrator to configure these 
settings manually (Carrell et al., 2012). 
 
4.4.2 Assign IP address in MANET     
 
Assigning IP address in wired networks is easier as the DHCP helps to assign 
IP addresses to clients. However, this method cannot be used in MANET as it 
requires the central server to allocate IP addresses to nodes. MANET’s non-fixed 
infrastructure devoid of central management cannot use this method. Assigning IP 
addresses in MANET is a challenge due to its dynamic topology and mobility. 
MANET needs an efficient and reliable host identifier for communications 
(Choudhury et al., 2015).  In order to ensure proper routing, assigning unique IP 
address in MANET is a prime task.  
Three types of method are used to assign IP addresses in MANET: leader-
based allocation, best effort allocation, and decentralised allocation. The majority of 
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these methods use the Duplicate Address Detection (DAD) method to identify IP 
address conflicts on the network. The DAD algorithm is used when entering a new 
node into the network, or when MANETs merge. For instance, the new node picks 
up a tentative IP address and uses the DAD method to check the availability of this 
IP address with all existing nodes in the network. The node then sends a Duplicate 
Address Probe (DAP) message to nodes and waits to receive the Address Conflict 
Notice (ACN) message within a specific timeout period. If the ACN is not received, 
the node assumes that the IP address is available. There are a number of limitations 
to using the DAD method. First, when the packet reaches its destination there is a 
chance that the duplicate is being tolerated. Second, this method depends on routing 
protocols, which involves traffic overhead caused by the routing packets (Vaidya, 
2002). Passive DAD is a modified version of the DAD method. Periodic link state 
routing information is used by nodes to inform other nodes about their neighbours. 
Unfortunately, this technique has a number of drawbacks, such as contention, 
absolutely costly, redundancy, and collision which is called broadcast storm problem 
(Weniger, 2003).  
In leader-based allocation schemes, an elected leader will allow nodes to 
obtain valid IP addresses as needed. This method does not require the use of the 
DAD method during the assigning of IP addresses, partitioning or merging. Using 
DHCP is a method under this category. The concept of this protocol is based on 
client/server where a central point is important. DHCP servers are responsible for 
assigning IP addresses for nodes which require a vacant IP address. The node 
therefore broadcasts a message in order to discover the server (Droms, 1997). The 
Dynamic Address Configuration Protocol (DACP) is designed to encourage the 
dynamic address allocation process in MANET. An elected Address Authority (AA) 
will maintain the state information of the network. A tentative address is used to 
verify the IP address and ensure its uniqueness using the DAD scheme. The 
limitations of this protocol stem from its high overhead, as messages flood networks 
using both AA and the DAD method (Hsu and Tseng, 2005).  
The best effort allocation approach allows a node to assign its own addresses 
and does not involve any other nodes within the network. Therefore, these 
approaches do not guarantee uniqueness of IP addresses and need the DAD 
mechanism to bypass IP address conflict to ensure correct communication (Munjal et 
al., 2013). 
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Decentralised allocation is the third type, as a host acquires an IP address, 
either itself or from a neighbour, and then applies the DAD to ensure the uniqueness 
of the IP address (Xiaonan and Huanyan, 2013).  
 
4.4.3 Examples of existing method to assign IP in MANET   
 
Based on the address management, three types of protocols are needed to 
configure incoming nodes: stateful protocols, stateless protocols, and hybrid 
protocols. Using stateful auto-configuration protocols, every node maintains a table 
relating to the IP addresses of other nodes, while stateless protocols require every 
node to administer its own IP address. In the latter case, the node creates a random 
address and applies a DAD algorithm to discover any conflicts (Kim and Chung, 
2013). Hybrid protocols are a mixture of the other two types that can improve the 
reliability and scalability of auto-configuration; hence, this type of protocol has a 
high level of complexity (García Villalba et al., 2011).   
 
4.4.3.1 Stateful Protocols 
 
Dynamic Address Allocation Protocol (DAAP) is based on the idea of 
address assignment by a leader. The leader functionality is shared through whole 
network nodes. If a new node joins the network, it would be the leader until the next 
node joins. A unique identifier is linked with the network. In addition, the leader 
preserves the highest IP address within the network (Patchipulusu, 2001). 
MANETconf is a stateful auto-configuration protocol used to allocate IP 
addresses for nodes in MANET. When using this method, each host in the network 
acts as an initiator to allocate IP addresses for new hosts. This method maintains both 
a distributed allocation table and a pending allocation table. The former is used to 
find un-configured addresses. The latter is a group of in-use configured IP addresses 
and a set of initial incomplete allocations. In addition, the pending allocation helps to 
bypass concurrent address allocations. The requester will ask the initiator about free 
and unused addresses via broadcast message. However, the initiator would flood the 
network simultaneously with asking messages in order to ask all hosts about the 
ability of the address allocation. In situations where all hosts confirm that a pending 
address is unique, this address will be assigned. Otherwise, the process will be 
repeated using a new address until a unique address is available (Nesargi and 
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Prakash, 2002). This method identifies both network partitions and merging, 
although identifying merging is more problematic. This is because using this method 
means two tables are maintained which transmit periodic control messages. This 
would raise communication overheads, latency, and affect the efficiency of 
communications (Sadok et al., 2014).   
A decentralised address configuration method called Prime DHCP (PDHCP) 
is developed by (Hsu and Tseng, 2005). This means a node can obtain a unique 
address without using the DAD algorithm. Every node works as a DHCP proxy and 
uses a prime numbering address allocation algorithm in order to compute a unique 
address for every new node. However, this method does not consider the issue of 
address recovery. When the address resources for the assignment of a DHCP are 
required, the DHCP proxy has to ask its own ancestor node to complete the address 
configuration process. The address configuration cost is therefore high, and even the 
delay is prolonged.  
According to (Mansi and Ravi, 2006) , every node in the network preserves a 
collection of unassigned IP addresses. When a node moves out the network, it will 
return its address to the corresponding collection. When the node leaves the network 
suddenly or fails, the address resource will be lost. For this reason, the periodic-
flooding query method is used in this approach to reclaim address resources lost by 
failed nodes. However, the periodic flooding query will consume the network’s 
resources.  
(Zhou et al., 2010) elucidated the use of a prophet address allocation scheme 
in MANET. A function f (n) is used to generate a collection of random numbers to 
assign addresses. The first node in the network will generate a random number and 
define its address to the number. A random state value will be used by the node as a 
seed for its function f (n). When a new node needs to obtain an address, then the first 
node could do so with a state value as the seed for its function. In situations where a 
new node enters the network, this node will perform the same process to acquire an 
address. The address configuration latency and cost in this scheme is low. On the 
other hand, its main drawback is that address conflict still occurs and can be solved 
by using a weak or passive DAD. 
(Gammar et al., 2010) suggested using an address configuration scheme in 
MANET. The address configuration process uses the transmission of the control 
packets and is controlled by a two-hop scope, decreasing both delay and the address 
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configuration cost. However, this method cannot reuse the address resources released 
by failed nodes.  
(Al-Mistarihi et al., 2011) illustrated the use of the Tree based Dynamic 
Address Auto-configuration Protocol (T-DAAP) for MANET. This protocol arranges 
the network in a tree structure. In addition, nodes are divided into three groups: root, 
normal and leader. The root node is responsible for keeping information on all 
leaders in the network, so it would be easy for any leader to check the status of other 
leaders. The network will have just one root node, which is responsible for network 
merging and address reclamation. Although the normal node does not have main 
functions in this protocol, it acts as a relay in many situations. The leader node 
consists of a disjointed free address pool and is responsible for assigning IP 
addresses to new nodes. The disadvantage of this protocol is that the root node 
maintains information on all leaders, which increases the address configuration cost. 
(Ghosh and Datta, 2011) developed an address configuration method 
whereby a new node broadcasts a discovery control packet to its neighbouring proxy 
nodes. When the discovery control packet is broadcasted by the new node is received 
by a proxy node, an offer control packet returns by the proxy node to the new node. 
The proxy node with the minimum address is selected by the new node as its father 
node. The new node then sends a select control packet to its father node. The father 
node requests the address resources from its ancestor nodes if it does not have 
address resources. The father node returns an Acknowledgment Packet (ACK) to the 
new node. In addition, the payload of the ACK packet would be the assigned 
address. If the father node does not have address resources, then the address 
configuration cost raises and the delay increases. Moreover, this method assumes 
that the first new MANET in its initial state sets its address as 0. The drawback of 
this method stems from a scenario whereby two new nodes join the MANET at the 
same time, which might cause an address conflict to occur.  
(Wang and Qian, 2014) discussed distribution address configuration methods 
for MANET. In this method, common nodes have unique address spaces in order to 
assign IP addresses. In addition, an isolated node can obtain a unique address from 
its neighbouring common nodes without the use of the DAD algorithm. Because of 
this, the address configuration process is distributed around the common node. A 
comparison between this scheme and other existing methods suggests this method 
decreases the address configuration cost and the delay. 
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Moreover, an address allocation algorithm is proposed. This algorithm 
bypasses network-wide broadcasts to allocate an address to a new node. 
Furthermore, this method helps to allocate addresses dynamically as the network 
maintains an ‘IP resembles topology’ state. Thence, routing becomes easier and the 
overall overhead in communication is decreased.  In addition, this algorithm is  
simple as the hierarchy in IP addresses is used, therefore, the algorithm is simple 
(Khatri et al., 2016).  
 
4.4.3.2 Stateless Protocols 
 
(Sun and Belding‐Royer, 2004) proposed the use of a stateless address 
configuration method based on DAD. The DAD packet will be broadcasted across 
the entire network in this scheme. The latter will therefore consume network 
resources and bring a high number of control packets. 
Automatic IP Address Configuration (AIPAC) is a type of stateless auto-
configuration protocol in MANET. This protocol aims to avoid any wastage of 
available resources. In this method, new nodes need a minimum of one neighbouring 
node in order to be configured. The new node might be a new un-configured node or 
an already configured node. After the new node enters the network, it selects a 
random 4 byte Host Identifier (HID) and sends GetConfig messages periodically 
until it receives a reply from neighbouring nodes. When the neighbour node is un-
configured, the node with the highest HID will begin the network initialisation 
process. The neighbouring node will select a net ID for the new network and an IP 
address for it and the second node.  The node with the highest HID value will send 
the initialise message to the second node. Alternatively, in situations where the 
neighbouring node is already configured, it would act as an initiator for the un-
configured node. The initiator therefore selects a random address and broadcasts the 
search IP message to all configured nodes within the network. Each node which 
receives this message will check whether or not this IP address is vacant. In a 
scenario when there is IP conflict, it will respond to the initiator with a used IP 
message. The initiator will then choose another random IP address, and the 
initialising process will be repeated. When the search IP timer expires, the initiator 
will resend the search IP address. If no reply is received, the selected IP address is 
vacant. Next the initiator sends the net ID and selected IP into the requester node 
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(Fazio et al., 2006). The main limitation of this method is that it is not scalable and 
complex to implement (Munjal et al., 2013). 
A dynamic and distributed method which uses Conflict-Free Auto-
configuration Addresses (CFAA) in MANET is presented by (Indrasinghe et al., 
2006); (Indrasinghe et al., 2007). This novel method generates IP addresses 
automatically and ensures they can be reused. Two MANET scenarios are considered 
in this method: partitioning and merging. This method uses the existing address 
space with regard to the child-parent relationships of hosts to implement the 
allocation of reusable addresses. If the root host is unavailable, then the address is 
reused by re-allocating the root address.  
(Indrasinghe et al., 2008) evaluated this work and compare this method with 
other existing MANET auto-configuration methods. The study also evaluates a 
CFAA scheme for new host configurations and even the merging of MANETs with 
respect to network merging and address assignment (Indrasinghe et al., 2009).  The 
same study also discusses different kinds of broadcasting methods and cluster 
formation in message broadcasting. In addition, a novel solution for both MANET 
merging and the more complicated case when the MANET ID is part of the IP 
address is the same for the merging MANETs. Granting a unique name for every 
MANET could allow its own group members to be identified from among other 
hosts from various networks, and so circumvent the difficulty posed by IP address 
duplication after a merger of MANETs that had the same MANET ID part of the IP 
address. Every host in MANET is able to generate a range of addresses, and the 
ranges of any two host’s addresses will be disjointed. Each host thus generates 
numbers unique for that host. The number of unique addresses which are generated 
by every hosts according to a selected Base Value. Hosts are numbered depending on 
the order of their arrival to the network. If the host departs from the network, the 
number is reused (Amgahd and Yadav, 2016). Another study discusses the 
difficulties of secure message transmission and assigning IP addresses to new nodes 
which are willing to join the network. Symmetric and asymmetric keys and 
timestamps are used to authenticate the message transmission. In addition, every 
node is regarded as a proxy server which could allocate the IP to any new node. In 
addition, every node has a unique tuple of node ID, MANET ID, and its own IP 
address for merging and partition scenarios in MANET. This method is secure, 
however, the overhead of using symmetric and asymmetric keys is high (Choudhury 
et al., 2015). 
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4.4.3.3 Hybrid protocols 
 
 (Weniger, 2005) presented Passive Auto-Configuration for Mobile Ad hoc 
Networks (PACMAN). This method is efficient, is distributed address auto-
configuration and supports many situations such as partitioning and merging. The 
protocol overhead is low as it uses cross-layer information derived from on-going 
routing protocol traffic. Moreover, PACMAN assigns IP addresses in a way which 
enables their compression, and significantly decreases the routing protocol overhead. 
Nominate the trust worthy nodes to assign IP address in MANET is 
conducted in (Hu and Mitchell, 2005). This method is based on MANETconf 
assumptions. In this method, every node has a threshold trust value to calculate the 
trust value and decide whether the node is trusted or malicious. The node whose trust 
value is greater than or equal to a threshold value is deemed as trustworthy. The 
trustable node is used as the initiator to assign an IP address to the requester node. A 
DAD algorithm is used in this method to check any conflict. However, the authors 
made some unrealistic assumptions which rendered their model unsuited for 
MANET. In addition, there is no consideration for security during the IP address 
configuration process.  Overheard is another drawback of this method regards the 
usage of DAD method. This method does not handle specific scenarios in MANET 
such as during the merging and partition processes of MM.  
The Scalable Hierarchical Distributive Auto Configuration Protocol 
(SHDACP) is designed to configure and manage the IP addresses of large MANET. 
In this method some nodes are termed cluster heads, which are responsible for 
configuring nodes within the network. The main idea of this protocol is to divide the 
address space into three fields: partition number, node id and cluster number. This 
method supports the merging scenario. Using this method gives better results than 
approaches such as MANETconf and AIPAC protocols (Munjal et al., 2013).  
(Singh et al., 2014b) presented the election algorithm, which uses a node as a 
cluster head based on its weight. The weight is calculated based on different factors 
such as battery lifetime, neighbouring node numbers and the transmission level. 
Heavy nodes will be elected as the cluster head. The network in this method is 
divided into sub-networks as clusters in order to improve the address auto-
configuration in MANET. The cluster head is the coordinator of the cluster. 
Moreover, the method supports both partition and merging methods. It should be 
noted that the simulation results reflect the power of this method in raising the packet 
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delivery ratio and minimizing the packet delay ratio. Basically, prior works focus on 
preserving a stable link between cluster heads and other members. In addition, the 
velocity of cluster heads are also measured (Chatterjee et al., 2000); (Chatterjee et 
al., 2002). A survey about existing methods to assign an IP address in MANET is 
featured in (Abdelmalek et al., 2009). Many studies have investigated address auto-
configuration and presented many such protocols. For example, (Wangi et al., 
2008);(García Villalba et al., 2011); (Zhou and Mutka, 2012) offer a comprehensive 
summary of existing auto-configuration addresses in wireless ad hoc networks. 
 
4.5    Chapter summary 
 
This chapter provides an overview of all studies related to the proposed 
method used in this thesis. Identify the advantages and disadvantages of the existing 
methods in order to design a new method and bypass the limitations of the existing 
studies. Many topics are considered, such as existing methods capable of detecting 
DoS attacks in MANET, using trust to detect misbehaving nodes in MANET, 
merging MANETs, and assigning IP addresses in MANET. These studies are 
interconnected, and understanding them is important in order to understand existing 
methods and their performance, and how to differentiate them from the proposed 
method. Moreover, commercial software has been explained and some examples 
have been mentioned. Figure 4.2 illustrates the scope of studies that are discussed in 
this chapter.  
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Figure 4.2. Scope of the study. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the next chapter, the methodology, design and analysis, in order to present 
the proposed method to detect DoS attacks in both Single MANET (SM) and Multi-
MANETs (MM) environments will be explained in detail.  
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Chapter 5: Design and Analysis 
of Monitoring, Detection and 
Rehabilitation Method - MrDR  
 
 
 
In the previous chapter, the existing methods used to detect DoS attacks are 
illustrated including their advantages and disadvantages. Thus, there is a pressing 
need to design a new method to detect DoS attacks in MANET that considers the 
advantages of the existing methods and avoids the disadvantages of the existing 
methods. This chapter outlines in detail the proposed method which is used in this 
research to detect DoS attacks in both Single MANET (SM) and Multi MANET 
(MM). This approach is called Monitoring, Detection and Rehabilitation (MrDR). Its 
name is derived from the stages used in this method to detect DoS attacks in 
MANET. Due to the mobility of MANET, network merging can occur. Under these 
circumstances, many issues need to be considered, such as assigning an IP address, 
as well as avoiding an IP address conflict and consider security aspect in the situation 
of merging. In addition, the method design and analysis of both SM and MM will be 
explained in this chapter. 
 
5.1   The concept of trust in the MrDR method 
 
In real life situations, individuals are obliged to place their trust in 
organisations and, indeed, trust one another in order to meet their everyday needs. 
For instance, when paying their bills online, people regard organisations such as the 
city council and electricity companies as trustworthy and reputable. Therefore, a 
strong association exists between trust and reputation. Mainly, trust stems from 
implicit and explicit trust of social networks. Direct trust statement to the users refers 
to the explicit trust. However, the potential trust to users is called implicit trust. In a 
real social network, explicit trust is not reliable as some people might use false 
information, so explicit trust is not reliable in this situation (Carminati et al., 2013).  
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Similarly, it is necessary to trust nodes in MANET in order to complete 
transmissions, without any guarantee being provided. Many factors need to be taken 
into consideration when establishing trust between nodes in MANET. These include 
an assessment of their trustworthiness in relation to ability, integrity, and cooperation 
with others. Consequently, the reputation of every node is built using a behavioural 
assessment with other nodes. For instance, if the node drops packet multiple times, 
then the node will be suspected to be malicious by other nodes.  Each node builds 
trust based on different trust values that are calculated by its immediate nodes 
opinion: all of which are temporal actions. 
In the proposed method, the trust value of each node will be calculated based 
on the three stages of MrDR. In addition, trust in MANET is temporal and needs to 
be re-calculated continually for all nodes within the network. Trust in MrDR also 
cannot be transitive. For example, if node X trusts node Y, and node Y trusts node Z, 
it does not necessarily follow that node X trusts node Z. This could be regarded as 
the dynamic topology of nodes in MANET and their mobility. Moreover, the 
reputation of each node will be built based on a behavioural assessment. According 
to the dynamic topology of MANET, many factors are measured in each node in 
order to calculate the total trust status value. In this method, the trust value has only 
two values:  1= trusted or 0 = untrusted. Furthermore, a trusted node is reliable as it 
performs and accomplishes all missions such as packet forwarding and does not 
perform any malicious or selfish activities such as drop packet. In addition, the trust 
value for each node in this method is utilised in order to evaluate other nodes. 
Therefore, it helps to distinguish between trusted and misbehaving nodes, whether 
they are malicious or selfish that may lead to DoS attacks. Misbehaving nodes 
degrade the performance of the network considerably and can cause attacks such as 
DoS. Every node will evaluate and monitor other immediate nodes, as an agent. 
Thus, a centralised administrative concept will be applied in a decentralised 
environment, as is the case with a MANET. Due to the dynamic topology of 
MANET, there is a high likelihood that MANETs may merge. Cooperation between 
nodes is essential in order to improve the network performance. The trust value will 
identify misbehaving nodes and isolate them temporally from communications when 
the trust value equals zero or until the node becomes trusted. The mobility of nodes 
in MANET proves that the trust value of nodes cannot be stable. Additionally, the 
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default value of each node is trusted until the assessment and calculation of the trust 
value is complete.  
A trusted node has accurate information about other nodes. On the other 
hand, an untrusted node contains false information about its immediate nodes. In the 
proposed method, every node could be described as an inspector that observes the 
behaviour of other nodes. This allows the network policies to independently reduce 
individual node’s computational load. In addition, this method assumes that a 
promiscuous mode is used between nodes. Promiscuous modes are a security policy 
that enables nodes to listen to immediate nodes activities in order to monitor the 
entire network traffic (Perry et al., 2010).  This means that every node monitors their 
neighbour’s activities within the network with the purpose of monitoring the overall 
network’s activities. Misbehaving nodes, which cause DoS attacks, are detected and 
isolated from communications temporally until their trust mode has been changed 
from 0 to 1. Nodes can be blacklisted for a specific time in order to rehab them and 
may only be used when they become trusted nodes. All nodes that misbehave 
maliciously or selfishly on three successive occasions will be sent to the blacklist for 
a temporal time period. This means that the calculation of the trust value will be 
longer, which will be explained later in this chapter, to save the network energy. As 
nodes in MANET can join or leave the network frequently, nodes cannot be 
considered permanently trusted or untrusted especially in MANET with its dynamic 
topology. 
There are differences between malicious and selfish nodes. While both are 
misbehaving nodes, they differ in terms of their impact on performance and effects. 
Malicious nodes modify or drop a packet, as they do not transmit it to the intended 
destination. Therefore, this node drastically harms and degrades the network’s 
performance. However, selfish nodes save battery power and do not transmit the 
packet to the intended destination. Hence, this node resembles a non-cooperative 
node, which does not harm the network directly compared to a malicious node. 
Malicious nodes cause damage and clearly lead to network outages due to their 
activities such as drop and modify packets.  
 
5.2   MrDR design  
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Figure 5.1. MrDR architecture. 
The MrDR method has three main stages, which are used to calculate the 
total trust status value for each node. Its acronym is derived from these three stages: 
Monitoring; Detection; and Rehabilitation, as illustrated in Figure 5.1. It is 
paramount that these stages correlate in order to calculate the Total Trust Status 
Value (TTSV) for each of the nodes in the network. Obviously, the good or trusted 
nodes will withstand scrutiny as they will behave normally. 
 
5.3   MrDR stages 
 
The three stages of the proposed method work collectively and interoperably, 
to measure the trust value for each node, whether trusted or untrusted. These stages 
will be explained in detail in the following subsection. It is important to mention that 
the first two stages are responsible to caculate the trust values, but rehabilitation is to 
caculate the trust values of nodes each specific time depends on the experiment 
duration.  
5.3.1 Monitoring stage 
 
The literal meaning of monitoring is noticing or even observing a particular 
object or person (Press, 2016c). In the proposed method, this stage involves 
monitoring the entire network by nodes within the network to detect any 
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Figure 5.2. ATV components. 
misbehaving behaviours as early as possible. At this stage, two checks will be carried 
out and their values will be measured as follows. 
5.3.1.1 Accomplishment Trust Value (ATV) 
 
 Accomplishment literally means the completion of an action or a mission. 
Trust between hosts in the network enables nodes to communicate with each other 
and enhance the network performance. For a more in-depth discussion about trust 
network see (Liu et al., 2012);(Vasanth et al., 2014). However, in the context of the 
MrDR method, it indicates that a node has completed its assumed and expected tasks 
by sending data which is confirming that it has already received data from the node 
that sent it. 
 The ATV comprises two parts: ATV1 and ATV2. ATV1 determines whether 
the node sends the required packet to the intended destination or not. Figure 5.2 
illustrates the ATV components. If the node sends the packet to the correct 
destination, then the ATV1=0.5; whereas if the node fails to send this packet, then 
the ATV1 = 0. In addition, if the node sends a confirmation message to indicate that 
it has already received the packet, then the ATV2 equals 0.5. However, if the node 
fails to send this confirmation message, then the ATV2 = 0. The overall ATV value 
may be calculated as follows: 
 
                𝑨𝑻𝑽 = 𝑨𝑻𝑽𝟏 + 𝑨𝑻𝑽𝟐                5.1 
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5.3.1.2 Reputation Trust Value (RTV) 
 
 Reputation may be defined as the views and opinions people hold in relation 
to a specific individual, organisation or even an object. In addition, reputation is 
connected to the node’s identity. It is usually based on previous behaviour, word of 
mouth or  personal experiences in particular situations (Press, 2016e). 
In MrDR, it is assumed that the punishment resulting from packet dropping is 
less punitive than packet fabrication. This is because packet dropping does not 
always occur for misbehaving nodes, whether as a result of maliciousness or 
selfishness. It could be due to power failure or network congestion, broken links, 
corruption of the medium, or lack of power resources which relate to the MANET 
environment. However, if the node drops packet sequentially then the node is 
obviously malicious.  Equally important, a node has a good reputation if it does not 
modify, drop, or mis-route packets such as DoS attacks. As previously mentioned, 
due to the specific nature of MANET, the RTV value of the node when it drops the 
packet for the first time is 0.5. Furthermore, when the node subsequently undertakes 
this action for the second time, the RTV is equal to 0.25. Finally, when the node 
drops the packet for the third time, the RTV is equal to 0 and the node is deemed to 
be malicious. However, when the node misroutes or modifies packet, or launches a 
DoS attack, the RTV is directly equal to 0. Alternatively, when the node does not 
perform any of these misbehaving actions, the RTV is equal to 1. Figure 5.3 shows 
the RTV value decision-making process based on the behaviour of the node.  
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Figure 5.3. RTV calculations. 
5.3.2 Detection stage 
 
  Detection literally means that someone or something has been discovered or 
observed (Press, 2016a). The objective of this stage is to detect misbehaving nodes, 
be they either malicious or selfish. The calculation of the Honesty Trust Value 
(HTV) at this stage is to assess the trustworthiness of each node within the network. 
In this situation, where the node exchanges accurate information about trust values 
and that information matches with information from the majority of the nodes, then 
the HTV is equal to 1. However, when the information is different or in conflict it 
means the information from this node has been modified, and the HTV is equal to 0. 
Figure 5.4 outlines the HTV calculation process for each node. 
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Figure 5.4. HTV calculation process. 
Based on the data presented in Figure 5.4, it is apparent that node B attempts 
to check and compare how the information matches, as well as its symmetry to its 
immediate nodes such as K, M, I, C and D.  It is assumed that node M is a malicious 
node and that it sends false information to node B. Thus, node B compares the 
information which originates from node M with information sent from other 
immediate nodes such as K, I, C and D. Accordingly, if node B considers that node 
M provides incorrect information, then its HTV is equal to 0, whereas the HTV 
values for nodes K, I, C and D are equal to 1. 
Subsequently, from stages 1 and 2, the Total Trust Status Value (TTSV) is 
calculated as follows: 
 
𝑻𝑻𝑺𝑽 = {
𝟎, 𝑨𝑻𝑽 = 𝟎. 𝟓 𝒐𝒓 𝟎 , 𝑹𝑻𝑽 = 𝟎. 𝟓 𝒐𝒓 𝟎. 𝟐𝟓 𝒐𝒓 𝟎 , 𝑯𝑻𝑽 = 𝟎
𝟏, 𝑨𝑻𝑽 = 𝟏 , 𝑹𝑻𝑽 = 𝟏, 𝑯𝑻𝑽 = 𝟏
            5.2 
 
TTSV is such a binary mode and has only two values: 1 is trusted and 0 is 
untrusted. A node can either be trusted or not in MANET. It is meaningless to 
provide a trust value to nodes that are partially trusted or suspicious as the node may 
eventually be untrusted and can rapidly degrade the network’s performance. 
Untrusted nodes in MrDR will be isolated from the communications temporally until 
their trust values are altered from 0 to 1. In addition, calculating the TTSV, for each 
node within the network, will have to be conducted on every specific occasion, as the 
Design and Analysis of Monitoring, Detection and Rehabilitation 
Method - MrDR 
 
 83 
number of times required to calculate the trust value for each node depends on the 
experiment’s duration as shown below in Equation 5.3 below. 
𝑪𝑻𝑽 =
𝑬𝑻𝑻
𝟑 
                 5.3 
 
These values are the optimal figures to reduce network load but any regular 
checking period may be applied. It is important to note that the Check Trust Value 
(CTV) indicates the number of times taken to calculate the TTSV for nodes, and 
where ETT means Equation Total Time. For example, if the ETT for an experiment 
is six, then: 
 
𝑪𝑻𝑽 =
𝟔
𝟑
  = 𝟐                    
 
For example, when the ETT is six minutes, every two minutes the nodes’ 
TTSV will be checked for. In the next chapter, the detection of DoS attacks will be 
completed for both SM and MM and it will be explained how the trust values would 
be calculated in each experiment.  
 
5.3.3 Rehabilitation (or resetting trust value) 
 
The goal of this stage is to rehabilitate misbehaving nodes and to reuse them 
in future transmissions. Rehabilitation literally means the gradual process of 
returning to a good condition, status or way of living (Press, 2016d). Due to the 
nature of MANET, nodes cannot hold the same status for an indefinite period of 
time, thus the status of all nodes is considered to be temporary. In empirical terms, 
for instance, a thief is a criminal, but he or she does not continuously carry out 
criminal activities. Criminal behaviour only occurs at specific times and, in some 
instances, the thief stops or repents at a later date. This analogy can be used to reflect 
the status of nodes, which cannot always remain stable. Hence, regular checks will 
be conducted on all trust values at specific periods of time and for every node in the 
network based on Equation 5.3. This is considered such as a resetting of trust value 
every specific time more than a stage. Rehabilitation is repeated a number of times 
(n), depending on the rate at which the nodes misbehave. For example, if node A is 
considered to be malicious on three successive occasions, then the rehabilitation time 
will be longer based on Equation 5.4 below: 
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Figure 5.5. The observation of other nodes. 
𝑪𝑻𝑽 =
𝑬𝑻𝑻
𝟐
                      5.4 
For example, if node A is malicious on three successive occasions, then the 
node’s rehabilitation will be longer in order to reduce energy consumption. Thus, if 
the total time of the experiment is six minutes, then the TTSV of that node will be 
checked, by its immediate nodes, every three rather than every two minutes. The next 
subsection will illustrate that every node calculates these trust values, as shown in 
Table 5.1, through its immediate nodes. However, this only exchange only occurs 
between immediate nodes (see Table 5.2). Hence, it would reduce the nodes’ energy, 
if it is definitely malicious.  
 
5.4    An example of how the MrDR method performs 
 
As below indicated in Figure 5.5, node A monitors its immediate neighbours 
(D, E, F, G, B, and H) and acts as an inspector that assesses them based on specific 
observations in order to calculate the trust value of each node. Table 5.1 
demonstrates the information that node A collects from these observations and on 
which the calculations are based. 
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 Table 5.1. All trust information in each node. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As shown in Table 5.1 above, N means normal, and * depends on the number 
of times that the RTV is given. The latter means that the RTV, as illustrated, cannot 
be 0 at all times for maliciousness or selfishness to occur. Due to the nature of 
MANET, the RTV can equal 0 as the packet drop might deem that the route has 
broken or that the destination node has left the entire network. Thus, when the RTV 
equals 0 on three successive time periods then it will undoubtedly be considered to 
be a malicious node. In addition, M indicates that a node is malicious, while S 
signifies it is selfish. To decrease the network overhead and message redundancy 
node A exchanges two types of information: TTSV and node type with all its 
immediate nodes. This is appropriate and efficient for power and resources which are 
constrained in networks such as MANETs. Details of the information exchanged 
between immediate nodes are shown in Table 5.2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Node 
ATV 
RTV HTV TTSV 
Node 
type ATV1 ATV2 
D 0.5 0.5 1 1 1 N 
E 0.5 0.5 0 1 0 * 
F 0.5 0.5 1 0 0 M 
G 0.5 0 1 1 0 S 
B 0.5 0.5 1 1 1 N 
H 0.5 0.5 1 1 1 N 
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Table 5.2. Information exchange between the nodes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As outlined in Table 5.2 above, node D is normal, and therefore its TTSV is 
equal to 1 and it is a trusted node. However, node E is untrusted, and the RTV value 
needs to be checked again as it might equal 0 due to normal issues in MANET such 
as packet dropping and routing issues. In addition, node F is a malicious node and it 
is untrusted, thus its TTSV is equal to 0. Node G is a selfish node as its ATV2 is 
equal to 0, therefore its TTSV is indeed equivalent to 0. Nodes B and H are trusted 
nodes and their TTSVs are equal to 1. This assessment is carried out on every node 
in the network to prevent misbehaving nodes from launching DoS attacks, which 
could degrade the network performance collectively. Moreover, this method gives 
natural traceability, which derives from the occurrence of any differences in 
exchange information amongst nodes. 
Nodes in MANET are not stable and move frequently, thus TTSV is 
calculated based on Equation 5.2, while Equation 5.4 depends on trust values. 
Similarly, rehabilitation is also important in terms of trust status, as changes can 
emerge due to the dynamic topology of MANET. Rehabilitation encourages 
misbehaving nodes to cooperate in future transmissions and does not isolate them 
permanently from communications. This essentially improves the network’s 
performance significantly as additional trusted nodes cooperate. Figure 5.6 illustrates 
the MrDR procedure to calculate TTSV for each node within the network.  
  
Node 
TTSV 
Number of packet drops 
(RTS) 
 
Node 
type 
D 1  N 
E 0 First time * 
F 0  M 
G 0  S 
B 1  N 
H 1  N 
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Figure 5.6. MrDR procedure to calculate TTSV. 
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5.5    Using the MrDR method on Multiple MANETs (MM)  
 
MANET, with its dynamic topology, non-fixed infrastructure and volatile 
nodes connected via a wireless communication encourages changes as nodes can 
frequently join and leave. Thus, the topology of the network can change, and there is 
a possibility that MANETs can both merge and partition. The existing studies as seen 
in Chapter 4, focus on handling IP address in the merging process and do not discuss 
specifically the security concerns in the precise issue of detecting DoS attacks. The 
proposed method in the first study considered the security aspect when MANETs 
merge. It is essential to detect attacks every time, for example, in the merging 
process. It should be noted that the proposed method is the first study to address the 
detection of DoS attacks when two or more MANETs merge.  
In the context of MM mergers, many issues need to be considered in relation 
to the IP address.  These include: the assignment of an IP addresses to the node of the 
MANET that joins the network; the avoidance of IP address conflict; and 
reclamation of the IP address when the node leaves the network. It is important to 
mention that IPv4 is considered in this thesis. 
 
5.5.1 Requirements of the IP address auto-configuration system 
 
Some requirements must be met when assigning an IP address in MANET. 
First, no conflict should arise in the IP address between nodes. If two nodes within 
the network have duplicate addresses, this could cause the malfunctioning of the 
network. Second, when a node leaves the network gracefully or abruptly, its IP 
address can be reused by another new node. Leaving abruptly leads to IP address 
leakage (because there are some IP addresses that are neither assigned to any node, 
nor available for assignment). Third, all nodes in the network must be reachable at all 
times as they must update their vacant IP addresses and help to allocate an IP address 
to the new host. Finally, it is assumed that nodes in MANETs are configured a 
priori, before they become part of the network. 
 
5.5.2 Proposed IP auto-configuration system to a new node 
   
In the previous chapter, the existing method for assigning IP addresses in the 
network are illustrated with their advantages and limitations. In general, this process 
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does not guarantee the uniqueness. Additionally, energy consumption is the greatest 
drawbacks of this method (Hsu and Tseng, 2005); (Al-Mistarihi et al., 2011); (Zhou 
et al., 2010). However, the existing examinations do not meet the project 
requirements, so a new method for assigning the IP address is proposed in this 
section. 
The proposed method for assigning IP address helps nodes within the 
network to cooperate and assign IP address for new nodes or for any node that needs 
an IP address in specific situations such as MANETs merges. According to Figure 
5.7, the following steps will need to be carried out in order to assign an IP address to 
the new node: 
1. Node F is a new node which attempts to join the network. 
2. Node F broadcasts Request IP Address (REQIP) to all its immediate nodes or one-
hop nodes (A, B, C) (see 1 in  Figure 5.7). 
3. The three nodes A, B and C receive this request. If any of these nodes have a 
vacant IP address, it will send a Reply IP Table (REPT) which contains just one 
vacant IP address. While some nodes may have more than one vacant IP address, 
only one will be sent.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4. The REPT is sent as a table, as shown in Table 5.3. 
 
 
F 
C 
A 
E 
D 
B 
1 
1 
1 
2 
3 
4 
4 
5 
5 
5 
Figure 5.7. IP address configuration. 
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Table 5.3. Information included in the REPT. 
 
 
 
 
5. The first node that sends a reply is considered and the others are discarded.  
6. It is assumed that node C is the first node to reply with a vacant IP address to 
node F (see 2 in Figure 5.7). 
7. Node F allocates the IP address and broadcasts confirmation of the allocation to 
node C (see 3 in Figure 5.7). 
8. Node C broadcasts this allocation to all its immediate nodes A and D (see 4 in 
Figure 5.7). They also broadcast this to their immediate nodes (see 5 in Figure 
5.7) and so on, in order to update their vacant IP address lists. 
9. In the case where, at the beginning of this process node F sends the REQIP and 
does not receive any reply, there are two possible derivations: 
1.  Nodes C, A and B do not have any vacant IP addresses. Subsequently, node F 
has a timer set at approximately 20 seconds. If the timer expires, then this 
process will be repeated once. If there is still no reply, then nodes C, A and B 
will broadcast this request to all their immediate nodes, namely D and E. This 
would be until the reply message arrives from a node that has a vacant IP 
address with the time interval. 
2. Where nodes C, A and B are no longer connected to this network, after the 
timer expires, this process is also repeated once. If there is still no answer, the 
process is repeated for the last time (timer = 20 sec). If at this stage there is no 
reply, then that means that nodes have departed from the network. Node F 
updates its routing table and broadcasts the request to its new immediate nodes.  
In addition, when a node departs from the network, the IP address 
reclamation is applied. In a graceful manner, prior to its departure, the host that is 
leaving needs to broadcast its IP address and leaving notification to its immediate 
nodes so that they can update their vacant IP addresses. Conversely, in a graceless 
manner, the immediate nodes will discover that they have not received any reply 
Node 
name 
Vacant IP 
addresses 
C 196.168.1.2 
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Figure 5.8. Procedure for merging two MANETs. 
from the leaving node, and this IP address will then be added to their vacant IP 
address lists.  
It is important to mention that in the situation where no nodes has a vacant IP 
address in the whole network, then one of the immediate nodes should produce a 
random IP address using (Indrasinghe et al., 2009) method.  
 
5.6    Merging MM based on Merging Using MrDR (MUMrDR) (Centralised 
trust) 
 
It could be that two MANETs might have the same ID.  Figure 5.8 depicts 
where two standalone MANETs are about to merge. A standalone MANET is where 
that network is not connected to any other, which includes any external network, 
such as the Internet. In Chapter 4, the literature that primarily focuses on auto-
configuring IP addresses in situation such as merging and partition scenario are 
discussed. Nodes participate in this process regardless of if the nodes are trusted or 
not (Ghosh and Datta, 2011); (Gammar et al., 2010). However, the proposed method 
specifically uses the centralised trust concept in order to reduce redundancy and 
consider security aspects, as one trusted node from each network helps to complete 
this process.  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In Figure 5.8, nodes C and D are trusted nodes and are called connected 
nodes, as their main responsibility is to help the two MANETs to merge smoothly.  
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The type of connected nodes is selected prior to the merging since trusted 
nodes nominate a trusted node which has been given high votes by other nodes in 
each network. For example, MANET1 assumes that nodes A and B vote that node C 
is the most effective node to be a manager; therefore, node C will become a 
connected node in this network. Nodes C and D also have some checking 
responsibilities. First, there must not be any IP address conflict amongst nodes.  
Second, any either malicious or selfish nodes need to undergo a rehabilitation 
process. For example, in Figure 5.8, node F is an untrusted node, so it is now the 
responsibility of node C, which is considered to be a manager, to check the status of 
node F and apply rehabilitation to it. Third, managers C and D nodes have the 
responsibility to allocate the IP addresses to all nodes in their domain, should any IP 
conflict arise. In addition, managers are trusted, otherwise they cannot complete their 
duties to accomplish the merging process. Consequently, another trusted node will 
instead be nominated to complete the merging process. For instance, if node D is 
untrusted, node C will communicate with other nodes in MANET 2, such as node E. 
Finally, if the node leaves the network, then its IP address will be reused. Thus, the 
immediate node will maintain this vacant IP address until it is needed.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
 To begin the merging process, first node C sends a MREQ (Merge Request) 
to node D. Node D replies with a Merge Check 1 (MCHK1) to node C. This reply 
contains all the nodes in the current MANET, their IP addresses and their trust 
values, as shown in Table 5.4 below.  
 
Table 5.4. Information included in the MCHK1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Node C receives this information and passes it in a Merge Check 2 (MCHK2) 
to node D, as shown in Table 5.5. 
 
 
MANET ID 
Node 
name 
IP address 
Trust 
value 
MAC address +timestamp (indicates the time of 
boot up) + number of nodes 
D 192.168.1.2 
1 
MAC address +timestamp (indicates the time of 
boot up) + number of nodes 
E 192.168.1.3 1 
MAC address +timestamp (indicates the time of 
boot up) + number of nodes 
F 192.168.2.1 
0 
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Nodes C and D check if their networks contain some misbehaving nodes, 
either malicious or selfish, and whether their trust values equal 0. Any misbehaving 
nodes found will be marked as suspicious. In addition, manager nodes check the IP 
addresses to establish if there are any conflicts, and if they arise, they resign the IP 
addresses.  
In a situation where there is no IP conflict, then node C sends node D an 
Acceptance of merger (ACCM). Then node D replies to node C with a Confirmation 
of Merger (ConfM) and the two networks become one large network, as 
demonstrated in Figure 5.9. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
If there is an IP conflict, then the IP address will be configured, as shown in 
Subsection 5.5.2.                                                                                   
A MANET ID is used to differentiate the nodes that belong to different 
networks. As the MANETs merge, their two IDs become one combined ID. The new 
identity of the merged MANETs is shown as follows: 
               
𝐌𝐌𝐈𝐃 = 𝑴𝑨𝑵𝑬𝑻 𝑰𝑫 𝟏 ⋃ 𝑴𝑨𝑵𝑬𝑻 𝑰𝑫 𝟐 ⋃ 𝒕𝒊𝒎𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒎𝒑 ⋃  𝒘𝒉𝒐𝒍𝒆 𝑵𝒐𝒅𝒆𝒔 𝑵𝒐        5.5    
 
Table 5.5. Information included in the MCHK2. 
MANET ID 
Node 
name 
IP address 
Trust 
value 
MAC address +timestamp (indicates the time 
of boot up) + number of nodes 
C 192.168.1.7 
1 
MAC address +timestamp (indicates the time 
of boot up) + number of nodes 
A 192.168.1.1 
1 
MAC address +timestamp (indicates the time 
of boot up) + number of nodes 
B 192.168.2.9 
0 
A 
B 
C D 
E 
F 
Figure 5.9. Node configuration following the merger. 
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As node F is a malicious node, it will need to be checked again for specific 
time interval, depending on the duration of the experiment and it is explained earlier 
in this chapter. If the status of it is still malicious, then it will be given another two 
chances (Rehabilitation). If the trust value of node F changes, then it will go from 0 
to 1. Otherwise, it will be sent to the blacklist and isolated from the network for a 
longer time period as it is shown in Equation 5.4 until the node becomes trusted. 
 Merging using the MrDR method (MUMrDR) is employed in this situation 
to help the two MANETs to combine. In addition, one trusted node in each network 
helps to complete the process and to avoid any misbehaving activities.  
 
5.7    Merging MM based on MUMrDR (Decentralised trust) 
 
Based on the existing literature on Chapter 4 , there is no study uses the trust 
value to detect DoS attacks in MM merging. Therefore, this is the first study 
discusses this situation. 
Figure 5.10 demonstrates that as the two MANETs are about to merge, a 
bridge will be built between each node to bring them closer to one another. The red 
lines above show the virtual format of that bridge. This bridge helps to exchange 
information from each node in MANET 1 to the corresponding node in MANET 2, 
which are the nearest nodes to one another. Each node will pass a table which 
includes: MANET ID, node name, IP address, node trust value, and the vacant IP 
addresses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                              
 
. 
 
 
Design and Analysis of Monitoring, Detection and Rehabilitation 
Method - MrDR 
 
 95 
Figure 5.10. Two MANETs at the start of the merging process. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 In the case where there are more nodes in MANET 1 than in MANET 2, two 
nodes from MANET 1 can communicate with a corresponding node in MANET 2. In 
Figure 5.11, node A will pass its table to node G in another network (see 1). Node G 
will check the table and compare the values with its immediate nodes (see 2). If the 
information is the same, then node A is trusted. Otherwise, the node is untrusted. The 
same process with be carried out with all other nodes, namely: B and H; C and I; D 
and J; E and K; and F and L. 
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Figure 5.11. Negotiations between nodes. 
 
 
During the negotiation process between nodes in both MANETs, any IP 
address conflict will be detected. For instance, if node H has the same IP address as 
node B, then an alarm message will be sent to both nodes via their immediate nodes. 
Therefore, the first node to receive a vacant IP address will change its IP to the new 
one. Assuming the nodes have negotiated, node B receives a vacant IP address from 
node D. When node B changes its IP address, it then informs node H of this via the 
IP change complete message. Then nodes B and H will send that information to all 
their immediate nodes. Figure 5.12 illustrates the process between nodes B and H. 
The red arrows show the alarm messages, which have been sent to both nodes B and 
H from their immediate nodes. The alarm indicates that there are IP conflict issues 
between nodes B and H. The yellow arrow from nodes B to H is to inform node H of 
the IP address change in node B. Therefore, node H does not need to change its IP 
address. The blue arrows show the announcement of the IP configuration of node B 
to all immediate nodes.  
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Figure 5.12. Negotiations between nodes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No IP address conflict arises as the two MANETs merge together to become 
one large MANET. Moreover, the MANET ID is explained earlier in this chapter in 
section 5.6. In addition, Figure 5.13 shows the large MANET resulting from the 
merger of the two MANETs. 
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Figure 5.13.  Large MANET following the merger of two MANETs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
However, if using either a centralised or decentralised trust concept to 
accomplish the merging process, both need to be managed, and that decision should 
be based on a number of criteria. The following section will explain this in detail. 
 
5.8    Selection of a merging method (an identifier protocol)  
 
Usually the larger MANET adopts the smaller one. The decision to use 
centralised or decentralised concepts when merging two MANETs is determined by 
different factors. There should be a concept identifier protocol in place to decide 
whether a centralised or decentralised concept is employed to accomplish the 
merging process. It is as follows: 
1. If the number of nodes in MANET 1 is greater than 50 per cent of the number of 
nodes in MANET 2, then the centralised method is used. 
2. If the number of nodes in both MANETs is equal or approximate then the 
decentralised concept is used. 
This protocol is used to decide whether the centralised or decentralised 
method will be employed, based on the quality of the nodes in each MANET. The 
steps below explain how this protocol operates: 
1. In Figure 5.14, nodes in MANET 1 have to nominate a trusted node. It has the 
responsibility for negotiating with another network. For instance, each node will 
send the trust value to its immediate node. Assuming that node C is trusted, it is 
nominated to negotiate with the second network. 
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2. The same process in the previous point will be repeated in MANET 2, where it is 
assumed that node D is nominated by the nodes in MANET 2. 
3. Now nodes C and D will exchange their node numbers. Node C will send 
information that MANET 1 has seven nodes. Node D will respond by indicating 
that MANET 2 has three nodes. Nodes C and D will send a message to begin the 
centralised trust concept in order to complete the merger process.  
 
 
 
 
This protocol helps to determine the concept used to merge, whether 
centralised or decentralised, depending on the node’s numbers in both MANETs. In 
order to ensure that the merging process is applied successfully, the security aspect 
should be considered. This protocol will help to determine the optimal merging 
concept depends on the factors which are explained above.  
 
5.9    Chapter summary 
 
This chapter presents and explains a novel method (MrDR) to detect DoS 
attacks in both SM and MM. In SM, the proposed method detects these attacks based 
on the calculation of the trust values of each node. Three stages are applied in MrDR 
in order to calculate the TTSV of each node. A node can be either trusted (TTSV = 
1) or untrusted (TTSV = 0). Rehabilitation encourages misbehaving nodes to be 
trusted in the future. If their TTSV changes from 0 to 1, then the node can 
communicate in transmission. Moreover, assigning an IP address to a new node 
Figure 5.14. Negotiations between nodes in both MANETs. 
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joining the network is discussed. In addition, as the topology changes in MANET, 
there is a likelihood that merging and partitioning can occur. MUMrDR is used to 
detect DoS attacks based on trust values in the case of merging MANETs. Two trust 
concepts are discussed, namely centralised and decentralised. A protocol is employed 
to decide which one should be used to successfully complete the merging process. 
Each independently configured MANET in a cluster can merge or partition. The 
selection of the merging type is dependent on the quality of each node. In the next 
chapter, three types of investigations will be undertaken. First, four experiments with 
different DoS attacks will be carried out to outline and evaluate the performance of 
the proposed method on SM. Second, the centralised trust concept and MUMrDR 
will be used to complete the merging process on MM (two independently configured 
MANETs). In this situation, one type of DoS attack will be detected in this 
experiment. Third, the decentralised trust concept and MUMrDR are used to detect 
different DoS attacks on MM (four independently configured MANETs).  
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Chapter 6: implemented a 
Simulation of MrDR method 
 
 
 
 
      This chapter deals with the implementation procedures to test and evaluate 
the proposed method in both SM and MM. Thus, the protocols and actions are 
transformed into procedures and events to express the scenario. Many programs and 
tools are used to simulate the network architecture and scenarios (Parker et al., 
2010). In this research, Network Simulator (NS2) is used in this task, in order to 
simulate the method in different scenarios. In addition, MrDR will be applied in this 
chapter on three scenarios: SM; MM (two MANETs); and MM (Four MANETs). 
Different DoS attacks are detected using MrDR and the results are dependent on the 
attack type, as will be shown in Chapter seven.  
 
6.1   Introduction to NS2 
 
First, simulation refers to a real-world system which is imitated via 
computational re-enactment of its behaviours based on rules in a mathematical 
format. Simulation is used in order to allow safer and cheaper testing, optimise 
system performance, and evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of the method. 
Because the nature of computer communications and network models are complex, 
the development of special computer programs for a specific simulation issue is a 
possibility, but totally inefficient and time consuming. With the improvement in the 
application of modelling packages and simulations, they have become time-saving in 
the area of coding and more customary which enables programmers to focus on the 
modelling problem rather than the programming details. Many network simulators 
are available to use such as Cnet, OMNET++, NetSim, OPNET, QualNet, 
GloMoSim, NS2, and NS3 (Guizani et al., 2010). In this study, NS2 is used for two 
main reasons. First, the majority of studies online use this tool to simulate their 
protocols which demonstrates its good reputation in the research community. 
Second, much documentation is available online which alleviates the difficulty of the 
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learning process and coding. However, selection criteria for the network simulation 
includes many factors; for example, software license costs. NS2 is free and one of 
the most powerful tools which can be used in network research and development.  
There are certain advantages of using NS2 to simulate networks and 
protocols. First, it is cost-free and does not require extra equipment. Usually it is run 
on a Linux platform or used with the Cygwin program on a Windows platform. 
Second, complicated scenarios can be simulated and tested easily. Third, it is a 
popular simulator as results can be obtained quickly and many ideas can be tested 
within a smaller timeframe. In addition, NS2 is considered as a standard 
experimental environment in research community. The use of the simulator provides 
an opportunity to investigate and understand the dynamics of networks. NS2 
provides substantial support, in order to simulate many protocols, such as FTP, TCP, 
UDP, DSR, and HTTP. Besides, NS2 is used to simulate both wired and wireless 
networks. TCL is the main scripting language, which is Object-oriented support 
(otcl). NS2 uses two languages: TCL script and C++. The reason for using two 
languages is that TCL simulates some slightly varying parameters or configurations, 
such as quick explore of scenario numbers and iteration time (Quintero et al., 2013).  
Furthermore, the simulator has various types of tasks to undertake. First, it 
needs a programming language to manipulate bytes efficiently or even packet 
headers which run over large data where the run-time speed is more essential and 
turn-around time is of low importance. Thus, C++ is fast to run but slow to change 
which makes it more suitable for detailed protocol implementation. Second, a great 
part of the network includes exploring a number of scenarios quickly as run-time 
speed has less importance. However, C++ simulates protocol requirements such as 
packet processing, algorithm implementation, run simulation, rerun, recompile, and 
run time speed (Issariyakul and Hossain, 2011). That OTcl runs more slowly but can 
be changed quickly makes it appropriate for system configuration (SHI et al., 2008).  
 
6.2   Experiment design and simulation parameters 
 
Design of experiments (DOE or DOX) or experimental design refers to the 
design of any task which aims to explain or describe the variation of information 
under specific conditions, and hypothesised to reflect the variation (Antony, 2014). 
In this section three main experiments will be conducted to test the proposed method 
on both SM and MM. The first experiment will test the proposed method on SM to 
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detect four types of DoS attacks separately: wormhole attacks; blackhole attacks; 
grayhole attacks; and jellyfish attacks. The reason for choosing these attacks is that 
they are the most popular DoS attacks which occur in the MANET environment, 
with the majority of studies raising the topic of their high occurrence (Jhaveri et al., 
2012a); (Jain and Tokekar, 2011).  
Some types of DoS attacks will not function successfully in MANET, such as 
Transfer Control Protocol Synchronize (TCP SYN) flood attacks. The reason behind 
this is that it is a multilayer attack that can occur in any layer. The attack exploits the 
TCP’s three way handshake in the transport layer between client and server. 
However, the TCP SYN attack relies on multiple spoofed addresses to leave the TCP 
connections uncompleted; this is achieved through non-application of the third part 
of the handshake. These multiple spoofed addresses will be outside the network's 
normal IP addresses, so will be easily detected. Delays might occur due to this attack 
in MANET, which may slightly affect network performance (Geetha and Sreenath, 
2015).  
Besides, the second experiment will test the proposed method on MM when 
two MANETs merge and detect a grayhole attack. The concept of centralised trust 
will be used in this situation to help the MM to merge. For example, checking IP 
address conflicts and assigning IP address to any node which requires one. The 
reason for choosing this attack is that it is a challenge to detect it, as it does not 
behave maliciously all the time and can turn toward normality on occasion.  
The third experiment will also test the proposed method on MM and in this 
situation on four MANETs. The four aforementioned attacks in experiment one will 
be used in this experiment. Further, the decentralised trust concept will be used to 
help these MANETs merge smoothly. 
 
6.3   Test the proposed method against different DoS attacks on SM 
 
Table 6.1 presents the simulation parameters that are used in the next four 
experiments, to detect different DoS attack scenarios, such as blackhole attack, 
wormhole attack, grayhole attack and jellyfish attack. Network Simulator (NS2.35) 
is utilised to run these experiments under LINUX (UBUNTU 12.04). 
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Figure 6.1 shows the network architecture that is used to test the attacks. 
Moreover, every attack is applied as a separate experiment. The main architecture of 
the network for the four experiments is the same, as it includes 71 nodes, including 
one source node (node 8) and one destination node (node 7). In the future, the 
number of nodes could be incrementally increased and the network density 
considered. The timeline of the next four experiments is shown later in this chapter 
in Figure 6.3 which illustrates the experiments scenario and identifies the process of 
detecting the misbehaving nodes.  
It is important to mention that the real-time schedule is used in the simulation 
which helps to synchronise the execution of events with real-time. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6.1. Simulation parameters used in the experiments. 
Simulation parameters 
Processor 
Intel(R) Core (TM) Duo CPU P8700 @ 
2.53GHz 
RAM 4.00 GB 
System type 64-bit 
Operating system UBUNTU 12.04 
Routing protocol AODV 
Simulation time 6 min 
No of nodes 71 
Traffic type CBR 
Packet size 512 bytes 
MAC type Mac/802_11 
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Figure 6.1. Network architecture for experiments.  
 
 
The TTSV presented in Chapter 5 in Equation 5.2, will be calculated and 
checked in this experiment every two minutes, with the total period of each 
experiment set to approximately six minutes. The duration of the experiment could 
be longer but six minutes is used in these experiments to compare the performance of 
the network in the following scenarios: before the attack occurs; when the attack 
occurs; and after detecting the attack using the proposed method. In addition, the 
trust value will be tested three times in order to evaluate the effectiveness of the 
proposed method.  Using the MrDR method, the network is able to update the TTSV 
of nodes and detect misbehaving activities as anomalies, such as occurring DoS 
attacks. Three factors are considered and measured in these experiments: network 
throughput; packet delivery ratio; and packet delay ratio. The comparison between 
these factors will evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed method in detecting DoS 
attacks. 
Furthermore, the network overhead will be measured during a grayhole attack 
experiment. Overhead refers to any combination of extra or indirect computation 
time, bandwidth, memory, or other resources required to achieve a specific goal 
(Singh et al., 2015). This is important as it evaluates whether the proposed method 
would impact energy costs in relation to the power constraints of this network 
environment. As previously mentioned, the reason for choosing the grayhole attack 
is to test the impact on using the proposed method on the network overhead is that 
grayhole attacks are a challenge to detect as they can frequently turn between 
normality and maliciousness.  
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6.3.1   Attack scenarios 
 
In this age of wireless devices, MANET has become an essential means by 
which to establish communication between nodes. However, security robustness is 
an essential service for both wired and wireless network communication. Due to the 
nature of the MANET environment, such as dynamic topology and the absence of a 
central administration point, it is prone to many attacks. In the first experiment, four 
DoS attacks are tested using the proposed method to detect them. This section gives 
an overview of attack scenarios and the design of each experiment to evaluate the 
proposed method on SM. 
 
6.3.2   Wormhole attacks 
 
In the case of a wormhole attack, the attacker receives the packet from one 
point in the network, which is referred to as the origin point, and tunnels itself to 
another point in the same network. This is referred to as the destination point. 
Subsequently, the attacker replies locally to the network from that point. The tunnel 
between the two attackers is a high-speed, off-channel link called the wormhole link 
that colludes to launch the attack in the network. After establishing the wormhole 
link, the attackers record the wireless data, overhear and forward them to each other. 
In addition, the adversary node replays the packet via the wormhole link at the other 
end of the network. Valid network messages are replayed at improper places. The 
wormhole attackers could make nodes that are far apart believe that they are really 
immediate neighbours, and force all communications between the affected nodes to 
go through them (Patel et al., 2015a).  
 Unfortunately, certain security mechanisms, such as encryption and 
authentication, are useless in preventing the latter mode of the wormhole attack. 
These security methods are applicable in the wired network. However, in the case of 
MANET, these methods are not applicable. Nodes in MANET perform basic 
network functions such as packet forwarding and routing. In addition, encryption and 
authentication increase the network overhead that is not appropriate in MANET with 
its constrained power. Applying security services in the MANET environment is 
challenging, as it is more vulnerable for eavesdropping and intrusion. Another mode 
of wormhole attack is the participation mode. The latter mode is more difficult than 
the hidden mode, owing to the fact it is harder to detect (Rajakumar et al., 2014). In 
the hidden mode, the intruder does not require cryptographic keys in order to launch 
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Figure 6.2. Wormhole attack architecture. 
the wormhole attack. However, in participation mode the attacker launches a strong 
attack utilising valid cryptographic keys. Thus, the intruder does not make virtual 
links between the legitimate nodes. In fact, malicious nodes in this mode participate 
in the routing similar to legitimate nodes and use the wormhole tunnel to deliver the 
packets with a smaller number of hops. In the hidden mode, the intruder could drop 
data packet after inclusion in the route between the source node and the destination 
node (Nagrath and Gupta, 2011). Figure 6.2 shows the architecture of this attack. 
Two malicious nodes, X and Y launch wormhole attacks. These malicious nodes 
falsify the route length and encapsulate data packets. Assuming that node S wants to 
deliver packets to node D and initiates the route discovery process, node X receives 
the route discovery request from node S and encloses the route request, then tunnels 
it to node Y via route [XFECY].  
 
 
When the encapsulated route is received by node Y, which is requested for D, 
node Y will pretend that it had only one path of travel [SX>YD]. Besides, 
neither X nor Y update the packet header. Thus, node D finds two path routes from S 
of unequal lengths, as the first one is of four and the second one is of three. When 
node Y tunnels back the route to reply to node X, node S falsely considers the path to 
D through X is better than the another path to D via F. Subsequently, tunnelling 
prevents honest intermediate nodes from increasing the metric used to measure the 
existing path lengths correctly.  
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Figure 6.3. The timeline of the experiment scenario. 
A wormhole attack is quite severe. An attack is possible even if the attacker 
has not disclosed any hosts, or even in a situation where all communications have 
been applied with confidentiality and authenticity (Hu et al., 2003). Geographical 
packet leashes, temporal packet leashes, directional antennas, neighbour node 
analysis and digital signatures are the most popular methods applied to detect 
wormhole attacks in MANET (Sorathiya and Rathod, 2015). In this chapter, the trust 
concept of MrDR method will be used to resist this versatile attack.  
 
6.3.2.1 Experiment scenario 
 
The total time length of all experiments is six minutes. At the beginning of 
minute two, or in other words the normal network mode, no wormhole attack occurs 
and the network is normal. Thus, the TTSV will be checked for each node to detect 
any malicious attacks and the network performance is measured. The timeline in 
Figure 6.3 shows the experiment scenario in terms of minutes to detect the DoS 
attacks used in this section on SM for each DoS attack. 
At the end of minute two, node 12 launches a wormhole attack. In addition, 
after ten seconds of the occurrence of the first wormhole node, node 16 also 
commences this attack. Moreover, nodes 18 and 25 follow the previous wormhole 
nodes and launch this attack in the beginning of minute 3, as it is shown in Figure 
6.4.     
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Figure 6.4. Network architecture after wormhole attack occurs in four nodes. 
 
Figure 6.5 (A, B, C, and D) shows the gradual removal of the wormhole 
attacks from the communications within the network. At the beginning of minute 
four, node 18 is detected followed by node 16 approximately 10 seconds later. 
Furthermore, node 12 is detected followed by node 25. Thus, by the end of minute 
four, all wormhole nodes have been temporally isolated from communications. 
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In the remediation phase or rehabilitation, the proposed method ensures that 
only trusted nodes perform tasks and rehabilitate misbehaving nodes. Thus, if the 
misbehaving nodes become trusted, then they can participate in the network 
activities. However, if the TTSV for the node is equal to zero on three successive 
Figure 6.5. The gradual removing of the wormhole attacks. 
A 
B 
C 
D 
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Figure 6.6. Blackhole attack architecture. 
occasions, it will be isolated from the network for longer. Thence, the calculation of 
the TTSV will be longer as is explained in Chapter 5 (Equation 5.4). Subsequently, 
this would save the network resources as MANET has constrained energy.  
The algorithm to detect this attack is implemented using NS2. The pseudo 
code of the algorithm which gives a representation of the actual code to calculate the 
TTSV of nodes using tcl and cc files is shown in the Appendix A. 
 
6.3.3 Blackhole attacks 
 
This attack aims to detect the AODV protocol. AODV is a state-of-the-art 
routing protocol that follows a purely reactive strategy. It establishes a route on-
demand at the start of a communication session and utilities it until it breaks, after 
which a new route setup is initiated. Specifically, AODV uses Route Request 
(RREQ) and Route Reply (RREP) control messages in its Route Discovery stage. It 
uses the Route Error (RERR) control message in the Route Maintenance stage. 
However, a blackhole attack exploits the AODV protocol to launch a DoS attack. 
Figure 6.6  represents the architecture of this attack (Pokhariyal and Kumar, 2014).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Assuming that node S wants to communicate with node D, node S launches 
or broadcasts route discovery request or RREQ to its neighbours. Any intermediate 
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Figure 6.7. Blackhole attacks in the network. 
node or the destination node D which has a fresh route will reply to node S with 
RREP. In a situation that has no intermediate nodes in the network, but has a fresh 
route to node D, they forward RREQ towards node D. Node M is a malicious node 
that does not forward RREQ forward. Instead, it replies falsely to node S, claiming it 
has a valid route to node D. Therefore, the RREP from node M arrives to node S 
faster than other neighbours of S. Thus, node S will send packet to node D via node 
M, as node M announced it has the shortest route to node D. Unfortunately, node M 
would now absorb drop all packets that are sent to node D from node S, and as a 
result, node D will receive nothing (Jhaveri et al., 2012b).  
 
6.3.3.1 Experiment scenario 
 
Based on the timeline in Figure 6.3, at the beginning of minute three or in the 
attack phase, blackhole nodes start to appear gradually, first node 16, then after five 
seconds, node 11. After ten more seconds, node 18 is also a blackhole node. Figure 
6.7  shows the progressive occurrence of this blackhole attack in the network. 
 
Subsequently, at the end of minute four or in the detection phase, the MrDR 
method starts to detect a DoS attack, which is the blackhole type in this experiment. 
First, node 16 is detected, then after 10 seconds, node 18 is also detected. 
Furthermore, at the beginning of minute five, node 11 is also isolated from network 
transmission temporally. Figure 6.8 (A, B, and C) illustrates the gradual detection of 
blackhole nodes using the proposed method. Each misbehaving node that has a 
TTSV equal to 0 is untrusted and should be isolated from communications until its 
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TTSV is restored to 1 and it becomes a trusted node. First, node 16 which is 
untrusted is isolated from communication, followed by node 18 and node 11 
respectively as they are also untrusted. Again, in the remediation phase it will be 
ensured that nodes are trusted in order to use them in future communications.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.3.4 Grayhole attacks 
 
Grayhole attack is an extension of blackhole attacks as the misbehaving 
nodes are unpredictable. In addition, grayhole attacks disturb route discovery which 
Figure 6.8. Detect blackhole attacks gradually. 
A 
 
B 
C 
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considerably degrades the network performance. At the beginning of the discovery 
process, the malicious nodes appear to be honest nodes. After a while, however, the 
malicious nodes start to drop some or all of the packets. However, a grayhole attack 
does forward nodes. Thus, grayhole attacks are more harmful than blackhole attacks. 
The latter drops packets certainly but the former may switch to normal status after 
dropping some packets. Thus, the detection of this type of attack is highly 
problematic because nodes intermittently switch their states from malicious to honest 
and vice versa (Kaur and Sidhu, 2014).  
 A grayhole attack drops and transmits packets selectively after advertising 
itself as owning the shortest path to the destination, as a response to a route request 
message from the source node.  However, malicious nodes could perform numerous 
attacks by subverting the AODV protocol as it does not have any security 
mechanism. For instance, routing message integrity and data origin authentication at 
every receiving node are important. A compromised node might impersonate the 
sender of routing packets or even change the sequence number in RREQ /RREP 
messages. Further, routing information can be modified which leads to inconsistency 
in the network. Moreover, routing tables could contain incorrect information 
regarding the network topology. Therefore, changes in sequence number can result in 
routing loops. Figure 6.9 presents the architecture of the grayhole attack in MANET.  
In this figure, node M is a malicious node which behaves maliciously and drops 
packets which are sent from source node S to the destination node D. Sometimes, 
node M acts normally, so therefore behaves maliciously for a certain time period and 
then acts as a normal node for a specific time. 
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Figure 6.9. Grayhole attack topology. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Many approaches have been proposed to detect this attack, such as creating a 
proof algorithm, check-up algorithm and diagnosis algorithm. The main drawback of 
the latter approaches is that they could not detect all malicious nodes within the 
network, especially due to the sporadic malicious behaviour (Jhaveri et al., 2012a). 
In addition, trust-based approaches use passive acknowledgement such as Simple 
Trust AODV to detect malicious nodes (ST-AODV). This model enables AODV to 
cope with the existence of malicious nodes in the network (Jhumka et al., 2008). 
There are limitations to this work, as there is no packet authentication, so attacks can 
be launched easily by malicious nodes. In this experiment, MrDR method will be 
used to detect grayhole attacks in SM.  
 
6.3.4.1 Experiment scenario 
 
At the beginning of minute three or in the attack mode in Figure 6.3, grayhole 
nodes occur gradually. First, node 10 and node 18 are grayhole nodes, as illustrated 
in Figure 6.10 (A). After ten seconds, they are followed by node 16 and five seconds 
later, they are followed by node 25 as it is shown in Figure 6.10 (B).  
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At the end of minute four or the detection phase, grayhole attacks are 
detected progressively as node 10 and node 18 are isolated from the 
communications. At the beginning of minute five, node 16 and node 25 are also 
detected using MrDR method and isolated from transmissions, until their trust values 
change from 0 to 1. Figure 6.11(A and B) illustrates this detection. First, node 10 and 
node 18 are detected and isolation from communications followed by node 16 and 
node 25.  
Figure 6.14. Grayhole attacks occur (nodes 10 and 18) 
A 
B 
Figure 6.10. Grayhole attacks occur gradually. 
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6.3.5 Jellyfish attack  
 
The jellyfish attack is one type of DoS attack that usually occurs at the 
transport layer of the MANET stack. During this attack, a malicious node can remain 
active in packet forwarding and even route discovering to inhibit it from diagnosis 
and detection. However, the malicious node may affect the traffic by itself via 
dropping packets periodically, reordering packets, or other such jitters. Thus, 
jellyfish attacks are considered harmful to TCP traffic as cooperative nodes can 
rarely differentiate the attack from the normal network congestion (Laxmi et al., 
2014). Figure 6.12 illustrates the jellyfish attack architecture in the situation of a 
reorder buffer. Jellyfish node or node M records the buffer, as the packets are sent 
via the buffer (Laxmi et al., 2015). At the destination point, if the packets do not 
arrive in the actual order, then duplicate acknowledgement will be sent to the sender. 
At the sender side, when three duplicate acknowledgements are received, re-
transmission of the packets begins without waiting for re-transmission timeout. In 
A 
B 
Figure 6.11. Grayhole attacks detection gradually. 
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Figure 6.12. Jellyfish attack architecture. 
addition, even when the packet reaches the destination, the sender still believes the 
packet to be lost and might re-transmit the packet (Kaur et al., 2015). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.3.5.1 Experiment scenario  
 
According to Figure 6.3 at the beginning of the experiment, the network is in 
the normal network mode as no attack appears. At the beginning of minute three or 
the attack phase, jellyfish nodes start to launch an attack, with node 13, and then 
node 11. Approximately ten seconds later, node 15 launches an attack and is 
followed by node 20 after another 10 seconds. Figure 6.13(A and B) shows this 
sequence. 
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At the beginning of minute five or the detection phase according to Figure 6.3 
, the jellyfish attacks have been detected, with node 13 first, followed by node 11, as 
illustrated in Figure 6.14 (A and B). This is followed by node 15 and node 20. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.13. Jellyfish attacks occur gradually. 
Figure 6.14. Detect jellyfish attacks completely. 
A 
B 
A 
B 
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6.4   Testing the proposed method against grayhole attacks on MM (Two 
MANETs) 
 
MANET, with high mobility and frequent topology changes, increases the 
chance of one or more MANETs merging and partitioning. In this study, the focus 
will be on MANETs merging. Due to the vulnerabilities of MANET, such as limited 
protection mechanisms and a lack of central authority, many attacks can occur at any 
time, such as in the merging process.  
 The proposed method will be tested on the situation when two MANETs are 
about to merge. This scenario is critical as when MANETs merge many issues need 
to be considered to complete the merging process as quickly as possible; for 
example, IP address conflicts, MANET ID, and bypassing any misbehaving activities 
which can hinder the merging process such as the occurrence of a DoS attack which 
can give incorrect information and paralyse the process. Therefore, if the merging 
process is not handled effectively and misbehaving nodes are not detected, the 
effects will be serious, such as traffic delays or IP conflicts. In this experiment, the 
centralised trust concept, which is discussed in detail in the previous Chapter, will be 
used to help the MM to merge safely and successfully.  
 
6.4.1 Experiment Design and scenario 
 
 
An experimental investigation is conducted when two MANETs merge, in 
order to explore the efficacy of the MUMrDR method in detecting DoS attacks in 
MM. In this experiment, a grayhole attack is used as an example of DoS attack to 
evaluate and test the performance of the proposed method in this scenario. Network 
Simulator (NS2.35) is used to perform this experiment under LINUX (UBUNTU 
12.04). This section illustrates the simulation parameters and the experiment 
scenario. A summary of both the simulation parameters and the computer 
specifications, which are used in this experiment, are illustrated in Table 6.2. 
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Figure 6.15. MANET 1 architecture. 
Table 6.2. Simulation parameters. 
                                                           
                                                   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Two standalone MANETs are used in this experiment. The first MANET, 
MANET 1, consists arbitrarily of 71 nodes. Figure 6.15 shows the MANET 1 
architecture.  
 
In this scenario, the source node is node 8 and the destination node is node 7. 
The proposed method checks the TTSV for every node, three times pre-merging and 
Simulation Parameters 
Processor Intel(R) Core (TM) Duo CPU P8700 @ 2.53GHz 
RAM 4.00 GB 
System type 64-bit 
Operating system UBUNTU 12.04 
Routing protocol AODV 
Simulation time 6 minutes 
No of nodes 101 
Traffic type CBR 
Packet size 512 bytes 
MAC type Mac/802_11 
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Figure 6.16. Timeline of the experiment scenario. 
three times post-merging. The reason why the TTSV is tested three times before and 
after merging is to test the performance of the proposed method in different scenarios 
before the attack occurs; when the attack occurs; and finally after removing the 
attack and isolating the misbehaving nodes using the proposed method. Further, refer 
to Figure 6.16 in the attack phase, two grayhole nodes appear gradually, in node 10 
and node 18, as shown in Figure 6.17(A). In addition, at the beginning of minute 
three, two extra grayhole attacks subsequently exist in nodes 16 and 25, as presented 
in Figure 6.17 (B).    
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At the end of minute four, the grayhole attack nodes are detected 
progressively, using the proposed method, as node 10 and node 18 are isolated from 
the communications. Further, a new MANET, which is named MANET 2 appears 
and will start to merge with MANET 1. Figure 6.18 (A and B) presents the gradual 
detection of the grayhole attacks and the occurrence of the new MANET. MANET 2 
is composed of 30 nodes, so after merging with MANET 1, the total nodes will be 
101 nodes.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A 
B 
Figure 6.17. Network architecture following grayhole attacks. 
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MANET 1 and MANET 2 start their negotiations, based on the centralised 
trust method, as one trusted node from each MANET helps to complete the process 
and accomplish the merging between the two networks. In this experiment, node 5 
from MANET 1 and node 85 from MANET 2 are the connected nodes that have the 
responsibility to finalise the merging operation and check the IP address for conflict 
for each node. In addition, at the end of minute five as it is illustated in Figure 6.16  , 
the two MANETs start to merge, as shown in Figure 6.19 (A and B). 
A 
B 
Figure 6.18. Detection of grayhole attacks gradually. 
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Figure 6.20. Grayhole attacks after merging. 
 
At the beginning of minute six at it is appeared in Figure 6.16, the two 
MANETs merge and two grayhole nodes occur whilst merging, at node 13 and node 
39, as shown in Figure 6.20.  
 
 
 
A 
B 
Figure 6.19. Two MANETs merging. 
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Figure 6.21. Detect grayhole attacks completely. 
At the middle of minute six, the proposed method detects the DoS attacks and 
isolates the grayhole nodes from the communication, temporally, as shown in Figure 
6.21. 
 
 
The proposed method then detects the grayhole nodes before and after the 
merging process. The TTSV measures the trust value of each three times before and 
after the merging process. Untrusted nodes are temporally isolated from the 
transmissions until their trust value changes from 0 to 1. Any node which is 
untrusted three successive times is isolated for longer until its TTSV changes from 0 
to 1, meaning from an untrusted to a trusted node. Therefore, the TTSV will be 
checked in this experiment every three minutes, based on Equation 5.4 in Chapter 5. 
The usage of the proposed method helps to detect the grayhole nodes systematically, 
even in the situation of merging. Therefore, the power and effects of DoS attacks are 
diminished by using the proposed method which increases network performance 
considerably.  
 
6.5   Testing the proposed method against different DoS attacks on MM (Four 
MANETs) 
 
There is a pressing need to detect any malicious activities all the time, in 
order to protect the network. In this experiment the proposed method will test its 
efficacy to detect four types of DoS attacks: wormhole attack, blackhole attack, 
grayhole attack, and jellyfish attack. Drawing upon the decentralised trust concept, 
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which is explained in detail in Chapter 5, the four configured standalone MANETs 
will be merged together to make a single large MANET.  
 
6.5.1 Experimental design and scenario  
 
 
In this experiment, four types of DoS attacks are used, as demonstrated 
above, in order to test the performance of the proposed method in a situation where 
many MANETs are merged, as well as determine how to detect DoS attacks in this 
situation. As demonstrated in the previous section (6.1), this experiment uses the 
same network simulator. The simulation parameters and the computer specifications, 
which are utilised in this experiment are shown in Table 6.3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6.3. Simulation parameters for four MANETs merge. 
Simulation Parameters 
Processor Intel(R) Core (TM) Duo CPU P8700 @ 
2.53GHz 
RAM 4.00 GB 
System type 64-bit 
Operating system UBUNTU 12.04 
Routing protocol AODV 
Simulation time 6 minutes 
No of nodes 50 
Traffic type CBR 
Packet size 512 bytes 
MAC type Mac/802_11 
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Figure 6.22. Four MANETs architecture. 
Each network has a different number of nodes. MANET 1 in top left has 
eleven nodes. MANET 2 in the top right includes fourteen nodes. MANET 3 in 
bottom left has twelve nodes. MANET 4 in the bottom right has thirteen nodes. 
Figure 6.22  shows the architecture of these MANETs.  
 
 
The duration of this experiment is six minutes and the complete timeline of 
this experiment is shown in Figure 6.23. 
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Figure 6.23. The timeline of the experiment.  
 
 
At the beginning or in the normal network mode as it is illustrated in Figure 
6.23, around the first 30 seconds of this experiment, the four MANETs do not start 
the merging negotiations, and they are separated. 
At the end of minute two or in the attack phase depends on Figure 6.23, 
different DoS attacks occur in each MANET. Grayhole attacks appear in both 
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Figure 6.24. Different DoS attacks occur in different MANET. 
Figure 6.25. Removing DoS attacks completely from all MANETs. 
MANET 3 and MANET 4. After ten seconds of the occurrence of jellyfish attack in 
MANET 1, a wormhole attack occurs in MANET 2 as shown in Figure 6.24. 
 
Using the proposed method in each MANET helps to detect the DoS attacks 
gradually from all MANETs by the beginning of minute three based on Figure 6.23.  
Figure 6.25 shows the detection of all DoS attacks in each MANET. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       
 
 
 
 
 
 
At the middle of minute three, as shown in Figure 6.26 (A and B), node 
number 35 joins MANET 2. 
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At the end of minute three (Figure 6.23), MANET 1 and MANET 3 start to 
merge, negations between them are based on decentralised trust concept. This is 
shown in Figure 6.27 (A and B). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A 
B 
Figure 6.26. Node 35 joins MANET 2. 
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As explained in Chapter 5, the decentralised trust concept means that all 
nodes from each MANET cooperate to complete the merging process. Thus, the 
decentralised trust concept enables all nodes either trusted or untrusted to participate 
in the merging process unless they give incorrect information and are nominated as 
malicious or selfish nodes. Thence, this type of untrusted nodes would be isolated 
from communication until their trust values change to 1 or the merging process is 
complete. This concept allows all nodes to participate in the merging process as 
some types of DoS attacks, such as grayhole attacks, do not behave maliciously all 
the time. They can convert to the normal mode sometimes. For example, a thief does 
not behave badly all the time; their behaviour can appear normal in the daytime and 
convert to criminal behaviour at night. Moreover, this thief could be a person who 
has a job and performs duties and tasks. The same concept is used here in the 
decentralised trust concept, as nodes which give correct information can cooperate 
and assign IP addresses to other nodes. 
 
A 
B 
Figure 6.27. MANET 1 and MANET 3 merge. 
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At the middle of minute four, MANET 2 starts merging with MANET 1 and 
MANET 3, as they become one big MANET. Figure 6.28 (A and B) shows this 
merging progressively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
At the beginning of minute five or in the attack phase regards Figure 6.23, 
MANET 1, MANET 2 and MANET 3 become one big MANET and many DoS 
attacks appear in the big MANET and in MANET 4, as illustrated in Figure 6.28.  
MANET 4 starts negotiations based on decentralised trust concepts to merge with the 
big MANET. Thus, nodes from the big MANET will communicate with nodes in 
MANET 4 in order to complete the merging process and ensure that nodes merge 
without any IP address conflict. In addition, DoS attacks, such as grayhole attack and 
wormhole attack occur during the merging process, as show in Figure 6.29 (A and 
B). In this situation, all nodes from both of the networks will cooperate to complete 
the merging process and isolate misbehaving nodes which give incorrect information 
from communication until either their TTSV changes from 0 to 1 or the merging 
process is complete. 
B 
A 
Figure 6.28. MANET 2 merges with merged MANET (MANET 1+ MANET3). 
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. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
At the middle of minute five or the detection phase as it is presented in Figure 
6.23, the detection of DoS attacks is performed, based on the proposed method as it 
is shown in Figure 6.30.  
A 
B 
Figure 6.29. MANET 4 starts merging process with the big MANET. 
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Figure 6.30. Merging nearly complete and the DoS attacks are detected. 
Figure 6.31. Merging complete. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
At the beginning of minute six or in the normal network mode as it is 
displayed in Figure 6.23, the merging process is complete and the four MANETs 
become one big MANET, as shown in Figure 6.31.  
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6.6    Chapter summary 
 
 
This chapter presents the simulation of the proposed method to detect 
different types of DoS attacks, in both SM and MM. The implementation of this 
simulation helps to test the effectiveness of the proposed method.  First, in SM, the 
MrDR is applied to detect different types of DoS attacks separately; blackhole attack, 
wormhole attack, grayhole attack, and jellyfish attack. The purpose of testing the 
proposed method under various DoS attacks is to evaluate the performance of MrDR 
against different scenarios. Second, the MUMrDR is used to detect grayhole attacks, 
when two MANETs are merging. In this experiment, a centralised trust concept is 
used to accomplish the process. Third, decentralised trust concept in this experiment 
helps four configured MANETs to merge and detect many types of DoS attacks. NS2 
is used to simulate all these experiments. In the next chapter, the results and 
evaluation will be done for these experiments, in order to assess the performance of 
the proposed method under multiple situations and experiments.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Results and Evaluation 
 
 137 
Chapter 7: Results and 
Evaluation 
 
 
 
 
This chapter presents the findings obtained from the research by setting out 
the results of different experiments on both SM and MM. First, the proposed method 
detects different DoS attacks on SM. In the previous chapter, four types of DoS 
attacks were tested on SM: wormhole attack; blackhole attack; grayhole attack; and 
jellyfish attack. In addition, MUMrDR is used to detect different DoS attacks, even 
on MM. Two main experiments are performed on MM: two MANETs and four 
MANETs.  
This chapter will illustrate the findings and evaluate the results against 
existing approaches on SM. On MM, there is no existing work that deals with this 
situation. Subsequently, this chapter will explore and clarify the results of the 
experiments explained in detail with their scenarios in the previous chapter. 
 
7.1   Evaluation overview 
 
Evaluation is the process of judging something's value,  importance, quality 
or a report which contains this information (Press, 2016b). Many evaluation schemes 
have been proposed in order to evaluate the efficiency of new methods or systems, 
such as Common Criteria (CC), Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL), Security 
Functional Requirement (SFR), and Security Function Policy (SFP) (Merkow and 
Breithaupt, 2004). CC is the set of recognised technical configurations and standards, 
which nationally and internationally enable security evaluations of information 
technology (IT) products and technologies. These are the individual set of 
configurations or common criteria for technical standards that improve a technology 
or specific product, which qualifies for such a protection profile (Wallace, 2003). 
However, CC has not been used in this study to evaluate the security in MANET as 
the CC is used only in federal government sectors and critical infrastructure instead 
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of personal networks and non-fixed infrastructure such as using MANET in 
conferences or cafes. 
Evaluation of a system or method is important in order to measure the quality 
and power of the new method. In addition, it provides a comparative analysis 
between the proposed method and existing methods, in order to prioritise the best 
method that is available in an environment such as MANET. It means that a method 
which results in increasing the network throughput and packets delivery ratio, can 
defend against misbehaving activities such as DoS attacks.    
It is important to bear in mind that in order to evaluate the effectiveness of 
the proposed method, it needs to be tested and simulated, to measure different factors 
and network performances, using this method. Network Simulator (NS2) is used in 
this study for reasons which are explained in the previous chapter to simulate the 
proposed method and express how the MrDR method could deter DoS attacks in 
both SM and MM. 
 
7.2   MrDR results against different DoS attacks on SM 
 
As explained in the previous chapter, different DoS attacks detect SM. As the 
total duration of the experiments is six minutes; the TTSV of each node will be 
calculated every two minutes based on Equation 5.3 in Chapter 5.  For each DoS 
attack, the network performance will be measured in three ways: network 
throughput; packet delivery ratio; and packet delay ratio. Subsequently, the network 
performance for each attack will be measured every two minutes. The reason for this 
measurement is to compare the performance of the network in three situations: 
before the occurrence of the attack; after the attack occurs, and after detecting the 
attack using the proposed method. 
 
7.2.1 Testing the MrDR method against wormhole attack 
 
In this subsection, the results of network performance are explored when a 
wormhole attack is launched by malicious nodes. The detailed scenario of the 
experiment is explained in the previous chapter. The comparison of the network 
performance aspects will show the efficacy of the proposed method in detecting this 
attack and enhance the network performance considerably. 
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Figure 7.1. Network performance before wormhole attack occurs. 
7.2.1.1 Network performance before the occurrence of a wormhole 
attack 
 
Figure 7.1 shows the network performance before the appearance of 
wormhole attacks. The packet delivery ratio and network throughput rise steadily, as 
there are no attacks that deteriorate the performance of the network. In addition, the 
packet delay ratio decreases, compared with the packet delivery ratio and the 
network throughput. That is to say, in the normal situation as no attack appears, the 
network performance is in the expected form and performs its tasks normally. 
Thence, packet delivery ratio and network throughput are high whereas the packet 
delay ratio is low.      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                
7.2.1.2 Network performance when the wormhole attack occurs 
 
From the data in Figure 7.2,  it is shown that the network performance when 
the wormhole attack is launched is affected as the network performance in network 
throughput and packet delivery ratio drop dramatically. More precisely, the packet 
delay ratio increases, due to the wormhole attacks. 
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Figure 7.2. Network performance when wormhole attack occurs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7.2.1.3 Network performance after detecting wormhole attack using 
MrDR method 
 
In Figure 7.3, it is shown from that there is a clear trend in the decrease in 
packet delay ratio after removing the wormhole attacks and isolating the wormhole 
nodes using the proposed method. The packet delivery ratio and network throughput 
increase considerably. Removing wormhole attacks means that the malicious nodes 
are temporarily discarded from communications, until its trust value is restored and it 
becomes a trusted node. 
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Figure 7.3. Network performance after removing wormhole attacks. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7.2.2 Testing the MrDR method against blackhole attack 
 
The proposed method is tested also against the blackhole attack, as explained 
in the previous chapter. This subsection defines the results of the network 
performance in three situations, as with the previous attack.  
 
7.2.2.1 Network performance before the occurrence of a blackhole 
attack 
 
The network performance before the occurance of blackhole attack is positive 
and normal as the packet delay ratio is low, whereas packet delivery ratio and the 
network throughput are high. Normal means that as there is no attack occurs, the 
nodes will perform their duties normally such as send packets to the intended nodes. 
Figure 7.4  shows the network performance at the end of minute two as no attack has 
yet occurred.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Packets (bytes) 
m/s 
ratio 
ratio 
Results and Evaluation 
 
 142 
Figure 7.4. Network performance before blackhole attack is launched. 
Figure 7.5. Network performance when blackhole attack occurs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7.2.2.2 Network performance when blackhole attack occurs 
 
Figure 7.5 plots the network performance when the blackhole attack is 
launched during minute four of the experiment or in the attack phase depends on 
Figure 6.3. The network performance is degraded as the packet delay ratio increases, 
whereas the network throughput and packet delivery ratio decrease dramatically. In 
the blackhole attack, the malicious nodes drop packet, so the packet delay ratio 
increments 
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Figure 7.6. Network performance after detecting blackhole attacks. 
7.2.2.3 Network performance after detecting a blackhole attack using 
MrDR method 
 
The network performance is positive as shown in Figure 7.6  In other words, 
the malicious nodes which launch the blackhole attack are detected using the 
proposed method and isolated from communications until they convert from an 
untrusted mode to a trusted one. The trust value is checked every two minutes in this 
experiment. Therefore, the network throughput and packet delivery ratio rise such as 
before the occurrence of the attack, and packet delay ratio decreases significantly.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7.2.3 Testing the MrDR method against grayhole attack 
 
The previous section has shown the results of using the MrDR method to 
detect blackhole attacks in SM. In this subsection, a grayhole attack is used to test 
the effectiveness of the proposed method. The whole scenario of the experiment is 
explained in the previous chapter. 
 
7.2.3.1 Network performance before the occurrence of a grayhole 
attack 
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Figure 7.7. Network performance before grayhole attack appears. 
Network activity in the first two minutes of this experiment in the normal 
network mode as the previous attacks and performs the expected activity because 
there is no attacks occur which disturb the network performance. Figure 7.7  
provides the network performance in that time as network throughput and the packet 
delivery ratio increase, whereas the packet delay ratio decreases sharply.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7.2.3.2 Network performance when grayhole attack occurs 
 
Furthermore, with the presence of the grayhole attacks, the network 
performance deteriorates. The network throughput and the packet delivery ratio 
decrease rapidly, whereas the packet delay ratio increases considerably. Figure 7.8  
shows this information clearly. In addition, in this plot the network overhead 
increases gradually due to the DoS attacks. Grayhole attacks increase the overhead 
on the network, as explained in the previous chapter about the performance of this 
attack. The misbehaving nodes can convert from normal mode to malicious mode 
and drop packets like blackhole attacks. Therefore, the detection of these attacks is 
considered harder than the blackhole attack (Shanmuganathan and Anand, 2012). 
 However, in this study, the network overhead is measured on grayhole attack 
because it is more harmful than the blackhole attack and can be measured in the 
future for the other DoS attacks. In addition, the measurement of the overhead will 
give an idea about the effects of using the proposed method on the network 
overhead. 
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Figure 7.8. Network performance under grayhole attacks. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7.2.3.3 Network performance after detecting grayhole attacks using 
MrDR method 
 
Figure 7.9 shows the network performance after using the proposed method 
and the detection of the grayhole attack. From this data, it can be seen that the 
network throughput and packet delivery ratio improve compared with data in Figure 
7.8.  The misbehaving nodes that launch this attack are detected using the proposed 
method and isolated from the communication until they become trusted nodes. Also, 
packet delay ratio decreases rapidly after detecting the grayhole attack in the 
network. Furthermore, the network overhead decreases slightly compared to data in  
Figure 7.8 . Thus, the proposed method does not increase the load on the network, 
and that is important in an environment such as MANET, with constraints on energy.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Packets (bytes) 
ratio 
ratio 
Packets (bytes) 
m/s 
Results and Evaluation 
 
 146 
Figure 7.9. Network performance after detecting grayhole attacks. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7.2.4  Testing the MrDR method against jellyfish attack 
 
This subsection presents the results of using the proposed method to detect 
jellyfish attacks. Again, the completed scenario of this experiment is outlined in the 
previous chapter.  
 
7.2.4.1 Network performance before the occurrence of jellyfish attack 
 
At the end of minute two or in the normal network mode, since there is no 
attack, the network performance is the same as is mentioned in the previous 
experiments. Before the occurrence of any attack, the network performs its tasks 
normally without any hindrances. Figure 7.10 indicates that both network throughput 
and packet delivery ratio increment, whereas the packet delay ratio decrements. 
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Figure 7.10. Network performance before the occurrence of jellyfish attack. 
Figure 7.11. Network performance when jellyfish attacks occur. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
7.2.4.2 Network performance when a jellyfish attack occurs 
 
At the end of minute four, Figure 7.11 plots the network performance after a 
jellyfish attack at the end of minute four or in the attack phase. A jellyfish attack 
deteriorates the network and affects the network activities. The packet delivery ratio 
and the network throughput diminish, with an increase in the packet delay ratio. 
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Figure 7.12. Network performance after detecting jellyfish attacks. 
7.2.4.3 Network performance after detecting a jellyfish attack using 
MrDR method 
 
Figure 7.12 shows the improvement in network performance after detecting 
the jellyfish attacks and isolation of the malicious nodes from transmissions using the 
proposed method, for a certain time until they become trusted nodes. The network 
throughput and packet delivery ratio increment whereas the packet delay ratio 
decrements. Thus, the network performance improves as the misbehaving nodes 
which affect network performance are isolated from communications. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7.3 Evaluating the results of detecting different DoS using MrDR between the 
DoS attacks used 
 
Generally, MrDR method succeeds in detecting different aforementioned 
DoS attacks, recording results after detecting the attack and isolating the malicious 
nodes. These attacks affect the performance of the network drastically. However, the 
performance of the proposed method is measured under different DoS attacks; 
wormhole attack, grayhole attack, blackhole attack and jellyfish attack. Every DoS 
attack has its own performance and effects on the network. Despite the fact that the 
mentioned DoS attacks have the same target which is to degrade the performance of 
the network, each attack has a different level of effectively and various degrees of 
difficulty of detection. Based on the experiments to detect the four types of DoS 
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attacks discussed in the previous section, a comparison of the different DoS attacks is 
shown in Figure 7.13. This comparison of the network performance after detecting 
the DoS attacks indicates that the MrDR method works differently, depending on the 
type of attack. 
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Figure 7.13. Network performance after detecting different DoS using the MrDR. 
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Figure 7.14. Packet delivery ratio after removing DoS attacks. 
Now, the three factors measured in previous experiments: network 
throughput; packet delivery ratio; and packet delay ratio will be compared between 
all attacks in the situation of detecting the DoS attacks. The reason for this 
comparison is to evaluate the proposed method effectiveness under different DoS 
attacks that are plotted in Figure 7.14 , Figure 7.15, and Figure 7.16 respectively. The 
purpose of this comparison also proves that the effectiveness of the proposed method 
and its work varies from one attack to another. 
Figure 7.14 indicates the packet delivery ratio for each DoS attack used in 
this experiment, after detecting the attacks using the proposed method. According to 
Figure 7.14 blackhole attacks have the highest value in packet delivery ratio using 
the proposed method compared with the other DoS attacks. However, it can be seen 
from the same figure that wormhole attacks gain the lowest value in the packet 
delivery ratio between the other DoS attacks. In addition, jellyfish attacks are in 
second place after blackhole attacks in terms of  high level in packet delivery ratio, 
followed by grayhole attacks.  
Further, the present findings from this graph support the hypothesis 
mentioned in the previous paragraph that each DoS attack responds in different 
degrees against the proposed method. 
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Figure 7.15. Packet delay ratio after removing DoS attacks. 
Moreover, based on Figure 7.15 below, the findings of the present study 
suggest that in terms of packet delay ratio the jellyfish attack gains the biggest value 
in packet delay ratio using the proposed method compared with the other attacks. 
Blackhole attack, grayhole attack, and wormhole attack are respectively followed by 
the jellyfish attack in this factor.  
 
 
Further, it is observed from Figure 7.16 that jellyfish attacks have the highest 
value in network throughput followed by blackhole attacks. For grayhole attacks, 
network throughput decreases significantly compared with jellyfish attacks and 
blackhole attacks. In addition, wormhole attacks receive the lowest results in this 
situation, as the network throughput falls considerably. Again, there is no specific 
reason why any attack succeeds in areas of network performance such as network 
throughput more than another, so it can be assumed that it is related to the attack's 
performance, power, and its reaction against the detection method in the network.  
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Figure 7.16. Network throughput after removing DoS attacks. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
From the perspective of identifying how the best attack reacts to the proposed 
method and gives the highest value in both packet delivery ratio and network 
throughput and the lowest value in packet delay ratio can be noted from Figure 7.14  
to Figure 7.16, and different DoS attacks react differently. In other words, the 
meaning here of the best attack, is the attack that is discovered and brought under 
control using the proposed method before further deterioration of the network.  
In terms of packet delivery ratio and network throughput, blackhole attacks 
give the highest value compared to other attacks. The reason of the latter depends on 
the attack performance as blackhole attacks can be detected quickly compared to, for 
example, grayhole attacks. Since the node in grayhole attacks can convert to the 
normal mode and sometimes returns to the malicious mode which makes the 
detection process complicated compared to a clear attack such as a blackhole attack. 
Furthermore, jellyfish attacks rank as the second best attack in terms of both packet 
delivery ratio and network throughput after blackhole attacks. Jellyfish attacks can 
also be detected clearly with regards to its performance which delays packets for a 
specific time before delivering them. 
 Figure 7.17 shows the ranks for the all DoS attacks that are used in the 
experiments and their performance in the perspective in both packet delivery ratio 
and network throughput. Besides, wormhole attacks have the worst values in both 
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Figure 7.17. Packet delivery ratio and Network throughput in different DoS attacks. 
network throughput and packet delivery ratio, as wormhole attacks do not inject 
unusual volumes of traffic into the network. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In terms of packet delay ratio, wormhole attacks give the best results as they 
score the lowest packet delay ratio compared with the other attacks as it is shown in 
Figure 7.15. Again, Figure 7.18 illustrates the ranks of the DoS attack in terms of 
packet delay ratio performance ascending. The reason of these results is depends on 
the experiment specifications and parameters. That is to say it does not mean that 
attack is lowest in effectively compared with others but as previously explained this 
regards the parameters used in the experiment. Overall, it is agreed that all the kinds 
of DoS attack used in these experiments caused packet delay, but that in varying 
proportions. 
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Figure 7.18. Packet delay ratio ranks in different DoS attacks. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7.4 Evaluation of the results from detecting different DoS using MrDR, with 
existing methods based on trust 
 
It is important to compare the results obtained from the use of the proposed 
method with the existing method that is based on trust concept to detect malicious 
behaviours. One of the methods discussed in the literature in Chapter 4 is used for 
comparison with this proposed method. The trust-enhanced anonymous on-demand 
routing protocol (TEAP) method is based on using a trust concept (Gunasekaran and 
Premalatha, 2013). TEAP is based on using an anonymity concept for an informant 
which can identify and anonymously report abnormalities within the network. In 
TEAP, when a node does not send any cooperative messages then it is revealed as an 
abnormal user to other users. Furthermore, when many claims are sent by a user, it is 
also termed as a misbehaving node. Moreover, TEAP is designed in terms of 
broadcast with trapdoor information that is used to detect misbehaving activities 
anonymously within the network. 
 TEAP is used for comparison with the proposed method in two aspects: 
packet delivery ratio and network overhead. In this comparison, grayhole attacks are 
used as an example to compare the results of the performance of the proposed 
method with TEAP. 
 In the aspects of packet delivery ratio after detecting malicious activities is 
shown in Figure 7.19. As can be seen, the performance of the MrDR in detecting the 
DoS attacks, precisely grayhole attacks in this case, is higher in the aspect of packet 
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Figure 7.19.  Comparison between TEAP and MrDR based on PDR. 
delivery ratio than TEAP performance after removing malicious nodes from 
communications. Accordingly, the proposed method or MrDR outperforms TEAP in 
this aspect.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In brief, TEAP considers a node as misbehaving when it does not send 
cooperative messages to other nodes. In addition, in TEAP when many claims are 
received about a specific node being abnormal then is also considered a malicious 
node. However, in MrDR different trust values need to be considered to identify the 
node as normal or misbehaving. Also, in the proposed method, there is rehabilitation 
to rehab the misbehaving node in order to use it in further communications. Thus, as 
it is assumed before in MrDR, the trust value is something temporary and short-lived 
and needs to be calculated every specific time.  
 
Figure 7.20 shows the differences between the two methods when 
considering network overhead. In this case, TEAP consumes energy and exhausts 
network resources more than MrDR. Therefore, while both the proposed method and 
TEAP consume network resources, from findings MrDR does so on a smaller scale 
which does not affect the network. 
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Figure 7.20. Comparison between TEAP and MrDR based on network overhead. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7.5 Results of detecting DoS attack on MM - Two independent configured 
MANETs 
 
The experiment that addressed the detection of grayhole attacks when two 
MANETs merged is explained in detail in the previous chapter. Subsequently, in this 
chapter, the network performance in the three aspects: packet delivery ratio; network 
throughput; and packet delay ratio will be measured before and after merging. The 
reason for these measurements is to demonstrate the performance and effectiveness 
of the proposed method in this specific situation. MANET with its specifications 
such as dynamic topology and non-fixed infrastructure is prone to merging and even 
partitioning. These measurements take place three times before merging and three 
times after merging as it is shown in the timeline of experiment scenario in Figure 
6.16 in Chapter 6. This experiment shows how two independent MANETs, which are 
clustered can merge successfully and detect DoS attacks.  
 
Figure 7.21 measures the network performance in the normal network mode 
from initiating the simulation when there are no attacks. The findings highlight that, 
in a normal situation where there is no attack, the network performance is as 
expected when delivering packets, which enhances the network throughput with no 
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Figure 7.21. Network performance before the occurrence of grayhole attack (Pre-merging). 
packet delay. It is apparent from Figure 7.21 that the network throughput and packet 
delivery ratio increase, whereas the packet delay ratio diminishes.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As explained in the previous chapter in (Figure 6.16), at attack mode from 
starting the simulation, two grayhole attack nodes occur. Obviously, grayhole attacks 
harm the network and affect network communications. In Figure 7.22, network 
performance is measured. In this situation, there is a clear trend of decrease in both 
network throughput and the packet delivery ratio with regards to the occurrence of 
grayhole attacks, whereas the packet delay ratio and network overhead increase 
significantly. 
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Figure 7.22. Network performance under grayhole attack (Pre- merging). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Moreover, at the detection stage from (Figure 6.16), the proposed method 
detects the DoS attack and temporally isolates the grayhole nodes from transmission, 
until their TTSV changes from 0 to 1. To put it another way, nodes become trusted. 
Figure 7.23 shows the network performance after detecting grayhole attack nodes. 
The findings suggest that the network throughput and the packet delivery ratio rise 
sharply, whereas the network overhead and the packet delay ratio drop suddenly. On 
account of isolating the misbehaving nodes which cause grayhole attacks, the normal 
nodes will perform the expected missions and deliver packets to the intended nodes. 
Thus, the network throughput and packet delivery ratio increase whereas the packet 
delay ratio and network overhead decrease. 
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Figure 7.23. Network performance after removing grayhole attacks (Pre-merging). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In addition, as illustrated in the previous chapter, when the grayhole attacks 
are detected, a new MANET that consists of 30 nodes appears and wants to merge 
with MANET1 to form a larger, single MANET as it is shown in the experiment 
timeline in Figure 6.16 in Chapter 6.  In order to achieve this, a centralised trust 
concept is used in this experiment. One trusted node from each network starts 
negotiations in order to complete the merging process and detect any further DoS 
attacks. 
 
At the end of minute five, specifically in the detection phase as the two 
networks merge (See Figure 6.16 in Chapter 6). Figure 7.24 shows the network 
performance for this larger MANET when there are no DoS attacks. Therefore, both 
network throughput and packet delivery ratio are high, whereas the network 
overhead and packet delay ratio are low. These results stem from the absence of 
grayhole attacks which considerably diminish the performance of the network. 
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Figure 7.24. Network performance before DoS attack (Post-merging). 
Figure 7.25. Network performance under grayhole attacks (Post-merging). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
After merging is complete as it shown in the timeline in Figure 6.16 in 
Chapter 6, grayhole attacks occur in two nodes as explained in the previous chapter. 
Figure 7.25 shows the network performance in this situation, where the network 
throughput and packet delivery ratio decrease dramatically due to the occurrence of 
grayhole attacks which drop packets. Thence, the packet delay ratio which increases 
network overhead also rises considerably. 
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Figure 7.26. Network performance after removing grayhole attacks (Post- merging). 
At the next detection phase (See Figure 6.16 In Chapter 6), grayhole nodes 
are detected using the proposed MUMrDR method. Figure 7.26 demonstrates the 
network performance after handling grayhole attacks. The packet delivery ratio and 
network throughput increment considerably and the packet delay ratio and network 
overhead decrement drastically. To put it another way, after detecting the 
misbehaving nodes, the other normal nodes perform the normal activities such as 
delivering packet to the intended destination. Thus, network performance is again 
enhanced.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7.6 Results of the detection of DoS attacks on MM - Four independently 
configured MANETs 
 
In the previous chapter, the experiment of merging four MANETs is 
explained in detail. Moreover, different types of DoS attacks occur in each MANET 
pre- and post-merging when it becomes one larger MANET with 50 nodes.  
 
At the beginning the experiment, precisely in the normal network mode 
according to the experiment timeline illustrated in the previous chapter (See Figure 
6.23 in Chapter 6), as no attacks existed in any MANET, the network performance is 
normal. Normality means that the nodes perform their tasks as they are expected to 
in terms of sending and receiving packets. As explained in Chapter 3, nodes in 
MANET act as a router and a host when sending and receiving packets. Figure 7.27 
shows that network throughput and packet delivery ratio are at their highest points 
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Figure 7.27. Network performance before the occurrence of DoS attacks (Pre- merging). 
Figure 7.28. Network performance when DoS attacks occur (Pre-merging). 
because nodes send and receive packets without hindrance as there is no attack 
occurring, so the packet delay ratio is at its lowest.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Following this, based on the timeline shown in Figure 6.23 in Chapter 6, 
different types of DoS attacks occur in each MANET prior to merging. Figure 7.28  
illustrates the degradation in network performance due to these DoS attacks: 
grayhole attack; jellyfish attack; and wormhole attack. A clear decline occurs in both 
network throughput and packet delivery ratio, as well as an increasing trend in packet 
delay ratio.  
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Figure 7.29. Network performance after detecting DoS attacks (Pre-merging). 
At the minute three mark which is the detection phase according to Figure 
6.23 in Chapter 6, the complete detection of all DoS attack nodes is performed to 
isolate all malicious or selfish nodes until their trust values change from 0 (untrusted) 
to 1 (trusted) under the proposed method. Figure 7.29 shows the improvements in the 
network performance after detecting DoS attacks in the networks.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
At the middle of minute three (See Figure 6.23 in Chapter 6), the four 
MANETs start negotiations in order to merge and to become a single, larger 
MANET, based on using decentralised trust concept which is explained early in 
Chapter 6. At the middle of minute four, (See Figure 6.23 in Chapter 6) MANET 2 
starts merging with MANET 1 and MANET 3. Figure 7.30 shows the network 
performance of the MANETs when there are no DoS attacks. The findings show how 
the network performance is positive. As explained before, due to the absence of DoS 
attacks the nodes perform their tasks as usual in sending and receiving packets. 
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Figure 7.30. Network performance before DoS attacks occur (after start merging process). 
Figure 7.31. Network performance after DoS attacks exist (Post-merging). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  At the beginning of minute five, MANET 1, MANET 2 and MANET 3  
merge. Many DoS attacks occur: jellyfish attacks; blackhole attacks; grayhole 
attacks; and wormhole attacks in this new MANET, as well as in MANET 4, which 
nearly merges with the larger MANET. Figure 7.31 demonstrates the network 
performance with the occurrence of the DoS attacks. Data in Figure 7.31 shows the 
decrease in the network throughput and packet delivery ratio, with an increase in 
packet delay ratio. In fact these results are expected in the presence of the different 
DoS attacks, which cause packet delays and also reduce the network throughput and 
packet delivery level. 
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Figure 7.32. Network performance after detecting DoS attacks (Post-merging). 
In minute five (See timeline Figure 6.23 in Chapter 6), MANET 4 starts 
negotiations to merge with the big MANET based on the decentralised trust concept. 
Furthermore, DoS attacks: blackhole attacks; grayhole attacks; and wormhole attacks 
occur again whilst the merging is in process, and all DoS are detected in the middle 
of minute five, as discussed in Chapter 6. At the beginning of minute six, the 
merging process is completed and the four MANETs form a single larger MANET. 
Figure 7.32 shows that the network performance is normal after merging as no attack 
occurs and the network in the normal mode. Thence, the nodes perform their tasks 
without any problems. The packet delay ratio decreases rapidly, whereas network 
throughput and the packet delivery ratio increase considerably.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7.7 Discussion 
 
The proposed method aims to detect DoS attacks in both SM and MM. due to 
the nature of MANET's non-fixed infrastructure, dynamic topology, and lack of 
central administration, many aspects need to be considered. The MrDR method is 
built on calculating various trust values in order to calculate the total trust value or 
TTSV for each node. 
 
The first experiments are applied to detect four types of DoS attacks: 
blackhole attacks; wormhole attacks; grayhole attacks; and jellyfish attacks in SM. In 
order to evaluate the performance of the proposed method and its power to combat 
these attacks, three aspects are measured: packet delivery ratio; network throughput; 
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and packet delay ratio. These three aspects are calculated in three scenarios: in the 
normal network mode; attack phase; and detection phase. Thus, the performance of 
the proposed method to detect the DoS attack would emphasise the importance and 
efficiency of it. The MrDR helps to establish trust between nodes and apply central 
administration in decentralised networks such as MANET. The findings from the 
simulation indicate the success of the proposed method in detecting different DoS 
attacks in SM, as explained in previous sections.  
 
However, as has been explained, in MANET the nodes move frequently into 
and out of the network. Thus, the chance of networks either merging or partitioning 
exists. For this purpose, the MUMrDR is used to help merging multiple MANET 
using the MrDR method which can also guarantee that in this certain scenario, no 
DoS attacks will affect the network. Two experiments are conducted to investigate 
the effectiveness of this proposed method in MM. the first experiment uses the 
centralised trust concept with MUMrDR to complete the merging process. This 
means one trusted node from each network will help to apply the proposed method 
and complete the merging operation smoothly. Furthermore, the centralised trust 
concept will ensure that many issues are handled in this situation such as no IP 
address conflict, MANET IDs; and assigning IP addresses if required. Grayhole 
attacks are used as an example in this experiment and detected using the proposed 
method. The results of this simulation prove the importance of this method in this 
critical situation. Thus, this study contributes to the MANET field of knowledge by 
addressing this critical situation and showing that it is possible to protect the network 
in the merging process. 
Also, the last experiment is also applied to the MUMrDR to detect different 
types of DoS attacks when four MANETs merge using the decentralised trust 
concept. The decentralised trust concept will enable all nodes to cooperate when 
merging. However, if the node is untrusted and gives incorrect information then it 
will be isolated from communication until the merging process is complete or it 
becomes a trusted node. The findings from this simulation again confirm the 
importance of this method to help merging in MM.  
 
The detection of DoS attacks when the MANETs are merging increases the 
level of security between nodes, as they can exchange correct information about their 
immediate nodes in each MANET. In addition, IP address conflict is also an 
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important issue which is considered, as using the level of security between nodes, 
they can exchange correct information about their immediate nodes in each MANET. 
These findings provide evidence that the proposed method succeeds in an increase in 
the network performance and a decrease in packets delay ratio, which is absolutely 
appropriate in an environment such as MANET with limited resources and energy.  
 
To knowledge, this is the first study to deal with and examine this critical 
situation of detecting DoS attacks in MM. In addition, when using the proposed 
method on SM it is also a unique method which utilises different aspects to calculate 
the trust value which is temporal and in binary mode trusted and untrusted. Thus, in 
SM the proposed method is compared with a method which uses the trust concept to 
identify misbehaving activities, but in MM the originality of this solution lies in the 
fact that no study to date has examined this situation.  
 
7.8 Chapter summary  
 
 
This chapter presents the results of the three experiments, which are 
explained in the previous chapter. The first experiment is on SM and four DoS 
attacks are tested to evaluate the performance of the proposed method. The second 
experiment tests the proposed method in a situation where two MANETs merge 
using the centralised trust concept, to determine how the detection of DoS attack will 
be effective in this situation. Finally, the third experiment tests the performance of 
the proposed method when four independently configured MANETs merge and how 
to control DoS attacks in this complicated scenario using the decentralised trust 
concept. The findings of this study emphsise the importance and effectivness of this 
study, which give positive results. Positive means that the network performance 
increases while packet delay ratio and network overhead decrease drastically. 
Further, it is notable that the current findings add a novel view to the literature on 
detecting DoS attacks in situations of both SM and MM. The next chapter concludes 
the thesis, outlines strengths and limitations of the proposed method, and suggests 
further developments.  
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Chapter 8: Conclusions and 
Future Work 
 
 
 
This chapter draws on work explained in the previous chapters. Here, the 
proposed MrDR method is used to detect DoS attacks in many scenarios and using 
many types of DoS attacks. The main aim of the proposed method is to detect DoS 
attacks in MANET. Trust value is the main concept of the proposed method. Three 
main experiments are carried out to evaluate the effectiveness of this method in both 
SM and MM. This chapter highlights the overall scope of the research, revisits the 
objectives, presents the significance of the findings and limitations of the study, and 
finally presents ideas for future work. 
 
8.1   Review the research objectives  
 
There is undoubtedly a pressing need to use devices to communicate and 
exchange data to perform duties and tasks. IoT with MANET can be used in many 
sectors, such as healthcare, where devices are joined wirelessly in mobile 
environments. For example, mobile nurse technology within the hospital using 
smartphones and tablets enables hospitals to deliver bedside care. Rather than relying 
on computers and landline phones to access the health information of patients and 
communicate with doctors and nurses, access to these MANET solutions helps the 
hospital to deliver immediate care. 
When reviewing the research objectives presented in Chapter 1, the focus of 
this research is the detection of DoS attacks in both SM and MM. Thus, the entire 
development is to achieve this aim. Each objective will be reviewed and connected to 
the research in order to understand how this specific objective has been achieved 
successfully.  
 
1. To study and understand the nature of MANET and its security challenges and 
vulnerabilities. The research will focus on DoS attacks in particular in order to 
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determine how they occur, the various types, and the threat they pose to 
MANET architecture, resources, and users.  
 
MANET is an autonomous group, or collection, of mobile nodes. Each node 
in this network is considered to be both a host and a router in sending and receiving 
packets. Nodes can be any kind of device which has an available wireless 
connection, including mobile smartphones and mobile tablets. Further, MANET is a 
self-configured, multi-hop network, with a non-fixed infrastructure, spontaneous 
network, dynamic topology, and self-maintenance capabilities; it does not require 
central administration to control other nodes within the network. In the MANET 
network, nodes communicate with others in radio range via wireless links; thus, due 
to the easy setup of this kind of network, the MANET system has proved useful, and 
is used across a variety of sectors including cafes, airports, conferences, emergency 
relief situations, and the military arena. 
However, despite the fact that all networks, whether wired or wireless, are 
vulnerable to attacks, the inherent nature of wireless networks (like MANET) makes 
them more vulnerable than their wired counterparts. Because of their characteristics, 
MANET nodes are freely able to frequently join, and leave a network. Further, 
because the topology changes dynamically in MANET, this increases the range of 
challenges and risks, including the unpredictable availability of resources, and the 
occurrence of multiple kinds of attack, as there are no administrator points which can 
monitor the whole network. In addition, power limitations also constrain MANET as 
energy is expended in both packet transmission and reception. Moreover, due to the 
dynamic topology of nodes, they have a high probability of being compromised by 
intruders. Many attacks can be launched, and exist in MANET including 
eavesdropping and DoS attacks. 
A DoS attack is an attack which aims to deprive, or prevent, legitimate users 
from accessing services, or resources, such as a computer system, web service, or 
website. The attack continues over a specific time, determined by the intruder, even 
if detected. A DDoS attack is a distributed DoS attack in which the attacker floods 
the victim’s network with a huge number of packets. Subsequently, DoS attacks 
affect the efficacy of security services as a network, and its defences, become 
unavailable to authenticated users as a result. Overall, many kinds of DoS attack can 
occur in MANET and their behaviour can be malicious or selfish. 
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A DoS attack is defined as a complicated attack on the basis of three main 
factors. First, there is no detection benchmark, or even baseline rule, which can be 
used to identify this attack in its different forms. As each type of DoS attack has 
various criteria and performance, each requires the use of several methods to be 
revealed. Second, there is a great deal of software available online to launch this kind 
of attack and thus, predominantly, these can be initiated easily by inexpert users. 
Third, there is a limited amount of attack incident details available that can be used 
to help conquer attacks in the future. Thus, although MANET networks are 
vulnerable to DoS attacks, there is no software yet available in the industry, or on the 
market, which can be used to completely solve this problem. 
 
2. To critically evaluate existing countermeasures used to identify DoS attacks on 
MANET and identify their advantages and disadvantages. This will highlight 
any flaws in the existing detection methods.  
 
In Chapter 4, a comprehensive study illustrates the existing methods of detecting 
DoS attacks in MANET. Traditional methods such as firewalls and methods which 
use the trust concept are also discussed. In addition, advantages and disadvantages 
are also defined for each method in order to design a new method which avoids 
such limitations. Moreover, some methods which show the assigning of the IP 
address in MANET are explained.  
 
3. To design and implement a novel method for the early identification of DoS 
attacks in both SM and MM, acknowledging the disadvantages of existing 
methods.  
 
In this thesis, the MrDR method is proposed for use to detect DoS attacks in 
the MANET environment. This method is based on the use of trust values, which are 
based on the calculation of multiple trust values, and can help to enforce cooperation 
between nodes in multi-hops networks such as MANET. The trust concept is used to 
calculate the Total Trust Value (TTSV) for each node in the network, based on a 
binary system with two values of trust; 1= trusted, or 0= untrustworthy. Because of 
the dynamic topology of MANET, each trust value is temporary, and the TTSV of 
each node will be calculated again every time as outlined in Chapter 5. Moreover, 
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this proposed method is based on three stages, each one is responsible for calculating 
one of the factors in order to calculate the TTSV. 
The first stage of this process is the monitoring phase where the entire 
network is monitored and any misbehaviour is detected. In addition, two types of 
trust are calculated at this stage; the Accomplishment Trust Value (ATV), and the 
Reputation Trust Value (RTV). Of these, the ATV determines whether, or not, a 
node sends required packets to intended nodes, or destinations, and whether, or not, 
it received confirmation from the destination that these are received. If this task is 
confirmed then ATV=1, otherwise ATV= 0. 
The RTV is used to determine whether, or not, a node has been responsible 
for any misbehaviour, including dropping packets or launching a DoS attack. Of 
these outcomes, the punishment attached to packet dropping is smaller than either 
packet fabrication or DoS attack because it might not always happen because of 
misbehaviour. Packet dropping can also occur because of power failure, network 
congestion, or the nature of the MANET network having limited energy. Thus, RTV 
is set to 0 automatically and the node becomes malicious if it fabricates packets, 
misroutes them, or launches DoS attacks. If the node drops packets for the first time, 
then RTV=0.5, but if this happens for a second time, then RTV= 0.25. Finally, if a 
node drops packets for a third successive time, then RTV=0, and it is defined as 
malicious. However, if a node behaves normally and does not misbehave, then RTV 
remains 1. 
The second stage of this process is the detection phase, which aims to detect 
misbehaving nodes. To achieve this, an Honesty Trust Value (HTV) is calculated to 
assess the relative trustworthiness of nodes. In a given situation, nodes exchange 
their trust values and if this information matches with that from the majority of 
nodes, then the HTV equals 1. If not, HTV equals 0. In addition, the TTSV is 
calculated at this stage can have just two values; 0, untrustworthy, and 1, trusted. 
Note that trust values in this method are short-lived and non-transitive. 
Rehabilitation is considered in this approach when a node has misbehaved 
three successive times, and thus calculation of the TTSV takes a longer time to 
conserve energy in the network. 
 
4. To evaluate the proposed novel method in an effort to establish its strengths 
and weaknesses, particularly with respect to SM, under various types of DoS 
attack. 
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This proposed method is applied on SM in order to detect four kinds of DoS 
attacks; wormhole, blackhole, grayhole, and jellyfish attacks. Results support the 
effectiveness of this proposed method as network performance improves 
considerably. Three factors are measured to detect each kind of DoS attack; network 
throughput, packet delivery ratio, and packet delay ratio. These factors are measured 
three times in the experiment; before the attack occurs, when the attack occurs, and 
after the attack has been detected or the misbehaving node is isolated. Note that 
isolation of the DoS attacked node will be temporary until the TTSV changes from 0 
to 1 and a node returns to trusted status. 
 
5. To compare the performance of the proposed method with existing methods 
using the trust concept to detect DoS attacks on SM.  
 
In fact, there is no existing method based on using the trust value as a binary. 
Indeed, comparisons between the detection of DoS using MrDR on SM are 
evaluated in light of different attacks, and against the types of detection explained 
in detail in Chapter 4 (TEAP). The MrDR method manages to outperform TEAP, 
as shown in Chapter 7. This comparison confirms the success of the proposed 
method in detecting examples of misbehaviour when compared to TEAP. 
 
6. To use the trust concept to assign IP addresses on MM. 
 
The dynamic topology of MANET means it likely can be merged with other 
networks, and MUMrDR is used to detect DoS attacks in MM. In this situation, two 
main experiments are done to test the performance of the proposed method; merging 
two MANETs, and merging four MANETs. In this situation, a number of aspects 
need to be considered including IP configuration, and the lack of IP address conflict. 
A proposed protocol to assign IP address to the new node is explained in detail in 
Chapter 5. This protocol guarantees that unused IP addresses will be reassigned in 
future to a new node or any other node needing one. IP address conflicts need to be 
managed during MANET merging. Two methods are used for merging: the 
centralised trust concept and decentralised trust concept. In the centralised trust 
concept, which is used when two MANETs merge, a trusted node from each 
MANET would be used as a manager which is responsible for completing the 
merging process. In addition, the node's responsibilities include checking any IP 
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address conflicts and assigning IP addresses when a node needs one. However, in the 
decentralised trust concept which is used in the last experiment when four MANETs 
merge, all nodes participate in completing the merging process whether they are 
trusted or not. The reason for this is that misbehaving nodes in some DoS attacks do 
not behave maliciously all the time and can sometimes be converted into a normal 
mode. Thus, even if the node is untrusted it will participate in the merging process 
unless it gives incorrect information then it will be isolated until the merging process 
is complete or it becomes a trusted node. 
 
7. To test the proposed method in MM where two MANETs merge, and in MM 
where more than two MANETs merge. This is the first attempt to use the trust 
concept to detect DoS attacks during the merger of MM.   
 
Thus, the first experiment on MM is done in the scenario where two 
MANETs merge to look at how the detection of a DoS attack, such as a grayhole 
attack, can be undertaken. In this experiment, a centralised trust concept is used as 
one trusted node from each MANET helped to check IP addresses, detect any IP 
address conflicts, assign IP addresses, and complete the merging process. Results of 
this investigation show that this proposed method is successful in detecting DoS 
attacks in this critical situation, and how the trust nodes from each network complete 
the merging process. Network performance is high in terms of both throughput and 
packet delivery ratio, while the packet delay ratio and network overhead are low, as 
appropriate in MANET. 
Further, MUMrDR is also tested when four MANETs merge with the 
occurrence of different DoS attacks. In this experiment, a decentralised trust concept 
is used as all nodes participate to complete the process. It is notable that even 
malicious nodes can participate in this merging process if they give correct 
information. This is because some DoS attacks such as grayhole attacks do not 
behave maliciously all the time as they can convert to a normal mode and behave 
ordinarily. However, if these grayhole nodes give incorrect information such as false 
vacant IP addresses, these untrustworthy nodes will not be able to assign IP 
addresses to others until the merging process is complete, or until their TTSV 
becomes equal to 1. The results of this experiment corroborate the effectiveness of 
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the proposed method in detecting the four types of DoS attack and network 
performance is positive. 
In sum, this study gives positive results for defence against DoS attacks 
despite all the challenges of the MANET environment. The findings of this study 
make several contributions to the current literature, as described in Chapter 1. 
However, it is also important to mention that MUMrDR on MM does not compared 
to existing work as there is no work that presently discusses this point. This study 
provides evidence of the contribution to the detection of DoS attacks on MM in 
merging situations. 
 
8.2   Strengths and limitations of the study  
 
The proposed method helps to detect DoS attacks in both SM and MM. Due 
to the nature of MANET such as dynamic topology and nodes being able to join or 
leave the network frequently, the proposed method is appropriate in many aspects.  
First, the trust value is in binary mode so it can be identified whether the node 
can be trusted or not, which saves the energy power of nodes. Thus, trusted nodes 
can perform tasks such as sending packets and temporarily isolating the untrusted 
nodes.  
Second, the rehabilitation of nodes helps to encourage nodes to cooperate in 
the communications. As explained before, the MANET is a temporal network so the 
node condition can change from trusted to untrusted and vice versa.  
Third, again the nodes in MANET have limited energy. Thence, any node 
which is identified as untrusted three successive times will be isolated longer from 
communications and sent to the blacklist until it becomes a trusted node.  
Fourth, the simulation results from testing the proposed method in both SM 
and MM give positive results in network performance which prove the efficacy of 
these methods. Furthermore, Our system is tested in (Chalamasetty et al., 2016). 
They present the Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA) system, 
which monitors and controls power system operations. It is intended for utilities’ ad-
hoc networks in residential power distribution networks to enable the collection of 
data from smart meters. Our method (MrDR) is used to protect the network from 
cyber-attacks and they confirm regards the experiments results that the proposed 
method is efficient and effective in detecting DoS attacks.  
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Although the proposed method succeeds in detecting DoS attacks in both SM 
and MM, there are some limitations in certain scenarios. When the novel method is 
designed and implemented it takes into account the avoidance of any obstacles or 
limitations in existing methods. The proposed method is based on using trust, and 
exchanges trust values between nodes. In the rare but possible scenario that all nodes 
in the network are malicious, the proposed method would not work effectively as the 
majority of nodes in this situation will give incorrect information about trust values 
and adversely affect the method. However, some nodes can behave normally but 
convert to a malicious mode occasionally such as in grayhole attacks. Thus, it is 
dependent on the DoS attack type whether the method can succeed and give correct 
information even when the majority of nodes are untrusted.  
 
8.3   Future work 
 
This thesis attempts to overcome some of the limitations of previous work, 
and build a new method to detect DoS attacks in the MANET environment. As a 
result, this research has thrown up many questions that are in need of further 
investigation; both further investigation, and experimentation, can now be done on 
both SM and MM. In the case of SM, the number of nodes can be increased to test 
the performance of the method proposed here in this situation, while other kinds of 
DoS attacks can also be used to compare the results of the proposed method in each 
case. Additionally, in the MM situation, there is a need to explore the performance of 
the proposed method in cases where many MANETs merge (i.e., ten, 20, or even 
more). 
Moreover, in the case of MM, the partition scenario needs further 
consideration. Given high mobility, there is a high probability that a network will 
split into many smaller ones, and partition occurs when some nodes move out of 
network range. An additional study could assess the performance of the method 
proposed here in this critical situation. In addition, in further research it might be 
beneficial to use the proposed method for the detection of other kinds of attacks, 
including fabrication, and then to compare the results with a DoS attack. Such a 
comparison will enable performance evaluation of the proposed method when faced 
with different attacks, including Sybil attacks and session hijacking. 
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8.4   Chapter summary 
 
This chapter concludes the thesis and summarises the scope of research based 
on the research objectives. The strengths and limitations of the study are also 
presented. Findings presented suggest a number of research directions for the future 
and demonstrate that the security aspects of each network are important for 
preserving their resources and services. The nature of the MANET network creates 
many challenges and means that it is vulnerable to many attacks. However, the 
method proposed here mitigates DoS attacks in both SM and MM. This method uses 
a combination of trust values to calculate a TTSV for each node which then helps to 
detect DoS attacks. Establishing trust between nodes helps to improve network 
security levels as each node can easily explore the behaviours of its immediate 
neighbours.              
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Calculations of trust values of nodes 
procedure trustvalue()     
{ 
networkscan() 
{ 
nodes = for loop 1:71; 
} 
# checking for the trust values 
 set ATV=0, ATV1=0, ATV2=0 
 set RTV=0, RTV1=0, RTV2=0, RTV3=0; 
 set HTV=0, HTV1=0, HTV2=0, HTV3=0 
 set TTSV=0, TTSV1=0, TTSV2=0 
now_recordfunctionns2() 
{ 
scan_manet(nodes) 
return node_address 
} 
Rehabilitationstage(node_address) 
{ 
Network node_address= scan_manet(nodes);  
return node_address; 
} 
scan_manet(nodes) 
{ 
Network network= new network(nodes); 
network.when(geResponse(every360)) thenReturn(nodeAddres); 
network.when(geResponse (every360)) thenReturn(trustStatus); 
network.when(geResponse(every360)) thenReturn(nonTrustStatus); 
return network;   
} 
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Detectionstage() 
{ 
CALL now_recordfunctionns2() 
CALL Rehabilitationstage(node_address) 
CALL stage1repeat1() 
} 
stage1repeat1(360seconds) 
{ 
calculate ATV() 
calculate RTV() 
calculate HTV() 
calculate TTSV() 
} 
stage1repeat2(360seconds) 
{ 
calculate ATV() 
calculate RTV() 
calculate HTV() 
calculate TTSV() 
}  
interface check_for_manet() 
{ 
stage1repeat1(360seconds) 
stage1repeat2(360seconds) 
} 
interface threshold() 
{ 
beingtrustedmethod() 
testedtrustedinthework() 
} 
Rehabilitation() 
{ 
threshold(n) 
networkscan() 
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if(message==null & notequal(message)) then 
{ 
print "node is trusted” 
} 
if (Recursion call Rehabilitation()) then 
{ 
repeated= for(1:threshold(n)); //n number of times take every 
specific minutes 
print “misbehaviour  rate  of  the  node" 
} 
else if(CTV) then 
{ 
Print "until the  value  of  RTS  has changed" 
} 
else  
{ 
networkscan(every500seco) 
} 
} 
calculate ATV(ATV1 , ATV2) 
{ 
if(ATV1>0) then 
{ 
Print  " Node transmits the required packet to the intended 
destination" 
print  "ATV1 =0.5" 
} 
else if(ATV1<0)) then 
{ 
threshold(n) 
networkscan() 
Print "ATV1=0 and the node is a malicious" 
Print "ATV1 =0" 
} 
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if (ATV2 =0.5) then 
{ 
print "Then  Node sends the confirmation message to the sender" 
} 
else if(ATV2=0) then 
{ 
 print  "Node is a selfish"  
} 
Recursion Call ATV(ATV1+ATV2) 
trustvalueATV = Trust_scale() 
trustvalueATV = Trust_facet() 
} 
Calculate RTV(RTV1, RTV2,RTV3) 
{ 
node_drop=packet   
if (node_drop>=0) then 
{ 
print " node drops the first time" 
print " RTV=0.5" 
} 
else if (node_drop=1) then 
{ 
Print "Node drops the packet for the second time" 
Print "RTV=0.25" 
} 
else 
{ 
Print  "node is a malicious" 
Print  "RTV=0" 
} 
Recursion  Call RTV(RTV1, RTV2, RTV3) 
} 
calculate HTV(HTV1, HTV2,HTV3) 
{ 
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Initialize Boolean HTV=0  
Network information_between_nodes = now_recordfunctionns2() 
if(information_between_nodes) then 
{ 
print  "no conflict in the information between nodes" 
print  "HTV=1"; 
} 
else  
{ 
print  "HTV=0" 
print  "information between nodes are conflict" 
} 
recursion Call HTV(HTV1, HTV2, HTV3) 
} 
// [TTSV calculation starts] 
calculate TTSV(TTSV1,TTSV2,TTSV3) 
 { 
calculate ATV(ATV1 , ATV2) 
calculate RTV(RTV1, RTV2,RTV3) 
calculate HTV(HTV1, HTV2,HTV3) 
threshold(n) 
networkscan() 
if(ATV==1 && RTV==1 && HTV==1) then 
{ 
print  " TTSV=1" 
 
print  " The node is trusted" 
} 
else 
{ 
print  "TTSV=0" 
print  "The node is untrusted" 
} 
recursion Call TTSV(TTSV1, TTSV2, TTSV3) 
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} 
} 
End procedure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
